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After the French and Dutch public rejected the European Constitution in 
2005, enthusiasm for referendums declined markedly among political 
leaders in Europe. Today, however, they are back on the agenda, with 
EU-related referendums being held in Greece in July 2015 on the country’s 
bailout deal, in Denmark in December 2015 on its opt-out from the EU area 
of freedom, security and justice, in the Netherlands in April 2016 on the EU’s 
Association Agreement with Ukraine, and in the UK in June 2016 on Brexit.
 
In this book, Saskia Hollander demonstrates that the generally assumed 
dichotomy between referendums and representative democracy does not 
do justice to the diversity of types of referendum and how they are used in 
EU countries. Although in all referendums citizens vote directly on issues 
rather than letting their political representatives do this for them, some 
referendums are more direct than others. Rather than reflecting the direct 
power of the People, most referendums in EU countries are held by, and 
serve the interest of, the political elites, most notably the executive – i.e. the 
Machiavellian Prince.
This book places political agency as central to referendum research. It 
argues that referendums are called because political actors have an interest 
in doing so, and that their interests rarely match the justifications given in 
the public debate. Instead of being driven by the need to compensate for 
the deficiency of political parties, political actors use referendums primarily 
to protect the position of their party. In unravelling the strategic role played 
by national referendums in decision-making, this book makes an 
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1.1 THE USE OF REFERENDUMS IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
In	the	past	decades,	an	extensive	academic	literature	has	been	established	on	the	use	
of	 referendums	 in	 European	 democracies.	 This	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 referendums	 is	
driven	by	 the	numerous	popular	 votes	held	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	20th 
and	 beginning	 of	 the	 21st	 centuries.	 These	 votes	 primarily	 concerned	 constitutional	
consolidation	and	reform,	the	status	of	overseas	territories,	sovereignty	transfers	and	









[that]	 influences	 political	 discourse	 and	 principles	 of	 political	 legitimacy	 beyond	 the	
policy	at	stake	in	any	single	referendum’	(Dalton,	Cain	and	Scarrow	2003,	254).	Or,	as	
Dick	Morris	(1999,	23)	puts	it,	‘The	fundamental	paradigm	that	dominates	our	politics	
is	 the	 shift	 from	 representational	 (Madisonian)	 to	 direct	 (Jeffersonian)	 democracy’.	
While	Morris’	conclusion	is	primarily	based	on	American	politics,	scholars	studying	the	
European	 context	 also	underscore	 the	notion	of	 an	 ‘increase	 in	 the	 real	 importance	
of	the	phenomenon	of	“direct	democracy”’	(Marxer,	Pállinger,	Kaufmann	and	Schiller	
2007,	7).	
	 On	 an	 aggregated	 level	 the	 number	 of	 referendums	 in	 European	 democracies	
has	 indeed	 increased	 significantly	 in	 the	 last	 half	 century,	which	 is	 especially	 due	 to	
the	large	number	of	votes	on	EU	affairs.	These	have	dealt	not	least	with	the	question	
of	whether	a	country	should	be	part	of	 	 the	EU	(or	 its	predecessor),	which	has	been	











held	 in	 July	 2015,	 the	 Danish	 referendum	 on	 its	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	 of	 freedom,	






	 Although	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 associated	 with	 a	
declining	relevance	of	representative	decision-making,	or	as	Matsusaka	(2005a)	coins	
it	 ‘the	eclipse	of	 legislatures’,	 the	academic	 literature	 so	 far	has	not	provided	 sound	




in	 the	 frequency	 with	 which	 referendums	 are	 used.	 In	 practice	 though,	 only	 a	 few	
European	 countries	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 frequent	 users	 of	 referendums,	 and	most	
countries	have	only	 experienced	one	or	 just	 a	 few	 referendums	over	 the	past	 sixty-












shift	as	a	consequence	of	an	alleged	crisis of representative democracy.2 The	argument	

















discontent	 with	 representative	 democracy	 (Sartori	 1987;	 Cronin	 1999;	 Mendelsohn	
and	Parkin	2001;	Scarrow	2001;	LeDuc	2003).	For	example,	Dalton,	Scarrow	and	Cain	
(2003,	1)	 speak	of	 a	 ‘spreading	dissatisfaction	with	 the	 institutions	and	processes	of	
representative	democracy’,	which	they	see	as	trend	that	is	‘concomitant	with	increasing	
demands	 for	political	 reforms	 to	expand	citizen	and	 interest	group	access	 to	politics	
in	 new	ways,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 restructure	 the	 process	 of	 democratic	 decision-making’.	
Lawrence	LeDuc	also	stresses	that	the	renewed	interest	in	referendums	as	crisis-solving	
instruments	 around	 the	 turn	of	 the	 century	 reflects	 the	 ‘mood	of	 the	times’	 (LeDuc	










democracy.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 assumption	 is	 not	 commonly	 challenged.	 Although	
scholarly	attention	has	been	given	to	the	role	authorities	play	in	framing	the	referendum	
question	and	debate	(cf.	Schuck	and	de	Vreese	2009),	little	comparative research has 
been	done	on	whether	the	normative	arguments	by	which	authorities	legitimize	their	











held	with	 the	same	frequency	 in	different	European	countries,	 I	also	assess	whether	
political	representatives	in	some	countries	are	more	prone	to	adopting	such	strategies	
than	their	counterparts	in	other	countries,	due	to	the	character	of	the	democratic	polity	























	 My	 third	 aim	 is	 to	 empirically	 assess	 what	 motivates	 political	 elites	 to	 hold	
referendums.	 I	 thereby	 follow	 a	 strand	 of	 referendum	 literature	 that	 outlines	 the	
strategic	 motives	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 initiating	 popular	 votes,	 rather	 than	 assuming	




mainly	 in	 terms	of	 government-opposition	dynamics.	 This	 disqualifies	 the	 claim	 that	
referendums	are	transforming	representative	decision-making,	as	often	assumed	in	the	
literature.
	 Finally,	 I	 aim	 to	 explain	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 referendum	 patterns,	 and	














1.2 A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SHIFT: FREQUENCY AND FORM?




number	 of	 countries	 where	 referendums	 are	 frequently	 held,	 like	 Switzerland,	 Italy	
and	 Ireland,	 while	 in	 most	 countries	 referendums	 remain	 sparsely	 used	 (cf.	 Butler	
and	Ranney	1978;	1994;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	LeDuc	2003;	Qvortrup	2005;	2014).	













issues	 is	exceptional,	and	 limited	 to	only	a	 few	European	countries	 such	as	 Italy	and	
some	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	(hereafter	the	CEECs).	
	 Scholarly	 claims	 of	 a	 national	 shift	 towards	 direct	 democracy	 are	 often	 based	
on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 at	 local	 or	 regional	 level.	 Direct	 democratic	 practice	 at	
national	level	is	significantly	less	common	than	at	regional	or	local	level.	For	example,	
Germany,	which	has	not	held	 a	 nationwide	 referendum	 in	 the	post-WWII	 era,	 has	 a	
rather	robust	 track	record	of	holding	referendums	 in	 the	Länder.	 In	Belgium	and	the	
Netherlands,	 which	 both	 experienced	 only	 one	 nationwide	 referendum	 between	
1950	and	2014,	municipality	referendums	have	also	been	much	more	common.	Thus,	






and	 local	 referendums.	 For	 example,	 Susan	 Scarrow’s	 conclusion	 that	 ‘countries	 are	
expanding	 opportunities	 for	 citizens	 to	 directly	 decide	 issues,	 and	 they	 are	 giving	







	 The	 democratic	 shift	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 misconception	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
frequency	and	weight	of	popular	votes,	but	also	in	terms	of	form.	Not	all	participatory	
institutions	 are	 alike,	 and	 their	 use	does	not	 imply	one	uniform	 shift	 towards	direct	
citizens’	 participation.	 Institutions	 that	 give	 citizens	 direct	 decision-making	 power,	
like	 referendums,	 are	 mentioned	 in	 one	 breath	 with	 participatory	 institutions	 that	
give	citizens	more	voice	but	no	direct	decision-making	power,	 like	agenda	 initiatives,	
petitions	 and	 deliberative	 forums	 (see	 for	 example	 Marxer	 and	 Pállinger	 2007).	 In	
addition,	Dalton,	Scarrow	and	Cain	(2003,	1)	identify	a	direct	democratic	trend	marked	






decide	 on	 issues	 directly,	 thereby	 circumventing	 parliamentary	 decision-making,	
referendums	 are	 usually	 gathered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 direct	 democracy	 and	
contrasted	 with	 representative	 democracy.	 I	 follow	 Setälä	 (1999)	 and	 argue	 that	
this	 dichotomous	 classification	 is	 too	 simplistic	 to	 analyse	 referendum	 practice	 in	
contemporary	democratic	 countries,	 as	 referendums	and	 their	 associated	provisions	
come	in	various	forms.	Although	all	referendums	provide	citizens	with	a	direct	role	in	
decision-making,	they	do	not	similarly	 imply	a	direct	democracy	shift.	This	argument	




triggered	 by	 citizens).	 According	 to	Hamon,	 only	 the	 latter	 category	 implies	 genuine	





	 Referendum	 scholars	 take	 these	 distinctions	 into	 account	 when	 classifying	
referendums	 and	 when	 providing	 an	 overview	 of	 available	 referendum	 legislation 
(see	for	example	Suksi	1993;	Gallagher	and	Uleri	1996;	Setälä	1999;	Setälä	and	Schiller	
3.	 	In	contrast	to	Hamon	(1995),	I	consider	both	referendums	that	are	triggered	by	the	president	and	









2009),	 but	 do	not	 assess	what	 types	of	 referendum	are	used	with	which	 frequency.	
For	example,	LeDuc	(2003,	47-48)	adopts	the	conceptual	differentiation	put	forward	by	
Hamon	(1995),	but	makes	no	distinction	in	initiation	procedures	in	his	overview	of	held	





or	 even	 contradictory,	 to	 mark	 European	 referendum	 practice	 as	 a	 broader	 direct	
participatory	shift.	
	 Referendums	 not	 only	 differ	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 direct 
participatory	 devices,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 extent	 to	which	 their	 outcomes	 simply	 reflect	
the	majority	will	 (cf.	Marxer	2012).	While	 referendums	triggered	by	 the	president	or	
government	 reflect	 decision-making	 by	majority	 rule,	 those	 triggered	 by	 opposition	
parties	or	citizens	allow	minority	preferences	to	be	integrated	in	decision-making.	It	is	
thus	important	to	develop	a	classification	of	referendums	based	on	whether	they	give	
primacy	 to	 the	people	or	 the	political	elites	 (and	which	political	elites),	and	whether	
the	 referendum	 is	merely	majority-	 or	minority-protective.	 These	 questions	 depend	






	 Rather	than	focusing	on	referendums	solely	as	 institutions,	 I	 follow	Setälä	(1999)	
and	Qvortrup	(2005)	and	place	much	more	emphasis	on	the	politics of referendum use, 
which	 also	 grasps	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 referendums,	 the	 political	 context	 in	which	
they	are	held	and	the	motives	and	(un)certainties	of	the	actors	that	trigger	them.	After	
all,	 when	 aiming	 to	 assess	 the	 shift	 towards	 direct	 democracy,	 it	 matters	 whether	
referendums	are	initiated	by	citizens	themselves,	possibly	against	the	interest	of	political	
representatives,	or	by	political	representatives,	possibly	with	the	aim	of	consolidating	
their	 interests.	Moreover,	 it	 also	matters	whether	 referendums	are	 triggered	by	 the	
opposition	or	by	the	ruling	majority.	Arguably,	the	latter	category	does	not	challenge	














1.3 REFERENDUMS AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Much	 of	 the	 referendum	 literature	 assumes	 a	 generic	 cause	 to	 be	 at	 work	 in	
contemporary	representative	democracies	that	leads	to	increased	use	of	referendums.	
This	 literature	 includes	 comparative	 analyses	 of	 referendums	 held	 (cf.	 Butler	 and	
Ranney	 1978;	 1994;	 Gallagher	 and	 Uleri	 1996;	 LeDuc	 2003;	 Qvortrup	 2005;	 2014);	
descriptive	studies	on	selected	countries	where	referendums	are	flourishing	(cf.	Frey	
1994;	 Cronin	 1999;	 Amar	 2004);	 normative	 pleas	 for	 direct	 democracy	 (cf.	 Barber	
1984;	2003;	Budge	1996;	Frey	2003);	and	examinations	of	the	effects	of	referendums	
on	national	and	EU	decision-making	 (Morel	1993;	Hug	and	Tsebelis	2002;	Matsusaka	
2005b;	 Hobolt	 2006;	 Hug	 2007).	 What	 these	 studies	 have	 in	 common	 is	 that	 they	
either	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 trace	 an	 increase	 in	 number	 of	 referendums	 back	 to	






and	 increasingly	 dissatisfied	 with	 representative	 decision-making	 (cf.	 Norris	 1999;	
Dalton	2004),	 referendums	are	pledged	because	politicians	assume	that	direct	votes	
can	channel	such	sentiments.	
	 I	 argue	 that	 such	a	 line	of	 reasoning	 stems	 from	a	normative	preference	on	 the	
part	of	many	referendum	scholars,	rather	than	from	empirical	analysis	per	se.	Typical	
studies	 in	 this	 respect	 are	 Benjamin	 Barber’s	 Strong Democracy (1984),	 Ian	 Budge’s	








	 First,	 referendums	 are	 seen	 as	 solution	 to	 both	 an	 input-	 and	 output-legitimacy	
crisis	of	national	decision-making.4	The	input-legitimacy	crisis	is,	as	the	argument	goes,	








volatile	 electorate.	 This	 is	 preventing	 parliamentary	 elections	 from	 providing	
satisfactory	 representative	 outcomes	 which,	 arguably,	 creates	 an	 ever-growing	 gap	




are	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 offer	 effective	 policy	 outcomes	 that	meet	 the	 demands	 of	 an	




increasing	the	scope	of	popular	participation	and	 introducing	 institutional	devices	 to	
bring politics back to the people	(cf.	Barber	1984;	Budge	1996;	Warren	2001).	
	 In	particular,	referendums	are	seen	as	solution	to	a	legitimacy	crisis	stemming	from	








like	 privatization	 and	 European	 financial	 and	monetary	 integration	 (cf.	 Barber	 1984;	
WRR	2007;	Schmidt	2013;	Mendez,	Mendez	and	Triga	2014).
	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 scholars	 hold	 the	 view	 that	 referendums	 can serve as 
crisis-management	 instruments	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 these	 instruments	
are	 being	 used	 to	 this	 end.	 And	 yet,	 the	 assumption	 that,	 in	 calling	 referendums,	
political	representatives	are	driven	by	a	belief	that	popular	votes	will	compensate	for	
democratic	gaps,	is	not	systematically	analysed.	Rather,	indicators	of	such	a	democratic	
crisis	 (i.e.	declining	 levels	of	political	participation	or	 increased	public	dissatisfaction	
with	 the	 functioning	of	democracy)	are	often	simply	 taken	as	 indicators	of	demands	
for	 referendums,	without	 empirically	 assessing	whether	 this	 shift	 has	 actually	 taken	
place	and	if	so,	in	what	form;	and	without	analysing	whether,	in	implementing	or	calling	
referendums,	 political	 representatives	 have	 been	 susceptible	 to	 such	 demands	 and/
or	pressures.	 Regardless	of	 the	question	as	 to	whether	 representative	democracy	 is	
indeed	in	crisis,	I	argue	that	such	claims	(of	a	crisis)	should	be	separated	from	empirical	












explains	 the	 increased	aggregated	use	of	 referendums,	which	 is	perceived	as	part	of	
a	direct	democratic	Zeitgeist,	as	an	outcome	of	increased	political	dissatisfaction	and	
decreasing	 levels	 of	 trust	 in	 representative	 institutions,	 rather	 than	 of	 normative	 or	
strategic	considerations	on	the	part	of	political	agents.	When	scholars	do	take	account	
of	 the	motivations	of	political	 agents	 to	pledge	 referendums,	 little	effort	 is	made	 to	










by	Markku	 Suksi	 (1993),	 Lawrence	 LeDuc	 (2003)	 and	Matt	Qvortrup	 (2005)	 are	 clear	
exceptions,	 as	 they	 do	 analyse	 referendums	 in	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 thereby	
taking	 into	 account	 the	motivations	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 pledging	 such	 referendums.	
These	studies,	however,	also	 focus	only	on	a	 limited	number	of	countries	and	 fail	 to	
provide	 an	 analytical	 framework	 to	 explain	 cross-country	 differences	 in	 referendum	








is	 indeed	to	 identify	 these	mechanisms	by	cross-country	variations,	explanations	are	
usually	sought	in	an	institutional	context	only.	For	example,	Adrian	Vatter	(2000;	2009)	
examines	 to	what	extent	 choices	 in	 referendum	 legislation	and	use	are	 grounded	 in	
the	existing	democracy	type	and	tradition.	Dag	Anckar	(2014)	extends	this	analysis	by	
also	explaining	a	country’s	referendum	track	record	in	terms	of	 institutional	spillover	






referendums	on	constitutional	 reform.	 In	addition,	 there	are	no	comparative	studies	






and	 number	 of	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	
values),	and	political	agency	(i.e.	strategic	interests).	Rather	than	analysing	referendum	
use	 from	 one	 theoretical	 perspective,	 I	 apply	 the	 underpinnings	 of	 four	 schools	 of	
institutional	 thought:	 classical institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological 




–	 which	 analyses	 institutional	 development	 by	 a	 ‘logic	 of	 appropriateness’	 –	 with	
rational	choice	institutionalism	–	which	analyses	institutional	development	by	a	‘logic	
of	rationality’	–	in	his	analysis	of	EU	referendum	use.	In	addition	to	Closa,	I	also	draw	





sociological	 institutionalist	 argument	 that	 referendums	 are	 a	 direct	 response	 to	
concerns	about	the	sustainability	of	representative	democracy.	Underlying	such	claims	




to	 pursue	 their	 own	 interests.	 Moreover,	 how	 much	 freedom	 of	 manoeuvre	 do	
political	actors	have	in	pledging	referendums?	How	fruitful	are	insights	from	classical	




	 These	 questions	 require	 a	 research	 design	 that	 goes	 beyond	 an	 analysis	 of	
aggregated	data	on	 institutions	 and	enables	 examination	of	 actors’	motivations	 and	
beliefs.	Moreover,	an	assessment	of	the	importance	of	history	requires	the	possibility	



















and	with	what	 frequency	 these	different	 types	are	provided	 for	and	used.	 Second,	 I	
provide	an	analytical	framework	to	analyse	the	factors	that	contribute	to	referendum	
institutionalization	and	use	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	combining	structural	

















to	 representative	 democracy.	 To	 understand	 contemporary	 referendum	 practice	
in	 Europe,	 and	 more	 in	 particular	 the	 various	 perspectives	 on	 the	 instrument,	 it	 is	














EU	member	 countries	 and	 their	 use,	 I	 choose	five	 countries	 for	 in-depth	 case	 study	
















 Chapters	 5,	 6	 and	 7	 contain	 the	 case	 studies.	 Chapter	 5	 deals	 with	 France	 and	
Denmark,	 chapter	 6	with	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Sweden,	 and	 chapter	 7	with	 the	
Netherlands.	 For	 each	 country,	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 is	 provided	 of	 the	 available	
referendum	provisions	and	their	use.	The	case	study	analyses	also	provide	the	basis	for	
examining	the	six	assumptions	concerning	the	potential	drivers	of	referendum	practice.	
I	 assess	 to	what	 extent	 a	 country’s	 referendum	 track	 record	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	


















THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO REFERENDUM USE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Most	 referendum	 research	 starts	 from	 the	observation	 that	 the	 growing	number	of	
referendums	in	Europe	in	the	past	half	century	is	a	peculiar	phenomenon	that	needs	





2004).	 Alternatively,	 such	 analyses	 are	 strongly	 embedded	 in	 rational choice theory, 




to	 use	 referendums	 than	 in	 other	 countries.	 To	 provide	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	
cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	 practice,	 this	 chapter	 presents	 an	 analytical	
framework	that	contrasts	both	strands	of	literature	and	combines	them	with	insights	
from	 classical institutionalism, which	 places	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 a	 country’s	 existing	
institutional	 context,	 and	historical institutionalism, which	examines	 the	 role	of	path	
dependency	in	institutional	choices.	
	 Referendums	are	 commonly	perceived	 as	participatory	 and	majoritarian	devices	
(cf.	Gamble	1997;	Gerber	1999;	Chambers	2001).	Often	no	distinction	is	made	between	
different	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 varying	 functions	 that	 they	 have	 in	 political	
decision-making.	While	some	referendums	give	primacy	to	popular	sovereignty,	others	
remain	 largely	 controlled	 by	 political	 representatives.	Moreover,	while	 some	merely	
reflect	 majority	 rule,	 others	 provide	 scope	 to	 integrate	 minority	 views	 in	 decision-
making	at	the	expense	of	the	ruling	majority	 (cf.	Setälä	1999).	Hence,	understanding	
the	institutionalization	and	use	of	referendums	and	how	that	varies	among	countries,	
requires	 differentiation	between	 various	 types	 of	 referendum,	 their	 design	 and	use.	
To	 allow	 for	 such	 a	 differentiation,	 this	 chapter	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 theoretical	
approaches	to	referendum	use.	First,	in	section	2.2,	I	discuss	the	referendum	instrument	
in	relation	to	democratic	theory.	In	section	2.3,	I	provide	a	classification	of	the	various	
types	 of	 referendum	 and	 how	 they	 are	 linked	 to	 various	 ideal	 types	 of	 democracy.	
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2.2 REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Referendums	enable	citizens	to	vote	on	issues	directly	rather	than	letting	representatives	
do	 this	 for	 them.	 For	 that	 reason,	 they	 are	 usually	 gathered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	
direct	democracy	and	contrasted,	or	even	opposed,	to	representative	democracy.	For	
example,	by	referring	to	British	democracy,	Lijphart	(1984,	9)	argues	that	‘Parliamentary	
sovereignty	 also	 means	 that,	 because	 all	 power	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 House	 of	
Commons	 acting	 as	 the	 people’s	 representative,	 there	 is	 no	 room	 for	 any	 element	





respects,	 too	 simplistic’,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 referendums	 provide	 citizens	with	





instruments,	 as	 shown	by	 their	 authoritarian	 use	 by	Napoleon	 I	 and	Napoleon	 III	 in	
France	 (cf.	Morel	 1996)	 and	under	 fascist	 rule	 in	Germany,	 Italy,	 Spain	 and	Portugal	
(cf.	 Rodrigues	 2013).	 Moreover,	 even	 when	 they	 are	 used	 democratically,	 political	
elites	often	exercise	considerable	control	over	the	referendum	process,	making	them	








on	the	basis	of	two	well-known	dimensions.	The	first	dimension	deals	with	the role of 















framework	 and	 reflect	 a	 continuum	 rather	 than	 a	 dichotomy.	 In	 practice,	 polities	
often	 include	 a	mix	 of	 decision-making	 procedures,	 some	 primarily	 aggregative	 and	
some	primarily	integrative.	When	the	two	dimensions	are	combined,	four	democratic	
ideal	 types	 can	be	distinguished	 (cf.	Hendriks	 2006,	 41-43):	majoritarian democracy, 
consensus democracy, direct democracy and deliberative democracy.	An	overview	of	the	
four ideal types is provided in table 2.1.	





power	 sharing.	 It	 thus	 combines	 the	 notion	 of	 representative	 sovereignty	 with	 the	
notion	of	minority	protection.5	Direct	democracy	and	deliberative	democracy	are	ideal	
types	 in	which	 citizens	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 directly	 rather	 than	 indirectly	
by	 electing	 representatives.	 Hence,	 in	 both	 models,	 popular	 sovereignty	 prevails.	
While	in	direct	democracy	decisions	are	made	by	aggregating	individual	preferences,	
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democracies	 and	 of	 why,	 and	 under	 what	 conditions,	 they	 are	 institutionalized	 and	
used.	Before	elaborating	on	this	argument	 in	section	2.3,	 I	first	provide	an	overview	
of	 the	development	of	political	 thought	on	the	preferred	role	of	citizens	 in	decision-
making	and	the	preferred	decision-making	modes.	
2.2.2 Representation versus Participation
Over	time,	different	views	developed	about	the	appropriate	role	of	citizens	in	political	
decision-making.	In	some	views,	this	role	is	restricted	to	the	election	of	representatives,	
while	 in	others,	 citizens	are	granted	a	direct	participatory	 role.	 This	 contrast	 can	be	
traced	back	 to	an	ultimate	difference	 in	 conception	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
state	 (i.e.	 ‘the	 public’)	 and	 the	 individual	 (i.e.	 ‘the	 private’).	 According	 to	 a	 liberal	
democratic	notion	extensively	put	forward	by	British	early	19th	century	philosophers	





separation	between	 the	public	and	 the	private	was	challenged	by	 thinkers	 like	 Jean-
Jacques	Rousseau,	who	stressed	that	the	two	cannot	be	separated	as	human	beings	are	
essentially	political	beings.	According	to	such	a	Rousseauian	notion,	the	polity	should	
enable	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 directly	 and	 hence	 referendums	
are	 applauded	 as	 instruments	 to	 achieve	 this	 goal.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 first	 provide	 an	
overview	of	political	 thinkers	proclaiming	direct	 citizens’	 participation,	 starting	 from	
political	thinkers	in	Ancient	Greece	to	the	development	of	the	participationist	school	in	
the	1960s,	after	which	I	look	how	the	notion	of	political	representation	evolved,	from	
Machiavelli’s	Prince	 to	 the	 restrictive	participatory	notion	developed	by	Schumpeter	
and	Weber	in	the	post-WWII	era.
	 Political	 thinkers	 proclaiming	 citizens’	 direct	 participation	 in	 political	 decision-
making	 generally	 refer	 to	 democratic	 life	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 (cf.	 Lucardie	 2012).	
Indeed,	 in	many	ancient	Greek	city-states,	citizens	participated	directly	 in	public	and	
administrative	affairs	(cf.	Finley	1973).	Aristotle	(384-322	BC),	who	provided	one	of	the	
most	thorough	accounts	of	democracy	in	Athens	in	his	books	Politics and The Athenian 
Constitution,	describes	a	system	based	on	 ‘checks	and	balances’,	 in	which	all	citizens	
(demos) rule (kratos)	 over	 all	 by	 participating	 in	 the	Assembly.	 For	 the	 advocates	 of	
this	system,	the	modern	liberal	separation	between	the	public	and	the	private	would	
have	been	unthinkable.	As	famously	stated	one	century	earlier	by	Pericles,	a	prominent	
Athenian	politician	of	 that	time,	 ‘we	do	not	say	 that	a	man	who	takes	no	 interest	 in	
politics	 is	 a	man	who	minds	his	 own	business;	we	 say	 that	 he	has	no	business	 here	









other	ancient	city-states.	 It	was	not	until	 the	high	and	 late	medieval	period	 that	 the	
notion	of	direct	citizens’	participation	was	revived	 in	Europe,	albeit	on	a	small	 scale.	
Examples	are	 the	 founding	of	 the	Alþingi	 in	930	 in	 Iceland,	one	of	 the	oldest	extant	
parliaments	in	the	world,	the	establishment	of	the	water	councils	in	the	Netherlands	in	












The Social Contract (1762),	Rousseau	reaffirmed	the	ancient	notion	of	the	homo politicus, 
and	argued	that	 the	 ideal	society	 is	a	society	 in	which	political	affairs	are	 integrated	









the	 thinking	 of	 Thomas	 Jefferson	 (1743-1826).	 Jefferson	 refuted	 the	 tendency	 of	 his	
contemporary	James	Madison	(1751-1836)	to	reduce	democracy	to	a	system	in	which	
‘the	people	will	have	the	virtue	and	intelligence	to	select	men	of	virtue	and	wisdom’	
(in	Madison,	The Writings of James Madison, G.P.	Putnam’s	Sons	edition	by	Hunt	1783-
1787/1901,	223).	Although	Jefferson	did	not	go	as	far	as	Rousseau	in	his	proclamation	
of	 direct	 democracy,	 he	 shared	 Rousseau’s	 confidence	 in	 the	 common	 sense	 of	 the	
ordinary	man,	and	stressed	that	the	‘will	of	the	people’	is	the	only	legitimization	of	any	
government	(cf.	Cronin	1999,	40).
	 In	 Europe,	 Rousseau	was	 an	 important	 source	 of	 inspiration	 for	 Friedrich	 Hegel 






also	 contested	 the	 liberal	 separation	 between	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private,	 but	 with	
an	 essentially	 different	 rationale.	 In	 line	 with	 his	 contemporaries,	 Rousseau	 upheld	





of	 wealth	 and	 power	 in	 society.	 Thus,	 in	 their	 ‘Communist	Manifesto’	 (1848),	Marx	
and	Engels	argued	that,	rather	than	entrusting	their	political	rights	to	representatives,	







	 In	 the	 decades	 after	 Marx	 and	 Engels,	 the	 idea	 of	 representative	 democracy	









Robert	Putnam,	 Jurgen	Habermas	and	Benjamin	Barber	 stressed	 that	 representative	
decision-making	tends	to	exclude	and	alienate	vast	amounts	of	citizens.	Following	the	
Rousseauian	 tradition,	 they	 stressed	 that	 such	 a	 political	 alienation	 jeopardizes	 the	
pursuance	of	the	public	good,	as	only	through	political	expression	and	self-determination	
could	democracy	be	given	meaning	and	could	citizens	live	a	fulfilling	life	(c.f.	Pateman	




	 Modern	 participationists	 are	 thus	 not	 principally	 opposed	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
political	representation.	Rather,	they	aim	to	strengthen	representative	democracy	by	
incorporating	mass	participatory	tools	in	a	way	that	does	not	jeopardize	the	effectiveness	
















	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 direct	 participation,	 the	 concept	 of	 political	





this	 decline	was	 inevitable	 as	people	were	 intrinsically	 self-seeking	 and	 incapable	of	
pursuing	the	common	good,	unless	they	were	forced	to	do	so	(in	Machiavelli,	Discourses 




too,	would	 ultimately	 pursue	 their	 own	 interests	 above	 the	 common	 good.	 Instead,	
Machiavelli	 advocated	 a	 ‘mixed	 government’,	 in	which	 people’s	 representatives,	 the	
Princes,	guaranteed	order	and	collective	well-being,	while	citizens’	liberty	was	protected	
by	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (Machiavelli 1531/2007).	 This	 notion	 of	 a	 necessary	 compromise	
between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	was	 shared	by	Hobbes,	who	underscored	 that	
citizens	should	be	willing	to	surrender	their	right	to	govern	themselves	to	a	powerful	




	 The	 writings	 of	 Machiavelli	 and	 Hobbes	 inspired	 later	 European	 Enlightenment	
thinkers	like	John	Locke	(1632-1704),	Charles	Louis	de	Secondat,	Baron	de	Montesquieu	
(1689-1755),	and	the	American	Federalists	Alexander	Hamilton	(1755-1804)	and	James	
Madison	 (1751-1836).	 All	 were	 occupied	 with	 the	 question	 under	 which	 conditions	
human	beings	would	be	willing	 to	 surrender	 their	 political	 rights	 to	 representatives.	
Unlike	Machiavelli	and	Hobbes,	these	thinkers	assigned	much	more	confidence	to	the	
individual	 but	 argued	 that,	 in	 an	 increasingly	 complex	 society,	 citizens’	 self-rule	was	








ones	 is	 subject	 to	many	 inconveniences,	 it	 is	 fit	 the	people	 should	 transact	 by	 their	
representatives	what	they	cannot	transact	by	themselves’	(in	Montesquieu,	The Spirit 


















	 A	 different	 view	was	 advocated	 by	 John	 Stuart	Mill	 (1806-1873).	 Like	 his	 liberal	
predecessors,	he	viewed	representative	democracy	as	the	only	governance	structure	
that	could	prevent	the	misuse	of	political	power	(in	Mill,	Considerations on Representative 
Government,	1861).	However,	his	conception	of	humankind	was	much	more	optimistic.	
Rather	 than	 stressing	 that	 democracy	 served	 to	 protect	 individuals	 from	 their	 own	
misbehavior,	Mill	 valued	 democracy	 intrinsically	 as	 a	minimal	 regulatory	 framework	
that	 guaranteed	 citizens’	 freedom,	 development	 and	 wellbeing.	 And,	 unlike	 earlier	
republican	 and	 liberal	 thinkers,	 Mill	 extended	 the	 notion	 of	 citizenship	 to	 formerly	
deprived	groups	in	society,	namely	women	and	the	poor.	
	 Mill’s	 optimistic	 notion	 of	 people’s	 capacity	 was	 contested	 by	 political	 thinkers	
like	 Max	 Weber	 (1864-1920)	 and	 Joseph	 Schumpeter	 (1883-1950).	 Writing	 in	 the	
context	 of	 nation-state	 expansion,	 they	 advocated	 the	 earlier	 restrictive	 conception	
of	representative	government	with	very	limited	scope	for	direct	citizens’	participation.	
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or	refusing	the	men	who	are	to	rule	them’	(in	Schumpeter,	Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy,	Allen	and	Unwin	edition	1942/1976,	284-285).	 In	a	 famous	essay	Weber	




	 After	 the	 introduction	of	universal	 suffrage	 in	Europe	 in	 the	 late	nineteenth	and	
twentieth	centuries,	there	was	for	a	long	time	no	genuine	alternative	to	representative	
(party)	 democracy.	 Yet,	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 the	 restrictive	 notion	 of	
representation	 was	 increasingly	 criticized	 and	 political	 thinkers	 began	 to	 favour	 a	
more	 integrative	 role	 for	 citizens	 in	 decision-making,	 for	 example	 by	 participating	
in	 intermediary	 groups	 (cf.	 Truman	 1951;	 Dahl	 1961)	 or	 through	 participatory	 and	
deliberative	 institutions	 (cf.	 Barber	 1984;	 Pateman	 1970;	 2012;	 Osbun	 1985;	 Budge	
1996).	 However,	 these	 notions	 implied	 calls	 to	 strengthen	 representative	 decision-
making,	 rather	 than	 for	 an	 alternative	 democracy	 model.	 Those	 who	 advocated	
alternative	models	were	critical	of	representative	democracy	for	not	adhering	to	one	
of	 the	 basic	 assumptions	 underlying	 democracy,	 namely	 politically equality.	 Some	
contemporary	 political	 thinkers	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	 reviving	 the	 principles	 of	 ancient	
Greek	direct	democracy	or,	as	some	would	say,	‘real	democracy’	(Lucardie	2012,	48).	
Others	began	theorizing	an	agonistic	democracy	model	that	takes	persisting	inequalities	
in	 society	 as	 its	 starting	 point,	 and	 that	 is	 aimed	 at	 integrating	 the	 widely	 varying	
views	of	 political	 decision-making	 (Tully	 2008;	Wenman	2013).	 Referendums	play	 an	
important	role	 in	both,	albeit	with	different	rationales.	Understanding	this	argument	
requires	understanding	the	different	notions	of	how	individual	preferences	should	be	
translated	 into	 policy.	 These	 notions,	 one	 based	 on	 preference	 aggregation	 and	 the	
other	on	preference	integration,	will	be	outlined	in	the	next	section.
2.2.3 Aggregation versus Integration





the	will	 of	 as	many	people	as	possible.	 These	 two	notions	divide	both	 scholars	who	
claim	that	decision-making	should	be	based	on	citizens’	direct	participation	and	those	















rule	 (cf.	 Aristotle	 c.350	 BC,	 Politics,	 Dover	 edition	 by	 Jowett	 and	 Davis	 2000,	 240-
241).	This	conception	of	a	necessary	trade-off	was	shared	by	Rousseau.	According	to	
Rousseau,	people	are	ideally	governed	by	the	‘volonté générale’	(i.e.	the	general	will).	








also	widely	 embraced	 decision-making	 by	majority	 rule.	 As	 Locke	 put	 it,	 ‘When	 any	
number	of	men	have	so	consented to make one Community	or	Government,	they	are	
thereby	presently	incorporated,	and	make	one Body Politick, wherein	the	Majority have 







of	 parliamentary	 reforms,	 such	 as	 virtually	 universal	 and	 equal	 suffrage	 (with	 the	
exception	of	women)	and	secrecy	of	the	ballot	(see	James	1981,	55).	For	Bentham,	the	
interest	of	the	community	as	a	whole	was	similar	to	 ‘the	sum	of	the	 interests	of	the	
several	members	who	 compose	 it’	 (in	 Bentham,	An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation,	Oxford	University	Press	edition	1789/1823,	3)	and	the	principle	
of	 utility	 stated	 that	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 community	was	 equivalent	 to	 ‘the	 greatest	











Theoretical approaches to referendum use
thus	perceived	 the	proletariat	 as	 constituting	a	homogenous	group,	whose	 interests	
were	easily	aggregated	into	the	general	will	and	contrasted	to	those	of	the	capitalist	














 The integrative	 notion	 of	 democratic	 decision-making	 evolved	 in	 response	 to	































what	 De	 Tocqueville	 called	 the	 ‘tyranny	 of	 the	 majority’.	 Mill	 and	 De	 Tocqueville	
became	known	as	the	first	proponents	of	proportional	representation.	As	John	Stuart	
Mill	put	 it,	 ‘In	a	really	equal	democracy,	every	or	any	section	would	be	represented,	
not	 disproportionately	 but	 proportionately’	 (in	 Considerations on Representative 
Government	 1861,	 133).	 An	 important	 factor	 that	 triggered	 this	 thinking	 was	 a	
changed	 conception	 of	 ‘the	 citizen’.	Whereas	 protective	 liberal	 democrats	 excluded	
large	segments	of	society	from	citizens’	rights,	the	new	generation	of	developmental	
democrats	 proclaimed	 an	 extension	 of	 these	 rights	 to	 both	 women	 and	 the	 poor.	
And	 in	 a	 heterogeneous	 society	 it	 would,	 arguably,	 be	 far	more	 difficult	 to	 achieve	
representative	majorities.	
	 One	 contemporary	 political	 scientist	 who	 elaborated	 on	 this	 notion	 is	 Arend	
Lijphart	(1969;	1999).	Lijphart	criticized	Schumpeter’s	competitive	elitist	model,	which	
was	dominant	in	post-WWII	Europe,	and	maintained	that	differences	are	so	profound	
in	 heterogeneous	 societies	 that	 promoting	majority	 rule	 would	 lead	 to	 conflict	 and	
disintegration	(Lijphart	1969,	213-215;	Shapiro	2002,	249).	Lijphart	argued	that,	rather	




paradox	 underlying	 the	 notion	 of	 preference	 aggregation.	 He	 showed	 that	majority	
preferences	can	be	in	conflict	with	each	other	and	as	such	majority	voting	can	lead	to	
inconclusive	outcomes.	At	a	time	when	party	democracy	thrived	in	post-WWII	Europe,	




(i.e.	usually	 the	party	programme)	 rather	 than	on	 individual	 issues.	This	 ‘Ostrogorski	




in	 favour	of	referendums.	Since,	 in	referendums,	 individuals	vote	on	separate	 issues,	
it	 is	 argued	 that	 representation	 paradoxes	 do	 not	 occur.	 As	 such,	 referendums	 are	
considered	 to	provide	 an	 additional	 instrument	 to	decide	on	 issues	 that	 fall	 outside	
traditional	party	 competition	or	 that	are	usually	not	 salient	 in	normal	parliamentary	





Theoretical approaches to referendum use
stresses	 that	 referendums	 create	 a	 reversed	 Ostrogorski	 paradox	 as,	 by	 separating	
issues	 on	which	 preferences	 are	 interdependent,	 alternatives	may	 be	 defeated	 that	
would	have	been	preferred	by	a	majority	of	the	voters	if	the	issues	had	been	voted	on	
in	a	more	compound	manner.	
	 The	 ideal	 type	of	deliberative	democracy	emerged	 in	 the	1990s	as	a	criticism	of	
both	 representative	 and	 aggregative	 decision-making.	 For	 deliberative	 democrats,	
democracy	 is	 ‘the	 ability	 or	 opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 effective	 deliberation	 on	
the	part	of	 those	subject	 to	collective	decisions’	 (Dryzek	2000,	1).	Accordingly,	 since	
society	 is	 too	 complex	 to	 reduce	policy	 issues	 to	a	 simple	 yes	or	no,	 citizens	 should	
communicate	 and	 deliberate	 on	 political	 choices	 rather	 than	 vote on these choices 














from	 bargaining,	 interest	 aggregation,	 and	 power	 to	 the	 common	 reason	 of	 equal	
citizens	as	a	dominant	force	in	democratic	life’	(Cohen	and	Fung	2004,	24).	In	contrast	








instruments	 (cf.	 Bogdanor	 1994;	 Cronin	 1999).	 Consequently,	 they	 are	 often	 placed	
under	 the	umbrella	of	direct democracy,	and	said	 to	 resonate	best	with	 the	 thinking	
of	 Jefferson,	Rousseau,	Marx	 and	–	more	 recently	 –	 the	participationist	 school.	 This	


















2.3 A CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENDUMS
Referendums	come	in	various	forms,	some	of	which	are more directly participatory than 
others.	Moreover,	while	the	eventual	outcome	is	always	based	on	the	sum	of	individual	
preferences, some referendums allow for more integration of minority views than 
others.	The	extent	to	which	referendums	can	be	seen	as	instrument	of	direct	citizens’	
participation	 and	 majority	 rule	 depends on who ultimately controls the referendum 
process	 (representatives	 or	 citizens;	 the	 ruling	 majority	 or	 a	 political	 or	 citizens’	




Since	 different	 types	 of	 referendum	 and	 associated	 provisions	 are	 grounded	 within	
different	normative	theories,	the	‘fit’	between	a	specific	referendum	and	a	democratic	





four	 other	 elements	 to	 this	 classification	 to	 determine	 who	 ultimately	 controls	 the	
referendum	process,	namely	the	function	of	the	vote,	its	effect,	the	issues	on	which	it	
can	be	held,	and	whether	or	not	a	quorum	applies.
2.3.1 Five types of referendum: who triggers the vote?
In	the	literature,	many	different	labels	are	used	to	categorize	referendums	and	there	
is	 no	 consensus	 on	 the	 criteria	 to	 differentiate	 between	 various	 types	 (Setälä	 1999,	
70).	 For	 example,	 Uleri	 (1996a,	 10-11)	 outlines	 six	 criteria	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	
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passive	 referendums	 –	 i.e.	 initiated	 by	 political	 actors	 in	 government	 –	 and	 active	
referendums	–	 i.e.	 initiated	by	citizens.	A	classification	of	 referendums	based	on	this	
criterion	is	also	grounded	in	the	particular	meaning	of	the	concept	‘referendum’	in	itself,	
which	 is	derived	 from	the	Latin	verb	referre	which	 loosely translated	means	to bring 
something back to its original place.	As	policy	instruments	referendums	were	introduced	
in	medieval	Switzerland	and	referred	to	the	practice	of	‘taking	central	decisions	back	to	





distinguished:	 1)	 optional	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 a	 legislative	majority	 (legislative	
majority	referendums),	2)	optional	referendums	triggered	by	the	president	(presidential	
referendums),	3)	optional	 referendums	 triggered	by	a	 legislative	minority	 (legislative	
minority	 referendums),	 4)	 citizen-initiated	 referendums;	 5)	 and,	 finally,	 mandatory	
referendums,	triggered	not	by	an	actor	but	by	the	constitution.	
	 These	labels	are	largely	based	on	the	labels	used	by	two	main	databases	that	map	
the	 availability	 and	 use	 of	 referendum	 institutions	 around	 the	world:	 the	Navigator 
to Modern Direct Democracy, and the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (see 
chapter 3). These	databases make	a	distinction	between,	amongst	others,	‘obligatory	
referendums’,	 ‘plebiscites’	 (referendums	 initiated	 by	 the	 legislative	 majority),	






and	 ‘popular	 initiatives’	 and	 ‘popular	 vetoes’	 (referendums	 initiated	 by	 citizens).	 As	
the Navigator to Modern Direct Democracy	has	no	separate	category	for	referendums	






the	 question	 of	 who	 triggers	 the	 vote	 determines	 who	 exercises	 control	 over	 the	
referendum	process	and	hence	over	the	decision-making	process	(Setälä	2006,	705).	To	
be	more	specific,	it	determines	whether	decision-making	is	controlled	by	representatives 
or citizens,	and	also	whether	it	takes	place	on	the	basis	of	aggregation and majority rule, 







Table 2.2: A two-dimensional classification of referendums











Decision-making by integration Legislative	minority	referendum Citizen-initiated	referendum
As	shown	 in	 table 2.2	 and	outlined	more	extensively	below,	 I	argue	 that	 in	 terms	of	
the	 triggering	 process,	 legislative	 majority	 referendums,	 presidential	 referendums	














	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 whether	 referendums	 give	 primacy	 to	 representative	 or	
popular	 sovereignty	 depends	 on	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 referendum:	 before or after the 
parliamentary	handling	of	the	issue.	If	the	referendum	is	held	prior	to	the	parliamentary	




However,	 in	 general	 (except	 for	 citizens’	 initiatives),	 these	 are	 advisory	 referendums	
that	do	not	bind	parliament	to	a	certain	decision	(although	often	in	practice	they	do).	
Moreover,	pre-legislative	majority	referendums	are	controlled	by	parliament	precisely	
because	 it	 is	 parliament	 that	 decides	 whether	 the	 vote	 is	 held.	When	 referendums	
are post-legislative	 (held	 after	 the	 parliamentary	 vote),	 the	 legislative	 proposal	 has	
already	 been	 formulated,	 debated	 and	 decided	 upon	 before	 citizens	 get	 to	 vote	 on	
the	issue.	Unlike	pre-legislative	referendums,	post-legislative	referendums	are	usually	
binding.	Hence,	 it	 is	not	straightforward	to	assess	the	 impact	of	 referendums	on	the	
parliamentary	process	on	the	basis	of	the	timing	of	the	vote	in	itself.	
	 The	 link	 between	 different	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 two	 dimensions	 for	
demarcating	 democratic	 ideal	 types	 (representation versus participation and 
aggregation versus integration)	 is	 partially	 borrowed	 from	 Setälä	 (1999;	 2006)	 and	
Vatter	(2009).	Rather	than	the	dimension	of	representation versus participation,	both	
authors	classify	referendums	on	the	basis	of	the	degree of government control. They 
argue	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 government	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 process	 is	 the	
lowest	 in	 referendums	triggered	by	citizens	or	by	a	minority	 in	parliament,	or	–	 to	a	
lesser	extent	–	by	the	constitution.	I	find	such	a	classification	based	on	the	degree	of	
government	control	misleading,	 since	 in	 those	 referendums	 that	 the	authors	classify	
as	 government-initiated	 referendums	 (Setälä	 1999)	 or	 plebiscites	 (Vatter	 2009),	
it	 is	not	 the	government	as	 such	 that	decides	on	whether	a	 referendum	 is	held,	but	
either	parliament	or	 the	president.	Hence,	 only	when	 the	 government	 is	 dependent	
on	a	majority	 in	parliament	do	 legislative	majority	 referendums	equate	with	Setälä’s	
government-initiated	 referendums	 or	 Vatter’s	 plebiscites.	 If	 a	 government	 party	 or	

















by	a	parliamentary	majority	either	 to	advise	or	 to	 impose	a	binding	decision	on	 the	
government	 on	 a	 certain	 policy	 proposal.	 According	 to	 Smith	 (1976),	 these	 are	
‘controlled’	 referendums,	 since	 the	 political	 elites	 decide	 whether	 the	 vote	 is	 held	
and	hence	they	reflect	what	Budge	(1993)	call	‘mediated	popular	voting’.	Despite	the	
fact	that,	 like	all	referendums,	 legislative	majority	referendums	allow	citizens	to	vote	










PRESIDENTIAL	 REFERENDUM.	 Presidential	 referendums	 are	 also	 ‘controlled’	








president	does	not	hold	a	majority	 in	parliament	–	 i.e.	 in	times	of	cohabitation	–	the	
president	can	be	said	to	represent	a	representative	minority,	 rather	than	a	majority.	
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of	 the	 parliamentary	 majority	 by	 initiating	 a	 referendum	 (cf.	 Vatter	 2002;	 Marxer	
and	Pállinger	2007).	This	type	of	referendum	therefore	appears	on	the	bottom	left	of	
the	 two-dimensional	 framework	 in	 table 2.2.	As	 (Setälä	1999,	166)	 argues,	 this	 type	












	 Citizen-initiated	 referendums	are,	as	 the	name	suggests,	 triggered	by	a	group	of	
citizens	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 petition.	 To	 trigger	 a	 referendum,	 such	 a	 petition	needs	 to	
be	signed	by	a	considerable	number	(though	still	a	minority)	of	citizens.	Two	types	of	
citizens’	referendums	can	be	distinguished:	one	on	a	legislative	proposal	approved	by	







of	 citizens,	 they	 give	minority	 groups	 an	 opportunity	 to	 launch	 a	 campaign	 against	
proposed	laws	or	to	introduce	new	laws,	thereby	bypassing	the	majority	in	parliament	



















be	 voted	 on,	 and	 how	parliament	 decides	 on	 the	 proposal	 (by	 a	 simple	 or	 qualified	










cases,	 and	 therefore	 primarily	 reflect	 popular	 sovereignty.	 This	 decision-controlling	
(see	below)	feature	of	the	constitutional	referendum	was	famously	put	forward	by	the	
British	 constitutional	 theorist,	 A.V.	Dicey	 (1835-1922)	who,	 in	 his	 Introduction to the 

































2.3.2 Functions, Issues, Effects, and Quorums 
As	Uleri	(1996a,	12)	argues,	the	referendum’s	function	in	the	decision-making	process	
depends	on	whether	the	promoter	of	the	referendum	and	the	agenda-setter	(i.e.	the	





mandatory	 referendums	are	decision-controlling,	given	 that	 the	constitution	triggers	
the	 vote	 on	 a	 proposal	 approved	 by	 parliament.	 Hence,	 a	 mandatory	 referendum	
takes place after the	parliamentary	process	and	serves	as	a	guarantee	that	important	
decisions	cannot	be	made	against	the	consent	of	the	popular	majority.		
	 By	 contrast,	 legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 decision-promotive,	 as	 the	
parliamentary	majority	that	triggers	the	vote	is	usually	the	same	as	the	majority	(generally	









	 Both	 legislative	minority	 referendums	and	citizens’	 initiated	 referendums	can	be	
either	decision-promotive	or	decision-controlling.	When	the	vote	 is	promotive	 (i.e.	a	














minorities	 (either	 in	 parliament	 or	 popular	minorities)	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	
process	 and	 hence	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 The	 level	 of	minority-protection	 is	
higher	in	case	of	initiatives,	as	they	allow	minorities	to	both	set	the	agenda	and	trigger	







between	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 issues	 and	 questions	 concerning	 the	 basic	
nature	of	 the	 state	 (such	as	 sovereignty	 transfer),	 referendums	on	public	policy	 and	
referendums	on	moral	 issues.	Silvano	Möckli	 (1994,	153)	makes	a	 further	distinction	
between	 referendums	 on	 policy	 issues,	 and	 referendums	 as	 vote	 of	 confidence	 in	
political	 leaders	(for	example,	the	Belgium	referendum	of	1950	on	the	return	of	King	
Leopold	III)	(cf.	Setälä	1999,	69).	Obviously,	the	more	issues	on	which	referendums	can	
be	held,	 the	more	control	 citizens	have	over	political	decision-making.	But	 the	same	
applies	to	the	actor	that	can	trigger	the	vote:	when	referendums	can	be	held	on	a	wide	
range	 of	 issues,	 the	 triggering	 actor	 exercises	 greater	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	
process,	 greater	 than	when	 referendums	 can	 be	 held	 only	 on	 particular	 issues.	 For	
example,	when	minorities	can	trigger	the	referendum,	they	have	greater	control	over	
the	decision-making	process	when	 there	are	no	subject	 restrictions.	And	conversely,	
a	 parliamentary	 majority	 has	 more	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 process	 when	 a	
referendum	can	be	triggered	on	a	wide	range	of	 issues.	 In	practice,	there	 is	a	strong	
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A	turnout	quorum	specifies	 that,	 for	a	 referendum	outcome	to	be	valid,	a	particular	
proportion	of	the	electorate	must	have	participated	in	the	vote.	The	higher	the	turnout	





	 The	 question	 whether	 a	 quorum	 applies	 is	 also	 important	 in	 assessing	 to	 what	
extent	the	referendum	is	primarily	a	majoritarian	 instrument,	or	whether	 it	provides	
more	 scope	 for	 integrating	minority	 preferences	 in	 decision-making.	When	 there	 is	




















of	 minority-protection,	 since	 they	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 the	 voting	 majority	 to	
impose	its	will.	
	 	A	classification	of	referendum	legislation	(in	which	legislation	differs	with	respect	
to	 triggering	 actor,	 agenda-setter,	 effect,	 and	 the	applicability	of	 subject	 restrictions	
and	quorums)	 along	 the	 two	dimensions	 –	decision-making by representation versus 














2.4 A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE REFERENDUM PRACTICE 
To	 examine	 the	 factors	 that	 impact	 upon	 referendum	 practice	 and	 how	 that	 varies	
among	 countries,	 I	 use	 the	 insights	 of	 four	 schools	 of	 institutional	 theory:	 classical 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism.	 These	 schools	 differ	 fundamentally	 in	 their	 approach	 to	
institutional	development,	and	consequently	in	how	they	would	explain	why	referendums	
are	institutionalized	and	used,	and	why	there	are	differences	between	countries	in	this	
respect.	 While	 classical	 institutionalism	 and	 historical	 institutionalism	 focus	 on	 the	
country-specific	 context	 in	which	 referendums	 are	more	 likely	 to	 occur,	 sociological	
institutionalism	and	rational	choice	institutionalism	focus	on	what	motivates	decision-
makers	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	 referendums.	 Rather	 than	 choosing	 between	 one	
of	 these	 schools,	 I	 argue	 that	 all	 perspectives	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	when	






(i.e.	public	demands).	 In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 shortly	outline	 the	underpinnings	of	each	
institutionalism	and	link	these	institutionalisms	to	the	study	of	referendums.	





theory’	 (1953;	 1965),	 designed	 to	 understand	 political	 decision-making	 in	 terms	 of	
the	flow	of	 inputs	and	outputs	of	 the	 system.	Central	 to	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	
approach	is	the	analysis	of	the	interrelationships	between	institutions	and	the	effects	
that	 certain	 institutions	 have	 on	 political	 action.	 A	 notable	 example	 is	 provided	 by	
Maurice	Duverger	who,	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	thoroughly	examined	the	relationship	
between	the	electoral	system	and	the	party	system	(i.e.	the	famous	Duverger’s	 law).	








limited	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 political	 system	 in	which	 they	 operate	 (cf.	 Amenta	 and	
Ramsey	2010).	













the	 relationship	 between	 the	 democratic	 system	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 referendum	
legislation.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	the better the institutional fit between a 
country’s type of democracy and a particular referendum, the more likely that this type 
of referendum will be institutionalized and used.	This	relationship	has	been	analysed	by	
several	 referendum	scholars	 (cf.	 Jung	1996;	 Lijphart	1999;	 Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	2007;	











a	 unicameral	 parliament,	 and	 a	 flexible	 constitution.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 consensus	
democracies	power	is	shared,	and	such	polities	are,	according	to	Lijphart,	more	likely	
to	 have	 a	multi-party	 system,	 broad	 coalition	 governments,	 a	 balanced	 relationship	









democracy,	 since	 in	 both	 models	 representative	 sovereignty	 prevails	 over	 popular	
sovereignty.	As	he	argues,	‘Direct	democracy	can	therefore	not	be	regarded	as	either	
typically	majoritarian	 or	 typically	 consensual.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 a	 foreign	 element	 in	 both	
majoritarian	and	consensus	democracy	because	 it	 is	 the	antithesis	of	 representative	
democracy’	 (Lijphart	 1984,	 31-32).	 However,	 based	 on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	
practice,	he	comes	to	see	the	referendum	as	a	‘strong	consensus-inducing	mechanism	
and	 the	 very	 opposite	 of	 a	 blunt	 majoritarian	 instrument’	 (Lijphart	 1999,	 231).	 His	
argument	 could	 be	 extended	 by	 hypothesizing	 that,	 for	 that	 reason,	 referendums	
will	 be	used	more	 in	 consensus	 countries	 than	 in	majoritarian	democracies.	 In	 their	
empirical	assessment	of	the	relationship	between	democracy	type	and	referendums	in	
countries	around	the	world,	Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	(2007)	found	that	this	is	indeed	the	case	
and	 that	majoritarian	 and	 presidential	 systems	 tend	 to	 provide	 fewer	 opportunities	
for	 referendums.	As	 an	explanation,	 they	argue	 that	 such	 systems	are	already	more	
accountable	to	citizens,	and	voters	therefore	have	little	interest	in	additional	channels	
to	 influence	 decision-making.	 However,	 they	 make	 no	 distinction	 in	 their	 analysis	
between	types	of	referendum.	
	 And	 indeed,	 the	findings	of	 Fiorino	and	Ricciuti	 stand	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 study	
of	Dag	Anckar	 (2014)	who	 found	 a	 positive	 correlation	between	one	particular	 type	
of	 referendum	 (namely	 mandatory	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 reform)	 and	
majoritarian	democracy.	He	concludes	that,	‘if	the	electoral	system	carries	in	its	wake	






democracy	 cannot	 be	 linked	 easily	 to	 either	 consensus	 or	 majoritarian	 democracy	
because	‘the	numerous	forms	of	direct	democracy	are	too	manifold	and	oppositional	
with	regard	to	their	 functions	and	effects’	 (Vatter	2009,	128).	Therefore,	 in	 line	with	
Setälä	 (1999;	 2006),	 Vatter	 calls	 for	 referendums	 to	 be	 differentiated	 and	 argues	
that	different	 types	of	 referendum	 link	up	differently	 to	certain	 types	of	democracy,	
depending	on	the	extent	to	which	the	government	majority	can	control	the	referendum	
vote	and	the	decision-making	rule	applied	(simple	majority	or	quorum	requirements)	
(Vatter	 2002;	 2009).	 He	 argues	 that	 optional	 and	 mandatory	 referendums	 without	
quorums	are	primarily	majoritarian	instruments,	while	citizens’	initiatives,	mandatory	




















shown	in	tables 2.3 and 2.4.	
	 As	shown	in	table 2.3,	legislative	majority	and	presidential	referendums	share	with	
majoritarian	democracy	that	they	give	primacy	to	political	representation	rather	than	
direct	 citizens’	 participation	 and	 that	 they	 primarily	 allow	 for	 aggregative	 decision-
making	(and	thus	by	majority	rule).	Likewise,	legislative	minority	referendums	share	two	
dimensions	with	consensus	democracy:	 they	give	primacy	 to	political	 representation	
(i.e.	they	are	triggered	by	political	representatives)	and	they	allow	for	the	integration	
of	 the	preferences	of	 political	minorities,	 thereby	fitting	 the	power-sharing	principle	
that	also	underlies	consensus	democracy	(see	also	Jung	1996;	Setälä	1999;	Marxer	and	
Pállinger	2007;	Vatter	2009).	As	shown	in	table 2.4,	referendums	that	have	a	turnout	
quorum	 also	 have	 a	 theoretical	 ‘fit’	 with	 consensus	 polities	 on	 both	 dimensions.	 In	
addition,	citizen-initiated	referendums	share	with	the	consensus	model	that	they	allow	
for	integrative	decision-making	(i.e.	they	provide	minorities	an	instrument	to	influence	
decision-making).	 Yet,	 as	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 underscore	 the	 principle	 of	
direct	 citizens’	 participation	 rather	 than	 representation,	 they	 have	 no	 theoretical	 fit	
with	either	of	the	representative	democracy	models	based	on	the	first	dimension.	By	









Table 2.3: Expected ‘fit’ between referendum types and type of democracy













Table 2.4: Expected ‘fit’ between referendum provisions and type of democracy














triggers	 the	 popular	 vote.	When	 referendums	 are	 strictly	mandatory	 (i.e.	 when	 the	
government	 cannot	 avoid	 a	 referendum),	 representatives	 have	 no	 control	 over	 the	
process	and	hence	the	referendums	can	be	seen	as	reflection	of	popular	sovereignty.	
In	 addition,	when	 the	proposal	 is	 voted	upon	by	 a	 qualified	parliamentary	majority,	
political	minorities	exercise	greater	control	over	the	triggering	of	the	vote	than	when	
the	proposal	is	decided	upon	by	a	simple	majority.		
	 All	 in	all,	classical	 institutionalism	is	primarily	occupied	with	explaining	countries’	
institutional	 design	 in	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 rather	 than	 the	 conditions	 under	
which	 this	 design	 might	 change.	 Moreover,	 when	 the	 purpose	 of	 analysis	 is	 to	
explain	institutional	reform,	the	explanatory	factors	are	commonly	sought	within	the	


















can	also	be	extended	to	the	use	of	referendums.	It	can	be	expected	that	the fewer veto 
players there are present in the process of institutionalizing or triggering referendums, 
the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 This	 seems	 a	 logical	 expectation	 as	 the	more	 veto	 players	 there	 are,	 the	more	
likely	 that	 these	 players	will	 use	 their	 veto	 power	 to	 block	 legislative	 proposals,	 for	
example	 to	 introduce	 referendum	 legislation	or	 to	 organize	 a	 referendum.	 The	 veto	
player	approach	is	particularly	relevant	when	explaining	the	former.	 In	Europe,	there	
are	a	wide	variety	of	procedures	to	amend	the	constitution.	For	example,	in	bicameral	
systems,	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution	 to	 allow	 for	 referendum	 legislation	
require	support	–	sometimes	of	a	supermajority	–	in	both	houses.	In	such	polities,	the	
number	 of	 veto	 players	 is	 potentially	 higher	 than	 in	 unicameral	 systems.	Moreover,	










































2.4.2 Historical Institutionalism: Past Referendum Experience
Historical	 institutionalism	 emerged	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	
tendency	 to	assess	and	compare	 the	 formal	 institutions	of	 the	 state	and	 its	primary	
occupation	with	explaining	the	institutional	status	quo	rather	than	institutional	change.	
By	 contrast,	 historical	 institutionalism	 is	 concerned	 with	 analysing	 the	 diverging	
historic	 pathways	 towards	 institutional	 outcomes.	 Historical	 institutionalists	 place	
strong	emphasis	on	 the	notion	of	path	dependency,	by	arguing	 that	 institutions	and	
organizations	are	‘mutually	reinforcing	or	complementary’	(Pierson	and	Skocpol	2002,	
709).	As	Pierson	and	Skocpol	(2002,	699)	argue,	‘outcomes	at	a	critical	juncture	trigger	
feedback	mechanisms	 that	 reinforce	 the	 recurrence	 of	 a	 particular	 pattern	 into	 the	
future’	[..and…]	‘once	actors	have	ventured	far	down	a	particular	path,	they	are	likely	to	
find	it	very	difficult	to	reverse	course’.	To	an	important	extent,	historical	institutionalism	
supports	 the	 classical	 institutionalist	 claim	 that	political	 outcomes	 are	 influenced	by	
existing	institutional	‘rules	of	the	game’.	As	Thelen	and	Steinmo	(1992,	10)	state,	‘The	
institutions	that	are	at	the	center	of	historical	institutional	analysis	[…]	can	shape	and	
constrain	 political	 strategies	 in	 important	 ways,	 but	 they	 are	 themselves	 also	 the	
outcome	(conscious	or	unintended)	of	deliberate	political	strategies	of	political	conflict	
and	 of	 choice’.	 Moreover,	 historical	 institutionalism	 places	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘power’	
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	 Like	 classical	 institutionalism,	 historical	 institutionalism	 has	 also	 been	 criticized	
for	not	providing	a	comprehensive	explanation	of	why	 institutional	contexts	change,	
for	 example	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 referendum	 legislation.	 As	 Schmidt	 (2008,	
2)	 argues,	 ‘Although	 the	 shift	 in	 historical	 institutionalism	 from	 “big	 bang”	 theories	
of	 change	 to	 incremental	 or	 evolutionary	 approaches	 have	 gone	 a	 long	way	 toward	
accounting	 for	 change	over	time,	 they	 still	 do	more	 to	describe	what	 changes	occur	



















and	 only	 change	 in	 light	 of	 ‘critical	 junctures’.	 It	 provides	 little	 explanation	 of	 why	
referendums	 are	 used	 more	 frequently	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others	 once	 the	
legislation	is	in	place.	However,	historical	institutionalism	does, in contrast to classical 
institutionalism,	provide	some	insights	as	to	why	political	actors	decide	at	some	point	
in	time	to	introduce	referendum	legislation.	In	this	respect,	historical	 institutionalism	
is	 particularly	 interested	 in	 examining	 the	 enabling	 or	 constraining	 role	 that	 past	
institutional	 choices	 play	 in	 institutional	 reform	 debates	 (cf.	 Hall	 and	 Taylor	 1996).	
Hence,	by	introducing	time	to	the	analysis,	a	combination	of	classical	 institutionalism	
with	historical	institutionalism	allows	assessment	of	how	present	institutional	choices	



























historical	precedents	 is	 likely	 to	constrain	 future	 referendum	use	because,	at	 critical	






historical	institutionalism	is	that, when there is past referendum experience in a country, 
it is more likely that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
2.4.3 Sociological Institutionalism: Public Demands and Political Values
While	 classical	 institutionalism	and	historical	 institutionalism	 consider	 institutions	 as	
relatively	 isolated	 entities,	 sociological	 institutionalism	 places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	
interrelationship	 between	 institutions	 and	 society	 (Hall	 and	 Taylor	 1996).	 According	
to	 sociological	 institutionalists,	 institutions	 and	 society	 are	 mutually constitutive: 





Taylor	1996,	947)	–	are	adopted	that	fit	 the	normative	 framework	of	 the	actors	 that	
adopt	them.	Drawing	on	the	pioneering	work	of	Almond	and	Verba	(1963),	sociological	
institutionalism	 claims	 that	 institutions	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	 taking	 into	
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which	 political	 actors	 operate	 and	 that	 determines	 their	 scope	 for	 manoeuvre	 (i.e.	


















grounded	 in	 a	 sociological	 institutionalist	 approach,	 and	 rather	 than	 identifying	 and	
explaining	cross-country	variations	in	referendum	practice,	most	referendum	scholars	
assume	 some	 general	 cause	 at	work	 that	 triggers	 a	 general	 direct	 democratic	 shift.	




globalization,	 national	 representative	 channels	 are	 no	 longer	 sufficient	 to	 guarantee	
the	legitimacy	of	political	decisions,	and	that	alternative	measures,	 like	referendums,	








and	 in	 which	 they	 thus	 indeed	 perceive	 referendums	 as	 legitimate	 decision-making	
tools.	 According	 to	 Jacobs	 (2011,	 23)	 such	 differences	 are	 rooted	 in	 different	 levels	
of	referendum	demands	from	within	society.	Hence,	a	first	expectation	derived	from	
sociological	institutionalism	is	that	the larger the public demands for referendums, the 










economic	 prosperity,	 higher	 levels	 of	 education,	 and	 subsequent	 increased	 political	






primacy	 given	 to	 participatory	 values	 (cf.	 Dalton	 1984;	 Bowler,	 Donovan	 and	 Karp	




referendums	 is	 due	 to	 increased	 levels	 of	 political	 interest	 on	 the	 part	 of	 European	
citizenries	(cf.	Budge	1996;	Pállinger,	Kaufmann,	Marxer	and	Schiller	2007).	
	 A	second	line	of	reasoning	is	that	referendums	are	invoked	in	response	to	increased	
political	 dissatisfaction.	 Scholars	 adopting	 this	 argument	 refer	 to	 a	 ‘polarization’	 of	
the	 citizenry	 into	 ‘insiders’	who	 are	 highly	 educated	 and	 politically	 engaged	 citizens	
and	 ‘outsiders’	who	 feel	 largely	 alienated	 from	politics	 and	have	 little	 confidence	 in	
representative	institutions	(Häusermann	and	Schwander	2009,	26-29;	see	also	Hibbing	
and	 Theiss-Morse	 2002;	 Dalton	 2004).	 Accordingly,	 these	 dissatisfied	 citizens	 prefer	
referendums	 as	 instruments	 to	 repair	 the	 irresponsiveness	 of	 political	 parties	 or	 to	
regain	 control	 over	 European	 integration	 (cf.	 Dalton,	 Burklin	 and	 Drummond	 2001;	
Donovan	and	Karp	2006;	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2007).	As	Cronin	(1999,	10)	argues,	
‘demand	 for	more	 democracy	 occurs	when	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 distrust	 of	 legislative	
bodies	and	when	there	is	a	growing	suspicion	that	privileged	interests	exert	far	greater	
influences	on	the	typical	politician	than	does	the	common	voter.’	
	 Based	on	 these	 lines	 of	 argumentation,	 I	would	 expect	 referendums	 to	be	used	
with	 more	 frequency,	 the	 more	 political	 actors	 are	 faced	 with	 public	 demands	 for	





	 However,	 to	 argue	 that	 referendums	 occur	 in	 response	 to	 societal	 demands	
stemming	from	either	participatory	values	or	dissatisfaction	implies	that	political	actors	











arguments	have	been	put	 forward	as	 to	 the	 role	 that	 values	play	 in	political	 actors’	
referendum	 pledges:	 the	 first	 is	 that	 referendums	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 intrinsic,	
participationist	values	associated	with	direct	votes,	and	the	second	is	that	referendums	
are	the	outcome	of	instrumental,	crisis-solving	values	associated	with	them.10 A second, 
referendum-level	 explanation	 derived	 from	 sociological	 institutionalism	 is	 therefore	
that the stronger the intrinsic and instrumental values that political actors attach to 
referendums, the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 The	first	argument	is	that	referendums	are	pledged	when	decision-makers	hold	a	
Rousseauian	perspective	towards	participation,	and	when	they	perceive	referendums	
primarily	 as	 an	 instrument	 that	 boosts	 political	 participation.	 In	 this	 reasoning,	





regular	 and	 active	 participation	 from	 its	 citizenry,	 and	 democratic	 polities	 should	
therefore	 include	 institutions	 for	 mass	 participation,	 such	 as	 referendums.	 The	
argument	goes	that	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used	when	decision-makers	
hold	such	participationist	values.	




















input-legitimacy)	and	 to	give	 citizens	a	direct	 say	over	 issues	 related	 to	political	 and	
monetary	 integration,	 which	 are	 increasingly	 shielded	 from	 national	 parliamentary	
control	(i.e.	output-legitimacy)	(cf.	WRR	2007).
	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 electoral	 reform,	 Renwick	 (2010,	 38-41)	 distinguishes	 three	
categories	 of	 instrumental	 values	 attached	 to	 such	 reform:	 representation,	
accountability	and	simplicity.	These	can	also	be	applied	to	the	analysis	of	referendums.	
Values	associated	with	representativeness	and	simplicity	are	thus	aimed	at	increasing	






referendums	 to	 guarantee	 policy	 outcomes	 that	 are	 legitimized	 by	 the	 majority	 of	
the	 people.	 Any	 problems	with	 the	 legitimization	 of	Western	 democracies	 are	 then	
predominantly	 thought	 to	 stem	 from	 representative	 institutions	 no	 longer	 being	

















	 Arguably,	 for	 post-materialist	 parties,	 such	 support	 is	 primarily	 intrinsically	
motivated	because,	as	famously	pointed	out	by	Ronald	Inglehart	(1977,	3),	these	parties	
place	strong	emphasis	on	preserving	individual	liberty,	freedom	of	expression,	better	
quality	of	 life,	and	 limiting	 the	power	of	authority	 (Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	2006,	
443).	Accordingly,	referendums	would	ensure	that	people	get	involved	in	politics,	and	
that	 their	 voices	 are	 heard.	 In	 addition,	 by	 emphasizing	 societal	 pluralism,	 it	 can	 be	
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Populist	 parties	 perceive	 society	 as	 divided	 between	 two	 homogeneous	 groups,	
‘the	 pure	 people’	 and	 ‘the	 corrupt	 elite’,	 and	 especially	 oppose	 the	 post-materialist	
emphasis	on	 societal	 plurality	 (Mudde	2004,	543;	Van	Kessel	 2015,	 12).	Accordingly,	
referendums	are	seen	as	instruments	that	truly	reflect	the	will	of	the	ordinary	people	
at	the	expense	of	political	elites	and	intermediary	structures	(Mudde	2004,	543;	2007,	
153;	 Jacobs	 2011,	 34-35).	 Hence,	 populist	 ideology	 underscores	 two	 characteristics	
that	 are	 generally,	 though	 –	 as	 I	 argue	 –	wrongfully,	 attributed	 to	 referendums:	 the	
prevalence	of	popular	sovereignty	over	representative	sovereignty	and	the	prevalence	
of	preference	aggregation	over	preference	integration.
	 Although	 such	 ideological	 arguments	 can	 indeed	 affect	 party	 stances	 towards	
referendums,	I	argue	that	a	focus	on	intrinsic	and	instrumental	values	is	more	useful,	
as	 these	might	 also	 be	 found	 among	 non-post-materialist	 and	 non-populist	 parties.	
The	more	such	values	dominate	the	political	debate,	the	more	likely	I	would	therefore	
expect	a	referendum	to	be	held.
2.4.4 Rational Choice Institutionalism: Strategic Interests 
All	 three	 institutionalisms	outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 sections	 tend	 to	 neglect	 the	 role	
of	political	agency.	This	stands	in	sharp	contrast	with	rational	choice	institutionalism,	
which	 states	 that,	 rather	 than	 institutional	 context,	 path	 dependency,	 public	
demands	or	political	values,	institutional	choices	are	above	all	the	outcome	of	actors’	
strategic	 interests	 (cf.	Williamson	1975;	Milgrom	and	Roberts	 1992).	 Rational	 choice	
institutionalism	 draws	 its	 analytical	 tools	 from	 the	 ‘new	 economics	 of	 organization’,	
which	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 rent-seeking,	 transaction	 costs	 and	 efficiency	
to	the	operation	and	development	of	 institutions	(Moe	1984;	Weingast	and	Marshall	
1988).	 Rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 has	 been	 employed	 to	 explain	 a	 wide	 range	
of	 institutional	 phenomena,	 from	 grand	 institutional	 development	 like	 democratic	
transition	(see	for	example	Przeworski	1991;	Marks	1992;	Geddes	1994)	to	the	rise	and	
fall	of	international	organizations	(see	for	example	Martin	1992)	and	the	development	


















provided	by	Benoit	 (2004),	who	uses	a	 rational	 choice	approach	 to	explain	electoral	
reform.	He	argues	 that	electoral	 reform	 is	 the	 result	of	parties’	 rational	 cost-benefit	
calculations.	Political	actors	will	support	those	reforms	which	coincide	with	their	pre-
defined	interest	and	which	provide	them	with	the	largest	electoral	benefits	(2004,	367-
379).	Whereas	 Benoit	 has	 specifically	 focussed	 on	 explaining	 party	 stances	 towards	
electoral	 reform,	 Jacobs	 (2011)	 extended	 this	 approach	 by	 analysing	 elites’	 support	
for	 democratic	 reform	 in	 general.	 He	 argues	 that	 ‘Political	 parties	will	 implement	 a	
democratic	 reform	when	a)	 they	have	 the	 required	majority	 to	do	 so,	and	b)	 such	a	
reform	would	maximally	benefit	them’	(2011,	19).	
	 When	extended	to	referendum	practice,	rational	choice	institutionalists	argue	that	
in	 institutionalizing	 and	 pledging	 referendums,	 political	 elites	 are	 rarely	 susceptible	
to	 either	 popular	 demands	 or	 ideological	 conventions.	 Rather,	 politicians	will	 assess	
each	referendum	option	in	itself	and	assess	whether	it	fits	their	immediate	interests.	A	
rational	choice	perspective	to	referendum	practice	has	been	expressed	by,	for	example,	
Butler	and	Ranney	 (1978,	221),	who	argue	 that	 referendums	are	generally	employed	






on	 democratic	 and	 electoral	 reform	 (Reed	 and	 Thies	 2001;	 Benoit	 2004;	 Pilet	 2007;	
Blais	and	Shugart	2008),	Jacobs	(2011,	38)	makes	a	noteworthy	distinction	between	act-
contingent	and	outcome-contingent	motivations	to	support	direct democratic	reform.11 
Outcome-contingent motivations	 imply	 the	anticipation	 that	 the	 reform	 itself	will	 be	
beneficial.	 In	the	case	of	referendums,	this	 implies	the	anticipation	that	referendums	
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or	retaining	coalition	partners	 (Renwick,	Hanretty	and	Hine	2009,	439-440).	Scholars	
in	 the	 field	 of	 electoral	 reform	 tend	 to	 argue	 that	 outcome-contingent	motivations	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 actual	 reforms	 (cf.	 Boix	 1999;	 Benoit	 2004).	 As	 Renwick	







derived	 from	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 is	 therefore	 that	 the stronger the act-
contingent and outcome-contingent interests of political actors to support referendums, 
the more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.
	 The	distinction	between	outcome-	and	act-contingent	motivations	is	also	relevant	
in	studying	the	motivations	at	play	in	the	actual	use	of	referendums.	As	I	place	more	
emphasis	 on	 explaining	 cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	 use	 than	 in	 the	
institutionalization	of	referendum	legislation,	outcome-	and	act-contingent	motivations	
are	 further	 disentangled	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 politicians’	 motivations	 for	 pledging	
referendums.	There	is	an	extensive	literature	on	the	strategies	that	may	go	to	explain	
why	 governments	 and	 opposition	 parties	 trigger	 referendums	 (cf.	 Bjørklund	 1982;	
Morel	2001;	Qvortrup	2006;	Closa	2007;	Rahat	2009;	Oppermann	2011;	Dür	and	Mateo	
2011).	Much	of	this	literature	elaborates	on	the	study	by	Bjørklund	(1982),	who	argued	
that	 referendums	 serve	 either	 as	 a	 ‘minority	weapon’	 to	 pursue	policies	 that	would	
otherwise	be	voted	down,	as	a	‘mediation	device’	to	retain	party	or	coalition	unity,	or	as	
a	‘lightning	rod’	to	separate	issues	from	the	electoral	debate	(1982,	247).	Referendum	
scholars	 have	 largely	 underscored	 these	 three	 strategies,	 although	 different	 labels	
have	been	used.	Qvortrup	 (2006)	has	 thereby	added	a	 fourth	 function,	 arguing	 that	
referendums	can	also	serve	as	an	‘empowerment	tool’	to	increase	the	legitimacy	of	the	
actors	that	trigger	them.	While	the	first	(minority	weapon)	thus	portrays	an	outcome-
contingent	 strategy,	 the	 latter	 three	 merely	 represent	 act-contingent	 strategies:	 in	
these	cases	it	is	not	the	outcome	of	the	referendum	that	is	deemed	beneficial,	but	the	
act	of	pledging	one.	
	 Moreover,	 by	 elaborating	 on	 Putnam’s	 two-level	 logic	 of	 international	 decision-
making	 (Putnam	 1988),	 Oppermann	 (2011)	 extended	 two	 of	 these	 strategies	 to	
examining	referendums	on	EU	affairs.	He	argues	that,	for	governments,	referendums	
have	a	particular	function	in	the	EU	context,	either	as	an	empowering	tool	to	strengthen	
a	 government’s	 legitimacy	 among	 its	 EU	 counterparts	 (i.e.	 act-contingent),	 or	 as	 a	
bargaining	tool	in	EU	negotiations	(i.e.	outcome-contingent).	
 Table 2.5	provides	an	overview	of	 these	strategies.	The	first	 strategy	 is	a	policy-








in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 required	 parliamentary	majority	 or	 supermajority	 for	 a	 desired	










Table 2.5: Overview of referendum functions and strategies 













Retaining party unity Both Defensive
Retaining	coalition	unity Government Defensive
Depoliticization Separating	controversial	issues	from	electoral	campaign Both	 Defensive
Often,	however,	the	motivations	behind	referendum	pledges	go	beyond	policy-seeking	




additional	 legitimacy.	 For	 government	 parties,	 however,	 this	 offensive	 strategy	 only	
works	 when	 the	 initiating	 actor	 is	 certain	 that	 the	 public	 is	 on	 its	 side,	 as	 a	 failed	
referendum	 vote	 would	 undermine	 rather	 than	 reinforce	 a	 government’s	 position.	
Oppermann	(2011)	argues	that	referendums	can	also	be	used	in	the	EU	context	for	the	












	 A	 third	 referendum	 strategy	 is	 conflict mediation.	 When	 a	 party	 or	 coalition	 is	
internally	divided	on	a	certain	issue,	it	can	prevent	a	split	by	letting	the	electorate	decide	
(Bjørklund	 1982).	 As	 Oppermann	 (2011)	 argues,	 such	 a	 strategy	 is	 thus	 at	 foremost	
defensive,	as	actors	perceive	it	as	risky	when	contested	issues	on	which	parties	or	the	
















	 A	 final	 referendum	 strategy	 is	depoliticization.	When	 a	 party	 or	 coalition	 is	 not	
in	 itself	divided	on	an	 issue,	but	holds	a	different	view	than	 its	 support	base,	calling	
a	 referendum	 can	 be	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 depoliticizing	 the	 issue.	 Accordingly,	 a	
referendum	may	be	used	as	a	‘lightning	rod’	(Bjørklund	1982,	248)	to	depoliticize	certain	
controversial	issues	and	decouple	them	from	the	election	campaign,	by	pledging	that	

















process	 (political	 representatives	 or	 citizens),	 and	 whether	 the	 process	 of	 initiation	
and	decision-making	reinforces	majority	rule	or	allows	for	the	integration	of	minority	
protection.	 Such	 an	 exercise	 is	 necessary	 to	 assess	 whether	 European	 democracies	
have	 indeed	 experienced	 a	 direct	 participatory	 shift,	 as	 is	 generally	 assumed	 in	 the	
referendum	literature,	and	hence	to	answer	my	first	two	research	questions	(see	chapter 
4). To	 explain	 countries’	 decisions	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	 national	 referendums	
and	hence	to	answer	my	third	research	question,	I	have	extended	the	insights	of	four	
institutionalist	theories	(classical	institutionalism,	historical	institutionalism,	sociological	
institutionalism	 and	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism)	 to	 the	 study	 of	 referendum	
practice.	These	four	institutionalisms	offer	different	perspectives	on	understanding	the	
relationship	between	individual	action	and	institutions,	and	therefore,	provide	different	
approaches	 to	 understanding	 referendum	 practice.	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 analytical	
framework	based	on	the	four	institutionalisms	is	provided	in	table 2.6.






































approach	 and	 understand	 the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	
terms	 of	 structural	 context.	 To	 sum	 up,	 classical	 institutionalism	 stresses	 that	 the	
institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums,	 and	 how	 that	 varies	 among	 countries,	
can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 democratic	 nature	 of	 the	 polities	 and/or	 the	 number	 of	
veto	 players	 present.	 Historical	 institutionalism	 explains	 referendum	 practice	 in	
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institutionalism	is	either	 interested	in	explaining	referendum	practice	in	terms	of	the	





	 I	argue	that,	 in	understanding	why	referendums	are	institutionalized	and	used,	 it	
is	important	to	take	into	account	both	structure	and	agency.	In	the	following	chapters,	
the	validity	of	 these	 six	expectations	will	 assessed,	first	by	providing	an	overview	of	
referendum	legislation	and	its	use	in	the	28	EU	member	states,	and	then	by	examining	
referendum	 legislation	 and	 use	 in	 detail	 in	 France,	 Denmark,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	
Sweden	 and	 the	Netherlands.	 Before	 addressing	my	 research	 questions,	 in	 the	 next	







RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The	 extensive	 referendum	 literature	 has	 not	 provided	 a	 conclusive	 answer	 as	 to	
which	 factors	contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	and	use	of	national	 referendums.	









studies	have,	 for	example,	 linked	 referendum	practice	 to	 the	 type	of	democracy	 (cf.	
Jung	 1996;	 Setälä	 1999;	 Vatter	 2000;	 2009;	Marxer	 and	 Pállinger	 2007).	While	 such	





This	 framework	 goes	 beyond	 purely	 structural	 explanations	 in	 terms	 of	 normative	
convictions	and	institutional	context	by	also	allowing	for	an	analysis	of	political	agency.	
	 Whether	 or	 not	 to	 institutionalize	 referendum	 legislation	 is	 a	 decision	made	 by	
political	authorities.	The	same	applies	to	decisions	to	organize	a	referendum	–	with	the	
exception	of	referendums	that	are	initiated	by	citizens	or	required	by	the	constitution.	








design,	 together	with	 the	 corresponding	 conceptual	 and	methodological	 choices.	 In	
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provides	an	overview	of	the	conceptualization	and	operationalization	of	my	dependent	
and	 independent	 variables.	 In	 section 3.4,	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	methods	 of	
analysis,	and	finally,	section 3.5	presents	an	overview	of	the	data	sources.







and	use	a	particular	 type	of	 referendum	because	 they	believe	 it	 is	 appropriate.	 Yet,	
while	 such	 approaches	 might	 explain	 why	 political	 actors	 decide	 at	 a	 certain	 point	




factors	 and	 take	 into	 account	 how	 political	 actors’	 decisions	 to	 institutionalize	 and	
use	 referendums	are	 shaped	by	 the	 type	of	democracy,	 the	number	of	 veto	players	





instances,	are	grounded	within	 the	 secondary	cases,	 i.e.	 countries	 (Scholz	and	Tietje	
2002;	 Yin	 2003).	 Hence,	 I	 assess	 both	 the	 availability	 of	 referendum	 provisions	 and	
frequency	of	use	within	European	democracies,	and	the	factors	that	impact	on	decisions	
to	 implement	 referendum	 legislation	 and	 pledge	 referendums	 at	 a	 certain	 point	 in	


















why	was	a	 referendum	held	on	a	 certain	occasion	and	not	on	another?)	 (cf.	Gerring	
2001,	190-191).	
3.2.1 The comparative case study design
This	 study	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 parts. The first	 part	 is	 descriptive	 and	 comprises	 a	




member	countries	is	provided	in	chapter 4.	The	second part of this research (chapters 
5-7)	 is	 explanatory	and	consists	of	 an	 in-depth	examination	of	available	 referendum	
provisions	 and	 referendums	 held	 in	 five	 selected	 countries:	 France,	 Denmark,	 the	
United	Kingdom,	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands.	This	part	thus	addresses	a	diverse	set	
of	cases,	namely	available referendum provisions and all referendums held in various 
countries.	 It	 combines	different	 types	of	comparison	 that	 follow	the	 logic	of	either	a	
most different systems design	 (MDSD)	 or	 a	most similar systems design	 (MSSD).	 An	
outline of this research design is provided in table 3.1,	and	is	elaborated	in	section	3.2.2.	
First,	however,	some	reflection	is	required	on	my	choice	for	a	comparative	case	study	
Table 3.1: Research Design
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design,	rather	than	a	large-N	statistical	analysis.	This	choice	is	grounded	in	the	nature	of	
the	dependent	variable	and	the	research	puzzle	that	I	aim	to	solve	(King,	Keohane	and	









	 There	 are	 four	 justifications	 for	 why	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 dependent	 variables	 –	
referendum	institutionalization	and	referendum	use	–	require	a	case-study	approach	
rather	than	a	statistical	analysis.16	The	first	is	what	Jacobs	(2011,	44)	calls	asymmetrical 
causation,	 meaning	 that	 explanations	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 referendums	 are	 not	
necessarily	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 the	 non-occurrence	 of	 referendums.	 For	 example,	
public	dissatisfaction	might	serve	as	catalyst	for	referendums	to	occur,	but	a	decrease	

































not	occur.	This	cannot	be	achieved	by	employing	a	statistical	 large-N	analysis.	 In	 the	
next	section,	I	set	out	the	foundations	on	which	such	a	design	is	built.
3.2.2 The cases in the comparative case-study design
The first	part	of	this	study	entails	a	comparison	of	available referendum provisions and 





thesis	 is	 to	explain	 referendum	practice	 in	European	democracies,	 I	need	a	selection	
criterion	 that	 guarantees	 that	 countries	 are	 indeed	 democratic.	Membership	 of	 the	
EU	 is	one	such	criterion.17	This	 rules	out	non-EU	countries	 in	Eastern	Europe	such	as	
Belarus,	Moldova	 and	 Ukraine,	 where	 referendums	 are	 also	 held,	 but	 hardly	 under	
democratic	conditions.
	 Arguably,	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	Central	 and	Eastern	European	 countries	 (CEECs)	 is	
problematic	 in	 terms	 of	 comparability.	 Given	 their	 history	 of	 Soviet	 control,	 their	
divergent	 paths	 towards	 democratic	 consolidation	 and	 their	 subsequent	 differences	
in	political	 culture,	 it	 is	 indeed	difficult	 to	 compare	CEEC	 referendums	with	 those	 in	
Western	Europe.	For	 that	 reason,	 I	have	excluded	 the	Central	and	Eastern	European	
countries	from	the	comparative	case	study	analysis.	However,	I	did	choose	to	include	
the	CEECs	in	the	descriptive	overview	of	referendum	practice	in	chapter 4.	The	reason	
for	 this	 is	 that	 claims	 of	 a	 direct	 democratic	 shift	 in	 Europe	 are	 often	 based	 on	 an	




plus	Cyprus	and	Malta	 (hereafter	 the	EU17)	 from	that	of	 the	eleven	post-communist	
accession	countries	that	joined	after	2000.
	 Of	course,	the	criterion	of	being	an	EU	member	country	rules	out	several	countries	
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because	I	need	to	select	countries	that	can	be	considered	susceptible	to	similar	pressures.	
One	 of	 the	 assumptions	 that	 serve	 as	 starting	 point	 for	much	 referendum	 research	




nurtured	 discourses	 in	 favour	 of	 referendums	 for	 ratifying	 a	 Constitution	 and	 some	
states	 provided	 a	 paradigm	 of	 this	 decision	 that	 could	 be	 appropriated	 by	 national	
actors’	 (Closa	 2007,	 1316).	 As	 there	 is	 considerable	 variation	 between	 EU	 countries	
regarding	the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	held,	such	a	process	of	diffusion	







in	 Europe	 that	 Rousseau	 would	 have	 regarded	 as	 genuinely	 democratic’	 (Bogdanor	
1994,	24).	Switzerland	 introduced	referendum	provisions	as	early	as	1848.	Currently,	
there	are	federal	provisions	for	mandatory	referendums,	citizen-initiated	referendums	
(both	 initiative	and	veto)	and	 legislative	minority	 referendums.18	Moreover,	between	
1950	and	2014,	over	450	federal-level	votes	were	held,	mostly	initiatives	or	mandatory	




	 A	 first	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 referendum	 use	 in	 Switzerland	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	
country’s	 exceptionally	 early	 and	 recurrent	 experience	with	 direct	 and	 participatory	
institutions.	 The	 origins	 of	 Swiss	 referendums	 should	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	
communal	 forms	 of	 government	 that	 characterized	 the	 Italian	 part	 of	 Switzerland	
in	 the	 thirteenth	 century,	 the	 French	 Revolution	 and	 Switzerland’s	 subsequent	 first	

























according	 to	whether	 referendum	 legislation	 is	provided	 for	 in	 the	 constitution,	and	
whether	referendums	were	used	frequently	or	only	to	a	limited	extent	between	1950	
and	2014.	This	analysis	in	chapter 4 reveals three clusters of countries (see table 3.2):	







	 Following	 George	 and	 Bennett	 (2004,	 5),	 I	 argue	 that	 such	 a	 comparative	 case-
study	design	with	a	diverse	 set	of	embedded	cases	–	namely	 referendum	 legislation	
and	 referendum	 instances	 in	 different	 countries	 –	 allows	me	 to	 test	 my	 theoretical	
propositions.	Such	an	embedded	research	design	also	solves	the	problem	of	‘too	many	




















Research strategy and methodology
Table 3.2: National referendums in three clusters of countries, 1950-201421















The	within-cluster comparisons	 follow	 the	 logic	of	 an	MDSD.	For	each	comparison,	 I	
select	 countries	 that	 score	 similarly	 on	 the	dependent	 variable	 (when	quantitatively	
defined)	 and	 that	 vary	 in	 many	 other	 aspects	 except	 for	 the	 country-level	 factors	
that	are	expected	to	affect	variation	on	the	dependent	variable	(see	table 3.3 for an 
overview	of	scores	on	the	dependent	factors	and	some	of	the	country-level	factors).22 
For	an	operationalization	of	all	variables,	see	section 3.3.	Although	type	of	democracy	
was	expected	 to	 impact	on	 referendum	practice,	 I	 nevertheless	 chose	 this	 factor	 as	
a	 criterion	 to	 select	 the	 five	 countries.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 comparative	




use	 of	 referendums	 once	 these	 countries	 have	 constitutional	 provisions	 for	 the	 use	




















Table 3.3: Overview of scores on the dependent variables and country-level factors
Dependent variables23 Independent country-level variables
Institutionalization Use Type of 
democracy
Veto players Experience Public 
demands24
France Yes High Majoritarian Medium	|	Low25 Yes High
Denmark Yes High Consensus Medium	|	Low26 Yes High
UK Yes Low Majoritarian Medium	|	Medium27 No Average
Sweden Yes Low Consensus Medium	|	Medium28 Yes Low
Netherlands No No/
Low









































Research strategy and methodology
	 In	chapter 5,	I	analyse	referendums	held	in	France	and	Denmark,	as	a	majoritarian	
and	 a	 consensus	 democracy	 with	 constitutional	 referendum	 provisions	 and	 where	
referendums	 have	 been	 relatively	 frequently	 used	 in	 the	 period	 under	 investigation	
(1950-2014).	 In	chapter 6,	 I	 analyse	 referendum	practice	 in	 the	UK	and	Sweden	–	as	
a	majoritarian	 and	 a	 consensus	 democracy	where	 referendums	 are	 institutionalized	
but	 where	 they	 have	 been	 held	 only	 sporadically.	 The	 difference	 between	 France	












Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 share	 some	 similar	 polity	 characteristics.	 Except	 for	
Cyprus,	 these	 are	 consensus	 democracies,	 characterized	 by	 relatively	 high	 levels	 of	
corporatism,	 a	 federalist	 (Belgium	 and	 Germany)	 or	 decentralized	 (the	 Netherlands)	
governing	structure,	a	bicameral	parliament,	and	a	relatively	rigid	constitution.	These	
factors	 could	 well	 account	 for	 the	 absence	 of	 national-level	 referendum	 legislation	
in	 these	 countries.	 Hence,	 no	 additional	 within-cluster	 comparison	 is	 necessary	 to	
assess	 whether	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 referendum	 provisions	 and	 use	 is	 absent	 in	
these	countries	applies	 in	different	contexts.	As	Cyprus	 is	classified	as	a	majoritarian	
democracy,	 a	 comparison	 with	 Cyprus	 would	 have	 allowed	 me	 to	 examine	 why	
referendum	 legislation	has	not	been	adopted	 in	 two	different	 institutional	 contexts.	
In	addition,	it	would	also	have	been	interesting	to	examine	under	which	conditions	a	
referendum	is	used	in	a	context	that	is	not	familiar	with	referendums.	However,	given	
the	 exceptional	 political	 context	 of	 it	 being	 a	 divided	 country,	 I	 do	 not	 perceive	 a	
comparison	with	Cyprus	suitable.	Moreover,	the	only	referendum	held	in	Cyprus	was	
triggered	by	the	UN,	and	this	is	not	comparable	with	motivations	elsewhere.





















is	 supported	by	 a	majority	 of	 the	members	 in	 parliament.	 For	 a	 long	time,	 the	 run-
off	voting	system	for	the	legislative	and	presidential	elections,	in	which	candidates	are	
chosen	on	 the	basis	of	majority,	or	plurality,	 rule,	 resulted	 in	a	bipolar	party	 system	
consisting	of	a	centre-left	bloc	and	a	centre-right	bloc	competing	for	office	(Cole	2003,	
12).	By	 contrast,	Denmark	 is	 characterized	as	 typical	 consensual	democracy,	marked	




and	 that	minority	 governments	 are	 therefore	often	 formed.	 This	means	 that	Danish	
decision-making	 is	 strongly	 consensus-	 and	 opposition-oriented.	 By	 ruling	 out	 these	
differences,	I	can	analyse	what	similar	factors	lead	to	the	fact	that	referendums	have	
been	held	in	both	countries	on	a	rather	frequent	basis.










THE	 UNITED	 KINGDOM	 AND	 SWEDEN.	 The	 second	 within-cluster comparison	 that	
follows	a	MDSD	logic	is	between	the	UK	and	Sweden,	two	countries	that	belong	to	the	
cluster	of	countries	where	referendums	are	institutionalized	but	held	only	sporadically.	
Other	 countries	 in	 this	 cluster	 are	 Spain,	 Austria,	 Malta,	 Portugal,	 Finland,	 Greece,	
Luxembourg,	 Poland,	 Romania,	 Estonia,	 Croatia,	 and	 Bulgaria.	 The	 countries	 in	 this	
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referendum	 on	 subsequent	 EU	 treaty	 reforms	 (Nice,	 TCE	 and	 Lisbon)	 suggests	 that	
referendums	on	‘Europe’	are	by	no	means	a	recurring	event	.	Hence,	this	choice	does	
not	bias	the	comparison	as	such.	
	 To	 a	 significant	 extent,	 the	 UK	 is	 an	 ambiguous	 case,	 as	 referendum	 provisions	
were	not	 	 formalized	until	2000.	This	 could	well	be	 the	 reason	why	 the	UK	has	held	
only	 two	 nationwide	 referendums.	 However,	 given	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 an	 uncodified	
constitution,	 referendums	 could	 always	 be	 triggered	 by	 parliamentary	 act.	 More	
importantly,	 recurring	 referendums	have	been	held	 in	 the	 separate	 countries	 of	 the	

















them	 (Bergman	 1993;	 Louwerse	 2014)	 –	 has	 led	 to	 a	 tendency	 to	 form	 single-party	








That	allows	an	examination	of	explanatory	 factors	 that	apply	across	 the	 institutional	






THE	 NETHERLANDS.	 The	 Netherlands	 represents	 an	 exceptional	 cluster	 of	 EU	
countries	 (also	 consisting	 of	 Belgium,	 Cyprus	 and	 Germany)	 where	 the	 constitution	
does	 not	 contain	 provisions	 for	 holding	 national	 referendums.	 For	 that	 reason,	 only	
one	national	referendum	has	been	held	 in	the	Netherlands	between	1950	and	2014,	
namely	in	2005	on	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty,	although	the	country	did	experience	
a	number	of	 referendums	 in	 the	 late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	centuries.	The	
institutionalization	of	referendums	has	been	a	recurrent	issue	on	the	political	agenda,	
and	several	initiatives	to	implement	it	have	failed.	The	Netherlands	therefore	provides	
an	 interesting	 explorative	 case	 to	 analyse	 such	 failures,	 and	 to	 ‘check’	whether	 the	
conclusions	 drawn	 from	 the	 two-country	 comparisons	 are	 valid.	 After	 all,	 if	 the	












country cross-cluster	 comparison.	 This	 comparison	 of	 similar	 countries	 that	 score	
differently	in	terms	of	referendum	practice	follows	the	logic	of	a	most	similar	systems	
design	(MSSD):	it	is	aimed	at	identifying	the	factors	that	contribute	to	different	outcomes	
















3.3 CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION
After	having	outlined	my	research	design	and	case	selection,	 in	 this	section	 I	outline	
the	 conceptualization	 and	 operationalization	 of	 the	 dependent	 variables	 –	 the	
institutionalization	and	use	of	national	referendums	–	and	independent	variables	–	type	
of	 democracy,	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	
values	and	strategic	interests.	
3.3.1 The dependent variables
My	dependent	variable	 is	 two-fold,	 comprising	 the	 institutionalization of referendum 
provisions and the democratic use of referendums.	 This	 distinction	 between	 the	
availability	of	constitutional	referendum	provisions	and	their	use	is	important.	Although	
I	 expect	 the	 independent	 variables	 to	 affect	 both	 institutionalization	 and	 use,	 I	 also	
expect	those	effects	to	come	in	different	degrees,	because	having	a	constitution	that	
provides	 for	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums	 is	 certainly	 not	 the	 same	 as	 actually	
using	these	provisions.	Both	the	institutionalization	of	referendum	provisions	and	use	







Table 3.4: Conceptualization of referendum institutionalization and use












































and	use.	 These	 relate	 to	 four	 additional	 aspects:	 1)	 The	 function	of	 the	 referendum	
(decision-promotive	 or	 decision-controlling);	 2)	 The	 applicability	 of	 quorums;	 3)	 The	
issues	on	which	referendums	can	be	held;	and	4)	The	effect	of	the	outcome	(binding	
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	 The	 same	 differentiation	 applies	 to	 referendum	 use,	 which	 entails	 not	 only	 the	
frequency	with	which	 referendums	are	used	but	also	 the	 types	used.	Of	course,	 the	
nature	of	 the	 referendum	provisions	 and	nature	of	 referendum	use	 largely	 interact:	
after	 all,	 mandatory	 referendums	 are	 held	 precisely	 because	 they	 need	 to	 be	 held.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	having	a	constitutional	requirement	does	not	necessarily	
lead	 to	 this	 type	 of	 referendum	 being	 held:	Malta	 and	 Spain,	 for	 example	 –	 where	











3.3.2 The independent variables  
In	chapter	2,	I	outlined	six	factors	that	are	assumed	to	contribute	to	the	institutionalization	
and	use	of	referendums:	type	of	democracy,	number	of	veto	players,	past	referendum	
experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	 values	 and	 strategic	 interests.	 These	 variables	
are	measured	 on	 different	 levels:	 type	 of	 democracy,	 number	 of	 veto	 players,	 past	
referendum	 experience	 and	 public	 demands	 are	 measured	 at	 country	 level,	 while	
political	values	and	strategic	interests	are	measured	at	referendum	level.	This	section	










































	 Policy-seeking:	 Enforcing	 policy	 outcome	 by	 bypassing	 national	
parliamentary	majority	or	EU	colleagues	(in	case	of	EU	referendums)




















since	 these	 countries	 combine	elements	of	both	 and	 there	 are	 too	 few	countries	 to	
make	reliable	distinctions	(see	also	Roberts	2006,	38).	In	chapter 2,	I	placed	Lijphart’s	
models	 within	 a	 two-dimensional	 framework	 to	 demarcate	 between	 different	
democratic	repertoires:	the	dimension	of	representation	versus	participation,	and	the	
dimension	 of	 preference	 aggregation	 versus	 preference	 integration.	 Both	 consensus	






In	 referendums	 triggered	 and	 controlled	 by	 representatives	 (legislative	 majority,	
legislative	 minority	 and	 presidential	 referendums,	 and	 some	 referendums	 that	 I	
labelled	as	mandatory	but	which	are	in	practice	not	strictly	required),	representative	
sovereignty	prevails	over	popular	sovereignty,	while	the	latter	prevails	in	referendums	
that	 are	 initiated	 by	 citizens	 themselves	 or	 are	 strictly	 required	 by	 the	 constitution.	
This	is,	however,	also	affected	by	the	effect	of	the	vote	(binding	or	advisory),	whether	
or	 not	 a	 quorum	applies,	 and	whether	 or	 not	 there	 are	 restrictions	 on	 the	 subjects	
on	which	referendums	can	be	held.	 In	addition,	 in	referendums	that	can	be	 initiated	
by	 minorities	 (legislative	 minority	 and	 citizen-initiated	 referendums),	 the	 notion	 of	






















necessary	 to	approve	a	 referendum	bill	 is	 the	government	party,	as	 this	party	holds	




	 The	 character	 of	 the	 polity	 is	 not	 the	 only	 determinant	 of	 the	 number	 of	 veto	
players.	 The	 number	 of	 players	 able	 to	 veto	 a	 decision	 to	 institutionalize	 or	 use	
a	 referendum	 is	 also	 determined	 by	 the	 rules	 by	 which	 referendum	 legislation	 is	




democratic	polity	 (majoritarian	or	consensus),	 there	 is	a	wide	variety	of	 institutional	
set-ups	in	both	majoritarian	and	consensus	countries,	and	the	actual	number	of	veto	

















held,	I	 look	at	whether the pre-WWII constitution of the country included referendum 
provisions and whether the country had experience with holding a referendum prior 
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process-tracing,	by	which	the	motivations	of	political	actors	are	unravelled.	The	second	
way	 to	 define	 experience	 is	 in	 terms	 of	 contemporary	 experience.	 Thus,	 I	 examine	





PUBLIC	 DEMANDS.	 The	 fourth	 factor	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 impact	 upon	 the	

























they	 can	 be	 used	 to	 infer	 the	 potential	 level	 of	 referendum	 demands	 by	 assessing	








risk	of	 individualistic	fallacy	(Landman	2003,	53-55):	 I	use	data	collected	at	 individual	
level	to	make	inferences	about	countries	in	a	certain	period	of	time.	However,	I	believe	
that	 the	 bias	 this	 engenders	 is	 limited	 due	 to	 the	 combination	 of	 data	 sources	 and	
methods	of	analysis	(see	next	section)	that	I	use	in	the	case	studies.	This	combination	
allows	me	 to	 assess	 the	potential	 level	 of	 public	 referendum	demands	 in	 society.	 In	
addition,	 by	 the	 method	 of	 process-tracing,	 I	 assess	 the	 likelihood	 that	 politicians’	
decisions	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums	is	a	response	to	public	demands.	
POLITICAL	 VALUES.	 The	 fifth	 variable	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 affect	 the	 availability	 and	
nature	of	referendum	provisions	and	the	actual	use	of	referendums	is	political values.	
By	 elaborating	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Bratton	 and	Mattes	 (2001),	 who	 made	 a	 distinction	









of electoral	reform	(related	to	increasing	representation, accountability or simplicity),	I	
argue	that	political	actors	value	referendums	instrumentally	when	they	perceive	them	
as	a	means	to	another	end,	for	example,	of	strengthening	the	polity’s	input	(Renwick’s	
representation and simplicity)	 or	 output	 legitimacy	 (Renwick’s	 accountability)	 (the	
distinction	 between	 input	 and	 output	 legitimacy	 is	 adopted	 from	 Scharpf	 1999).	 I	
operationalized	such	motivations	in	terms	of	whether	positive	values	were	assigned	to	
a	referendum	bill	and	the	emphasis	placed	on	this	value	by	the	political	actor.	
	 In	addition,	 following	Bowler,	Donovan	and	Karp	 (2002,	733),	 I	 also	analyse	how	
such	values	relate	to	party	ideology	(either	post-materialism	or	populism).	As	I	argued	






















for	 referendum	 legislation	might	become	a	 strategy	 to	win	votes.	When	 it	 comes	 to	
the	actual	 triggering	of	 referendums,	 the	differentiation	between	outcome-	and	act-
contingent	 motivations	 is	 too	 limited.	 Therefore,	 in	 chapter 2,	 I	 further	 distinguish	





























Table 3.6: Conditions for assessing referendum strategies
Initiator faces 














Policy-seeking	–	nat. NO Not	relevant YES Not	relevant
Policy-seeking	–	EU	/	
EU	bargaining
NO Not	relevant YES Not	relevant
Empowerment	–	nat. YES Not	relevant YES If	yes,	extra	
motivation
Empowerment	–	EU	 YES Not	relevant YES Not	relevant





3.4 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
As	I	stated	above,	the	aim	of	my	research	is	four-fold.	First,	I	aim	to	provide	a	classification	






embedded	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	 Hence,	 this	 study	 comprises	 two	main	
analyses:	a	descriptive	one	 to	assess	 the	shift,	and	an	explanatory	one	 to	assess	 the	
determinants	of	referendum	practice	and	how	it	varies	among	countries.	This	required	
collecting	data	on	countries	(to	assess	the	shift	and	country-level	factors	that	influence	
the	 institutionalization	 and	 use	 of	 referendums)	 and	 on	 referendum	 provisions	 and	
referendum	 instances	 (to	 assess	 the	 micro-level	 factors	 that	 influence	 referendum	
practice).	 To	 assess	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	 referendum	 practice,	 I	 formulated	 six	



















These	data	are	used	to	answer	the	first	two	research	questions:	1) Did Europe experience 
an increase in the institutionalization and the use of national referendums between 
1950 and 2014? And 2) If so, does this increase mark a shift from national decision-
making by representation to decision-making by direct citizens’ participation? The data 
are	 also	 used	 to	 select	 the	 cases	 examined	 in	 chapters	 5-7	 (countries,	 referendum	
provisions	 and	 referendum	 instances).	 Although	 this	 cross-country	 comparison	 is	
mainly	descriptive,	chapter 4	also	provides	information	to	assess	the	validity	of	these	
expectations	 concerning	 two	 country-level	 factors:	 type	 of	 democracy	 and	 past	
referendum	experience.	
	 To	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 referendum-level	 factors,	 I	 conduct	 within-country	
comparisons	of	decisions	on	whether	to	institutionalize	and	pledge	referendums.	I	do	
this	by	the	method	of	process-tracing,	 in	which	I	reconstruct such decisions, and test 
my	theoretical	expectations	(see	George	and	Bennett	2004).	In	the	country	chapters,	I	
first	provide	a	narrative	of	the	context	surrounding	decisions	to	institutionalize	and	use	
referendums,	by	analysing	how	the	factors	type of democracy, number of veto players, 
past referendum experience and public demands	might	have	affected	such	decisions.	A	
second	step	is	to	analyse	the	motivations,	in	terms	of	either	political values or strategic 
interests,	 by	 which	 political	 actors	 decided	 to	 institutionalize	 or	 use	 referendums.	
Combining	these	findings	allows	me	to	provide	a	causal	narrative	of	why	referendums	
in	 each	 particular	 country	 became	 institutionalized	 and	 used.	 To	 establish	 such	 a	
narrative,	three	steps	need	to	be	taken	into	account	(see	Jacobs	2011,	62-63),	namely	























country-level	 factors	 and	 then	provide	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 referendum-level	
factors.	
3.4.2. Assessing the impact of the country-level and referendum-level factors 
To	answer	the	third	research	question	(Which factors contribute to the institutionalization 
and use of national referendums in European democracies?), I	assess	the	impact	of	both	













not.	This	 is	different	 for	 the	referendum-level	 factors.	 Indeed,	analysing	motives	 is	a	
daunting	task.	Hence,	I	am	only	able	to	conclude	that	certain	motivations	likely	played	




of	predictions	to	be	used	in	process-tracing	analyses:	straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking 
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counterfactual reasoning (see table 3.7).	In	examining	whether	a	suspect	is	guilty	of	a	
murder,	the	straw in the wind test	would	be	passed	if	the	suspect	was	with	the	victim	
prior	to	the	murder.	Passing	this	test	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	to	infer	a	causal	




it;	if,	however,	the	test	is	a	failure,	the	hypothesis	is	proved	false.	The	smoking gun test 
would	be	passed	 if	 the	suspect	was	 literally	caught	with	a	smoking	gun.	Passing	 this	
test	is	not	necessary	to	infer	a	causation	(the	suspect	could	have	murdered	the	victim	
with	another	weapon),	but	it	is	sufficient.	Hence,	if	the	test	is	passed,	the	hypothesis	is	
confirmed;	but	if	it	is	failed,	the	hypothesis	is	not	eliminated.	The	double decisive test 
would	be	passed	if	the	suspect	was	recorded	on	camera	while	murdering	the	victim:	
this	 is	 both	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 to	 infer	 that	 the	 suspect	murdered	 the	 victim.	
Hence,	if	the	test	is	passed	it	confirms	the	hypothesis	and,	if	it	is	failed	the	hypothesis	is	
eliminated.	Passing	the	test	also	implies	that	alternative	hypotheses	are	eliminated.	
Table 3.7: Four tests of process-tracing for causal inference



























allows	for	the	use	of	hoop tests.	After	all,	 if	political	actors	assigned	strong	values	 in	
favour	 of	 a	 referendum,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 that	 the	 referendum	 was	
indeed	motivated	by	such	values,	but	it	is	at	least	likely.	If	such	values	were	not	assigned	
to	the	referendum,	however,	it	is	unlikely	that	it	was	motivated	by	these	values	(since	












	 In	 some	 cases,	 I	 can	 contrast	 values	 with	 strategic	 interests,	 thereby	 inferring	
which	of	the	two	is	 likely	to	have	been	decisive.	 If	a	government	decides	to	organize	
a	 referendum	 on	 ratification	 of	 an	 EU	 treaty,	 it	 can	 claim	 that	 this	 is	 because	 such	














whether	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 towards	 intensified	 national-level	 referendum	 practice	 in	








legislative	 majority,	 legislative	 minority;	 mandatory	 or	 citizen-initiated	 –	 veto	 or	
initiative).	For	this	assessment,	I	use	the	database	of	the	Centre for Research on Direct 
Democracy.31 
	 To	assess	the	presence	and	strength	of	the	six	factors	(type	of	democracy,	number	
of	 veto	 players,	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 public	 demands,	 political	 values	 and	







Research strategy and methodology
types of data sources. A	detailed	overview	of	all	sources	used	in	the	country	studies	in	
chapters 5-7 is provided in appendix 3.	To	determine	a	country’s	type	of	democracy,	I	
use	Lijphart’s	majoritarian-consensus	division	(see	appendix 1 for an	overview	of	some	
institutional	 characteristics	 per	 EU	 country).	 To	 assess	 the	 institutional	 fit	 between	
referendum	provisions	and	type	of	democracy,	I	compare	referendum	provisions	in	28	
EU	countries,	based	on	data	from	the	Direct Democracy Navigator. In	addition,	country	
studies	allow	me	to	examine	the	relationship	between	type	of	democracy	and	the	nature	






of	 referendums	 is	 the	number	of	veto	players.	Although	 I	 labelled	 this	as	a	 country-







number	of	 veto	players	 in	 the	case	of	particular	decisions	 to	 initiate	 (or	not	 initiate)	
referendum	bills.	I	used	election	outcomes	on	the	effective	number	of	parliamentary	
parties	 and	 information	 about	 government	 compositions	 to	 gather	 this	 data.	 I	 also	
needed	 information	 about	 parties’	 preferences	 regarding	 referendums	 in	 general	
and	on	particular	referendum	bills.	This	information	was	gathered	by	using	secondary	
literature	and	official	documents,	such	as	party	manifestos	and	parliamentary	reports.
To	 assess	 whether	 a	 country	 has	 a	 past	 referendum	 experience,	 I	 mainly	 use	
secondary	 literature	and	official	political	documents,	 such	as	past	 constitutions.	 The	
conceptualization	 of	 experience as	 a	 binary	 variable	 is	 highly	 problematic,	 as	 this	
also	 includes	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	 referendum	was	held	 and	 the	outcome,	 how	
this	 experience	 is	 perceived	 both	 by	 the	 authorities	 and	 citizens,	 and	 the	 role	 that	
referendums	have	played	in	the	political	debate.	For	this	reason,	I	analyse	this	variable	
in-depth	 in	 the	 country	 studies	 to	 obtain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 that	
referendum	experience	plays	in	a	country’s	current	referendum	conduct.
	 I	 operationalized	 public	 demands	 in	 terms	 of	 five	 proxies:	 the	 level	 of	 support	
for	referendums,	the	 level	of	support	for	a	particular	referendum,	the	level	of	public	
dissatisfaction	 (dissatisfaction	 with	 democracy,	 and	 distrust	 of	 political	 parties,	
parliament	 and	 government),	 average	 level	 of	 Euroscepticism	 (lack	 of	 support	 for	






membership;	 dissatisfaction	 with	 EU	 democracy;	 and	 distrust	 of	 EU),	 and	 the	 level	









be	 decided	 by	 referendum’.	 I	 also	 used	 national	 public	 opinion	 survey	 data-sets	 to	
assess	average	support	in	a	country	for	referendums	in	general.	Support	for	a	particular	
referendum	is	also	measured	by	national	survey	data,	if	available.	Dissatisfaction	with	





	 Conclusions	on	 the	basis	of	 these	data	bear	 the	 risk	of	 individual	 fallacy:	 results	
obtained	 through	 analysis	 of	 individual-level	 data	 are	 used	 to	 make	 inferences	










Research strategy and methodology





































To	 assess	 the	 effect	 of	 political	 values	 on	 referendum	 practice,	 I	 needed	 to	 gather	
information	on	the	referendum	level.	I	needed	to	know	whether	political	actors	indeed	
assigned intrinsic and instrumental	 values	 to	 referendums,	 but	 also	 whether	 their	
decisions	to	implement	or	use	referendums	(or	not	to	do	so)	were	likely	to	be	driven	by	
such	values.	To	do	this,	I	used	a	number	sources:	official	party	documents	(by	using	the	
Manifesto Project Database and	for	the	Dutch	case	the	database	of	the	Documentation 
Centre for Dutch Political Parties),	 political	 statements,	 media	 articles	 (by	 using	
LexisNexis)	and	secondary	 literature.	For	the	Dutch	case,	 in	which	 I	more	thoroughly	
assess	 the	 role	 of	 political	 ideology,	 I	 also	 made	 use	 of	 minutes	 of	 parliamentary	
debates	and	interviews	conducted	by	Kristof	Jacobs	when	writing	his	dissertation	The 
Power or the People: Direct Democratic and Electoral Reforms in Austria, Belgium and 
the Netherlands	(2011).	This	is	possible	since	referendum	legislation	was	only	recently	
implemented	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 a	 referendum	 only	 recently	 held.	 The	 other	





















Denmark	 (chapter 5)	 as	 two	 countries	with	 different	 types	 of	 democracy	 and	which	
held	a	relatively	large	number	of	referendums	in	the	period	between	1950	and	2014;	




















REFERENDUM PROVISIONS AND USE IN EU COUNTRIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As argued in chapter 2,	most	 referendum	 literature	assumes	 that,	 together	with	 the	
consolidation	 and	 endurance	 of	 democracy,	 twentieth-century	 Europe	 witnessed	
an	 increase	 in	the	use	of	referendums.	At	the	same	time,	scholars	acknowledge	that	




This	 study	 takes	 instead	 cross-country	 variations	 in	 referendum	practice	as	 its	point	












the	frequency	with	which	referendums	are	used,	but	also	what type of referendums are 
provided for and used.	 I	 therefore	examine	cross-country	differences	 in	who	triggers	
referendums,	 the	 functions	 that	 referendums	have	 in	 the	decision-making	process	 is	
(decision-promotive	or	decision-controlling),	whether	the	provisions	prescribe	specific	
quorums,	whether	 subject	 restrictions	 are	 applicable,	 and	whether	 referendums	are	
binding	or	advisory.	The	analysis	presented	 in	this	chapter	provides	the	basis	 for	the	
remaining	 empirical	 chapters	 in	 this	 study.	 Section	 4.2	 analyses	 the	 constitutional	
availability	of	referendum	provisions,	and	the	nature	of	these	provisions	and	associated	
procedures	in	the	EU28.	In	section	4.3,	I	examine	the	actual	use	of	referendums	on	an	
aggregated	 level	 and	 in	 section	 4.4,	 I	 disaggregate	 these	 findings	 by	 country,	 taking	
into	 account	 the	 types	 of	 referendum	 that	 are	 used	 and	 the	 issues	 on	 which	 they	






Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
the	 participatory	 nature	 of	 referendum	 use,	 and	 outline	 in	what	way	 cross-country	
differences	in	provisions	and	use	correspond	to	the	nature	of	the	democratic	polity.	





In	 addition,	 to	assess	whether	 the	nature	of	 the	 referendum	provisions	 in	 European	
constitutions	marks	such	a	shift	in	national	decision-making,	this	section	also	provides	
an	overview	of	the	types	of	referendum	provided	for.	
4.2.1 The context of referendum institutionalization
Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	a	growing	number	of	EU	member	states	adopted	
referendum	 provisions	 in	 their	 democratic	 constitutions.	 Currently,	 there	 are	 only	
four	EU	countries	where	the	constitution	does	not	make	explicit	reference	to	the	use	
of	 national	 referendums,	 namely	 Belgium,	 Cyprus,	 Germany	 and	 the	 Netherlands.33 








Ireland).	 The	 second	 group	 consists	 of	 countries	where	 referendum	provisions	were	
(re-)adopted	 in	 the	constitution	between	1945	and	1990	 (Italy,	France,	Malta,	Spain,	
Greece,	Finland	and	Portugal).	The	third	group	consists	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	
countries	 where	 referendum	 provisions	 were	 (re-)adopted	 in	 the	 new	 post-1989	
constitutions.	Finally,	in	the	United	Kingdom,	referendum	legislation	was	not	introduced	
until	the	twenty-first	century.	
	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 five	 EU	 members	 countries	 where	 referendum	
legislation	was	 in	 place	 prior	 to	 the	 Second	World	War,	 a	 first	wave	 of	 referendum	














were	already	 introduced	during	 the	French	Revolution,	and	were	 frequently	used	by	
Napoleon	I	and	Napoleon	III.	1946,	however,	marked	the	first	time	France	had	adopted	
a	democratic	constitution	that	 included	referendum	provisions.	 In	 Italy,	referendums	
were	institutionalized	in	1948	with	the	coming	into	force	of	the	democratic	constitution	
after	 fascist	 rule	 and	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Second	World	War,	 and	 these	 provisions	





referendums	 as	 such	 were	 certainly	 not	 a	 new	 phenomenon,	 as	 they	 were	 already	
constitutionally	provided	 for	 (in	Portugal	and	Spain)	and	used	 (in	all	 three	countries)	
under	dictatorial	 rule.	Malta	 implemented	 the	 referendum	 in	 1964	with	 the	 coming	
into	force	of	its	constitution,	after	gaining	independence	from	the	UK.	Finally,	Finland	
introduced	referendum	provisions	by	specific	constitutional	amendment	in	1987.	
Table 4.1: Referendum institutionalization in European democracies 














































Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
of	 communist	 rule	 and	 the	 subsequent	 necessity	 to	 adopt	 a	 new	 constitution	 (Albi	
2005).	Following	 the	many	examples	of	 their	European	counterparts,	 it	was	a	 logical	
step	 for	 the	CEECs	 to	 adopt	 referendum	provisions	 in	 their	 constitutions	 (Council	 of	
Europe	1998).	
	 In	 the	UK,	 referendums	had	no	 formal	 status	until	 the	beginning	of	 the	 twenty-
first	century.	As	the	UK	has	an	uncodified	constitution,	referendums	are,	and	were	also	
prior	 to	 that	 period,	 triggered	 by	 Parliamentary	Act.	 From	2000	onward,	 the	 use	 of	











referendums,	and	even	 for	citizens’	 initiatives.	This	 latter	provision	was	however	not	


















after	authoritarian	 rule,	 independence	or	 regime	change;	 the	exceptions	are	France,	







connected	 to	 country-specific	 processes	 of	 constitutional	 consolidation	 or	 change,	





4.2.2 Nature of referendum provisions
In	chapter 2,	 I	 provided	a	 classification	of	five	different	 referendums	on	 the	basis	of	
the	actor	who	ultimately	decides	whether	or	not	 the	 referendum	 is	held.	When	 the	
constitution	 prescribes	 that	 a	 referendum	 is	 held	 on	 certain	 type	 of	 issues,	 these	
are considered mandatory	 referendums.	 Optional	 referendums	 pledged	 by	 political	
representatives	can	be	divided	into	presidential	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	
the	president	 (and	for	which,	 in	principle,	 the	consent	of	a	parliamentary	majority	 is	
not	required);	legislative	majority	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	
majority	 (i.e.	 in	 most	 cases,	 but	 not	 necessarily,	 the	 government);	 and	 legislative	
minority	referendums,	which	are	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority.	Finally,	there	
are citizen-initiated	referendums,	optional	referendums	directly	triggered	by	a	certain	
proportion	 of	 the	 citizenry.	 When	 placing	 these	 five	 referendum	 types	 on	 a	 scale	
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initiated	 by	 representative	 bodies	 are	 most	 common:	 they	 are	 constitutionally	

























for	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 In	 the	 EU17	 countries,	 it	 is	 largely	 impossible	 for	








	 To	 link	 referendums	 to	various	democratic	 traditions,	 I	argued	 in	chapter 2 that, 
besides	 the	question	of	whether	 the	 referendum	process	 is	 controlled	by	citizens	or	
representatives,	 the	question	of	whether	 it	 is	 controlled	 by	 the	political	majority	 or	
by	minorities	 is	 also	 important.	 I	 therefore	 further	 divided	 referendums	 initiated	by	
representatives	 into	 three	 categories,	 based	 on	 who	 ultimately	 decides	 whether	 a	
referendum	 is	 held:	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	 (legislative	
majority	referendums),	referendums	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	minority	(legislative	
minority	referendums)	and,	finally,	referendums	triggered	by	the	president	(presidential	
referendums).	Table 4.3	provides	an	overview	of	 the	availability	of	 the	 four	 types	of	
referendum	 triggered	by	 actors	 (rather	 than	 the	 constitution)	 in	 the	 28	 EU	member	
countries	 and	 the	 position	 of	 these	 referendums	 within	 this	 two-dimensional	
classification.	
	 Legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 most	 commonly	 provided	 for,	 in	 17	 EU	
countries.	 In	 the	Czech	Republic,	 the	 constitution	only	 specifies	 that	 parliament	 can	
decide	 to	 organize	 a	 referendum	 on	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 by	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	
constitutional	act.	Given	this	exceptional	character,	this	country	 is	placed	 in	 italics	 in	
table 4.3.	 Presidential	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 three	 semi-presidential	
countries	 in	 the	 EU28	 (France,	 Portugal	 and	 Romania),	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Croatia	 and	
Poland.	 Legislative	minority	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 only	 eleven	 countries,	
most	of	them	consensus	democracies.	The	exceptions	are	France	(since	2015),	Ireland	
and	 Spain,	 which	 are	 majoritarian	 democracies.	 However,	 in	 Spain	 a	 parliamentary	
minority	 can	 only	 trigger	 a	 vote	 on	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	 constitution,	 and	 these	
votes	are	advisory.	In	addition,	in	France,	a	parliamentary	minority	needs	the	additional	
support	of	one-tenth	of	the	electorate	(by	means	of	a	signature	petition)	to	trigger	a	











Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
Citizen-initiated	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 only	 ten	 countries,	 most	 of	 them	




Table 4.3: Constitutional availability of four referendum types in EU38
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
As	I	argued	in	chapter 2,	to	assess	more	comprehensively	who	controls	the	referendum	
and	 the	ultimately	decision-making	processes,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 four	other	



















Luxembourg,	Spain,	Sweden, UK,	Bulgaria,  
Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 



















LEGISLATIVE	 MAJORITY	 REFERENDUMS.	 As	 shown	 in	 table 4.3,	 in	 seventeen	 EU	
countries	the	constitution	contains	provisions	for	holding	referendums	triggered	by	a	







only	 in	 case	 of	 constitutional	 revision	 or	 (also)	 on	 regular	 policy	 issues	 (see	 below).	
Finally,	in	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Hungary,	Latvia,	Malta,	and	Slovakia,	referendums	can	be	
initiated	 by	 parliamentary	majorities,	and	 by	 opposition	 parties	when	 supported	 by	
citizens’	signatures	(citizen-initiated	referendums,	see	below).		
	 Legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 most	 commonly	 triggered	 by	 a	 simple	 or	




However,	 in	 consensus	 countries,	 and	 most	 notably	 countries	 where	 minority	
governments	 are	 common,	 such	 as	 in	 Sweden,	 the	 function	 of	 legislative	 majority	
referendums	 can	 also	 be	 decision-controlling:	 i.e.	 referendums	 are	 not	 necessarily	
triggered	by	the	parliamentary	majority	that	approved	the	proposal,	but	potentially also 
by	a	majority	in	opposition.	
	 In	most	 countries	where	a	 referendum	 is	 triggered	by	 a	parliamentary	majority,	
this	can	be	done	in principle	on	any	type	of	legislation.	This	is	shown	in	table 4.4.	This	




Adoption of new constitution Amendment 
of democratic 
constitutionFull revision of democratic 
constitution
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CEECs,	the	power	of	the	majority	to	trigger	a	referendum	is	restricted	by	specific	subject	
requirements:	 either	 referendums	 can	only	be	pledged	on	politically	weighty	 issues,	
such	as	the	constitution	or	the	EU,	or	there	are	considerable	exceptions	regarding	the	
issues	on	which	a	referendum	can	be	held,	as	is	the	case	in	Hungary	and	Slovakia.
Table 4.4: Legislative majority referendums: issues
EU17 CEECs























there	are	 regulated	by	a	 specific	 constitutional	 act.	 The	UK	 is	placed	 in	 italics,	 since	
referendum	 provisions	 are	 not	 unequivocal.	 UK-wide	 referendums	 are	 in	 principle	
advisory	 and	 held	 prior	 to	 the	 parliamentary	 vote,	 unless	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	
decides	 to	 hold	 a	 post-legislative	 binding	 referendum.	 Also,	 in	 principle,	no quorum 
is	specified,	but	a	majority	in	parliament	can	decide	otherwise.	Indeed,	in	most	EU17	
countries,	 legislation	on	 legislative	majority	 referendums	does	 not	 specify	 quorums,	






















Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia
Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
PRESIDENTIAL	REFERENDUMS.	In	the	three	semi-presidential	systems	in	the	EU	(France,	
Portugal	 and	 Romania)	 the	 president	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Only	 in	 Romania	





(with	 the	 exception	 of	 France	 since	 2015),	 in	 these	 two	 countries,	 parliamentarians	
can	also	trigger	a	 referendum.	 In	most	cases,	presidential	 referendums	are	decision-
promotive,	 as	 the	 president	 usually	 belongs	 to	 the	 party	 that	 holds	 the	majority	 in	
parliament.	However,	presidential	referendums	can	also	be	decision-controlling,	when	
they	serve	to	veto	a	proposal	submitted	by	a	parliamentary	majority.	This	is,	however,	
only	 plausible	 in	 periods	 of	 cohabitation,	 when	 the	 president	 comes	 from	 another	
political	party	than	the	party	that	holds	the	parliamentary	majority.	The	2007	Romanian	
referendum	 initiated	by	president	Basescu	 is	 an	example.	 This	 referendum	was	held	
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majority.	 This	 generally	 implies	 legislative	 proposals	 or	 proposals	 to	 amend	 the	
constitution	 that	 are	 not	 yet	 in	 effect	 (rejective	 referendums).	 In	 Italy,	 five	 regional	
councils	can	trigger	a	referendum	to	veto	decrees	that	have	already	been	implemented	
(abrogative	 referendums).	 Such	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 regional	 councils	 are	 of	
course	not	strictly	speaking	legislative	minority	referendums,	as	they	are	not	triggered	





















Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.
When	 referendums	can	be	 triggered	by	a	minority	 in	opposition,	 this	 can	usually	be	
done	on	a	wide	range	of	issues	and	the	effect	of	the	votes	is	usually	binding.	In	some	
countries,	 such	 as	 Austria,	 Luxembourg,	 Poland,	 Spain	 and	 Sweden,	 parliamentary	
minorities	can	trigger	a	referendum	only	on	proposals	to	amend	the	constitution,	and	
not	 on	 regular	 legislation.	 In	 addition,	 in	 binding	 legislative	 minority	 referendums,	















minority	 referendums	are	binding	 in	effect	and	never	 require	a	quorum.	 In	 Italy	and	
Spain,	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 on	 constitutional	 reform	 are	 advisory,	 and	
subsequently,	do	not	require	a	quorum.	
CITIZEN-INITIATED	 REFERENDUMS.	 The	 number	 of	 countries	 where	 citizens	 can	









these votes is only decision-controlling.	 Such	vetoes	can,	 in	principle,	deal	with	both	
constitutional	 issues	 and	 regular	 legislative	 proposals.	 Exceptions	 are	 Luxembourg	 –	
where	citizens	can	only	veto	proposals	on	constitutional	revision	–	and	Malta	–	where	
constitutional	 amendment	 proposals	 are	 specifically	 excluded	 from	 the	 citizens’	




decision-promotive	 citizens’	 referendums	 (or	 citizens’	 initiatives)	 are	 provided	 for	
in	 Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	Hungary,	 Lithuania	 and	 Slovakia.	Hence,	 in	 none	of	 the	 ‘old’	 EU	
member	states	do	citizens	themselves	have	the	right	to	initiate	a	referendum	on	a	self-
written	policy	proposal.	
	 Regulations	 for	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	are	 stricter	 than	 for	other	 types	of	
referendum.	In	all	countries,	the	constitution	explicitly	prescribes	the	issues	on	which	
such	referendums	cannot	be	held.	Also	turnout	quorums	are	usually	specified.	Citizens’	



























Table 4.7: Mandatory referendums: issues and introduction
Mandatory referendum on 
constitution





















Latvia ‘dissolution of 
parliament’ 
Sources:	Direct Democracy Navigator; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy; country	constitutions;	see	
appendix	1	for	an	extended	overview.





referendums	do	not	automatically	 sideline	governments.	The	actual	 control	 that	 the	
government	 exercises	 over	 the	 triggering	 of	 such	 constitutional	 referendums	 is,	
however,	difficult	 to	assess	and	depends	on	 the	political	 context	and	public	opinion.	













1996a,	 100).	 Moreover,	 in	 some	 countries,	 legislation	 is	 crafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	
a	 referendum	 is	 only	 required	 in	 the	event	of	 certain	 amendments.	 For	 example,	 in	
Estonia,	 Lithuania	and	Spain,	a	 referendum	 is	only	 required	 in	 the	case	of	a	 revision	
of certain constitutional	 articles,	 while	 in	 Austria	 a	 referendum	 is	 only	 mandatory	






a	 referendum	and	 instead	submit	 the	bill	 to	Congress,	 the	 joint	assembly	of	 the	two	
houses	of	parliament.





is	 indeed	required.	Thus,	 these	votes	are	not	strictly	 speaking	mandatory.	As	will	be	
shown	in	the	case-study	chapters,	there	are	many	cases	in	which	governments	decided	
that	a	 specific	EU	 treaty	 ratification	did	not	 signify	 a	 transfer	of	 sovereignty.	Hence,	
in	 these	 cases,	 the	 ruling	majority	exercises	 considerable	 control	over	 the	 triggering	
process.	
	 A	 second	 element	 is	 whether	 indirect	 control	 over	 the	 triggering	 of	 the	 vote	 is	
exercised	by	the	ruling	majority	or	whether	opposition	parties	also	play	a	role	in	this	
process.	 As	 I	 argued	 in	 chapter 2,	 this	 depends	 on	 how	 parliament	 decides	 on	 the	

















and hence to indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum.	 Such	 decisions	 are	made	 by	 a	 simple	
majority	in	Denmark,	France	and	Ireland.	In	these	countries,	triggering	the	referendum	






party	or	coalition	determines	whether	a	referendum	is	necessary	under	Article 20, once 





referendum	was	mandatory	 in	 the	case	of	 ratifying	 the	accession	of	other	 countries	
to	 the	 EU.	 In	 2008,	 a	 clause	was	 introduced	which	 stated	 that	 a	 referendum	on	 EU	
enlargement	is	not	held	when	the	motion	is	adopted	in	Congress	(the	joint	assembly	of	
the	two	houses	of	parliament)	by	a	three-fifths	majority.	Rather	than	strictly	mandatory,	




	 The	 EU17	 countries	where	mandatory	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 are	mainly	
majoritarian	 democracies,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Austria	 and	 Denmark.	 This	 finding	
is	 consistent	with	 a	 study	by	Anckar	 (2014,	 15),	who	 concludes	 that	 ‘if	 the	electoral	
system	carries	 in	 its	wake	 situations	 in	which	one	 single	party	may	decide	alone	on	
constitutional	 reform,	 the	 need	 for	 corrections	 and	 balancing	 counter-measures	





referendums	 are	 not	 provided	 for	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 consensual	 democracies.	











Table 4.8: Mandatory referendums: quorums and effect
Yes No
Quorum Denmark,	Latvia, Lithuania Austria,	France,	Ireland,	Malta,	Spain,	UK,	
Croatia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia
In	 sum,	 the	analysis	of	 available	 referendum	provisions	 in	 the	EU28	 reveals	 that	 the	
institutionalization	of	referendums	in	the	twentieth	century	in	Europe	does	not	mark	
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example,	 the	 second	half	of	 the	1990s	 saw	29	 referendums	and	 this	number	halved	
between	2010	and	2014.	
	 Moreover,	the	increase	between	1950	and	2000	is	particularly	due	to	two	outlier	
cases,	 Italy	and	 Ireland.	The	 largest	number	of	votes	were	held	 in	 Italy.	This	country	




























Figure 4.2: Referendum frequency (in votes)
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
4.3.2 Nature of aggregated referendum use
In	terms	of	the	nature	of	referendum	use	 in	Europe,	there	 is	also	no	straightforward	
direct	participatory	 shift,	 as	 aggregated	numbers	 for	 the	EU28	 in	 total	 are	distorted	
by	outlier	cases.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 total	EU28,	113	of	 the	256	votes	held	between	1950	
and	2014	were	 triggered	by	 citizens	 (44%),	 compared	 to	66	mandatory	 referendums	
(26%),	and	77	referendums	triggered	by	political	elites	 (30%).	Hence,	 in	 terms	of	 the	
types	of	referendum	used,	the	largest	number	of	votes	in	the	EU28	on	aggregate	were	
indeed	 controlled	 by	 citizens	 rather	 than	 representatives.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 some	
of	 the	 other	 four	 components	 (function,	 quorums,	 effect	 and	 issues)	 important	 in	
assessing	the	nature	of	referendum	use	(see	appendix 2	for	an	overview).	In	total,	nearly	
60	per	cent	of	the	votes	held	in	the	EU28	were	decision-controlling	and	hence	served	




over	 half	 the	 votes	were	 dedicated	 to	 one-off	politically	weighty	 issues,	 almost	 half	
dealt	with	more	regular	policy	 issues.	All	 in	all,	when	the	referendums	held	 in	all	28	
EU	countries	are	aggregated,	there	are	clear	indications	that	citizens	indeed	exercised	
considerable	control	over	referendum	use.



























Table 4.9: Types of referendum EU17 
EU17 Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 23	(14%) 3 20
Mandatory 51	(32%) 51 0
Presidential 12	(8%) 9 3
Legislative minority 6	(4%) 4 2
Citizen-initiated 66	(42%) 39 27
Total 158 106	(67%) 52	(33%)
When	 the	 two	EU17	outlier	 countries	 Italy	 and	 Ireland	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 count	













Table 4.10: Types of referendum EU15 (EU17 excl. Ireland and Italy) 
EU15 Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 22	(42%) 3 19
Mandatory 15	(28%) 15 0
Presidential 12	(23%) 9 3
Legislative minority 4	(7%) 4 0
Citizen-initiated 0	(0%) 0 0






Hence,	 for	 the	EU17,	 these	numbers	do	not	point	 to	a	direct	participatory	shift.	This	
is	 different	 for	 the	CEECs	 (table 4.11).	 Almost	 half	 the	 votes	 held	 in	 the	CEECs	were	






triggered	 by	 political	 elites	 (22	 by	 a	 legislative	majority,	 12	 by	 a	 legislative	minority	





Table 4.11: Types of referendum CEECs 
CEECs Binding Non-binding
Legislative majority 22	(23%) 10 12
Mandatory 15	(15%) 14 1
Presidential 2	(2%) 1 1
Legislative minority 12	(12%) 9 3
Citizen-initiated 47	(48%) 17 30
Total 98 51	(52%) 47	(48%)
The	nuanced	nature	of	the	direct	participatory	shift	also	emerges	when	assessing	the	
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and	Spain),	 and	one	on	 the	EU	patent	 court	 (Denmark).	On	 top	of	 that,	 in	 the	 same	
period,	 Ireland	 held	 seven	 EU	 referendums,	 on	 Maastricht,	 Amsterdam,	 Nice	 (2x),	
Lisbon	(2x)	and	the	EMU.		
Figure 4.3: Issues of referendum votes EU15, 1950-2014 
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	overview.	











of	 the	 CEECs	 held	 a	 referendum	 on	 subsequent	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications,	 although	 a	
referendum	on	the	TCE	was	pledged	but	not	held	in	the	Czech	Republic.



































































Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.	
 
4.4 CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN REFERENDUM USE
Until	now,	I	have	mainly	focused	on	aggregated	referendum	use.	In	this	section,	I	will	













referendums	are	held	most	 frequently,	 they	are	 in	many	cases	mandatory	 (Denmark	
and	Ireland)	or	the	result	of	citizens’	petitions	(Italy	and	Lithuania),	which	partly	explains	
why	referendums	are	used	more	frequently.	








Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
issues,	such	as	constitutional	revision	or	EU	affairs	(partly	because	in	some	countries,	
referendums	can	only	be	held	on	certain	issues).	
Table 4.12: National referendums in three clusters of countries, 1950-201444

























The	 only	 EU17	 countries	 where	 referendums	 are	 a	 recurring	 event	 are	 Italy	 (69	
referendums),	Ireland	(36	referendums),45	Denmark	(18	referendums)	and,	to	a	lesser	
















EU17	 countries	where	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	mandatory	 referendums	 (Ireland	
and	Denmark)	and	citizen-initiated	referendums	(Italy)	were	held.47	Most	EU17	member	
states	 belong	 to	 the	 second	 cluster	 of	 countries	 and,	 despite	 available	 referendum	
provisions,	 have	only	held	one	or	 a	 few	 referendums.	 This	 applies	 to	 Spain,	Austria,	
Malta,	Portugal,	Sweden,48	the	UK,	Finland,	Greece	and	Luxembourg.	Of	these	countries,	
the	UK	 is	 a	notable	 case,	 as	 several	 referendums	have	been	held	on	devolution	and	





































Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
Table 4.13: Referendum votes in the EU17, 1950-2014
Total Majority Minority Presidential Mandatory Citizens
Cluster 1
Italy 69 1 2 - - 66
Ireland 36 - 0 - 36 -
Denmark 18 2 4 - 12 -
France 10 - - 9 1 -
Cluster 2
Sweden 5 5 0 - - -
Spain 3 2 0 - 1 -
Austria 3 2 0 - 1 -
Malta 3 3 - - 0 0
Portugal 3 - - 3 - -
UK 2 2 - - 0 -
Finland 1 1 - - - -
Greece 1 1 - - - -
Luxembourg 1 1 0 - - 0
Cluster 3
Belgium 1 1 - - - -
Cyprus 1 1 - - - -
Netherlands 1 1 - - - -
Germany 0 - - - - -
Total 158 23 6 12 51 66
Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	0=	provided	for,	but	not	used;	-	=	not	provided	for;	see	
appendix	2	for	an	overview.		
In	countries	where	referendums	were	held	only	occasionally,	they	were	largely	triggered	
by	 a	 parliamentary	majority.	 This	 is	 remarkable,	 as	 legislative	minority	 referendums	
are	also	provided	for	 in	some	of	these	countries,	such	as	Sweden,	Spain,	Austria	and	







	 Obviously,	the	more	referendums	held	 in	a	country,	the	more	are	held	on	 issues	
other	than	institutional	reform	and	EU	affairs.	The	four	frequent	users	of	referendums	














































Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.	








































	 In	 France,	 after	a	mandatory	 referendum	on	 the	adoption	of	 the	 constitution	 in	
1958,	nine	decision-promotive	presidential	referendums	were	held:	three	on	political	
system	 reforms,	 three	 on	 EU	 affairs	 and	 three	 on	 overseas	 territorial	 questions.	 No	
referendums	were	held	on	regular	policy	issues.	























up	by	 the	United	Nations	 to	 force	the	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	negotiators	
towards	an	agreement.		
Figure 4.6: Referendum use in cluster 2, EU17 (1950-2014)
 
  




































Referendum provisions and use in EU countries
 Table 4.14: Referendum votes in the CEECs, 1989-201453 
Total Majority  Minority Presidential Mandatory Citizens
Cluster 1
Lithuania 21 1 3 - 6 11
Slovenia 20 4 9 - - 7
Slovakia 15 3 - - 1 11
Hungary 12 1 - - 1 10
Latvia 9 1 - - 2 6
Cluster 2
Poland 7 7 0 0 - -
Romania 5 1 - 1 3 -
Estonia 4 3 - - 1 -
Croatia 3 0 - 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 0 - - - 1
Czech	Republic 1 1 - - - -
Total 98 22 12 2 15 47




by	 citizens.	 In	 Lithuania,	 for	 example	–where	 the	most	 referendums	were	held	 –	 20	
questions	have	been	put	to	a	popular	vote,	of	which	ten	were	citizens’	initiatives	(8	being	
held	at	the	same	time	in	1994).	In	fact,	in	this	group	of	CEECs,	referendums	initiated	by	
political	 representatives	are	 rare.	An	exception	 is	Slovenia,	where	 thirteen	of	 the	20	
referendums	were	initiated	by	representatives.	By	contrast,	in	most	of	the	CEECs	where	
referendums	are	only	held	occasionally	 (cluster	2),	 the	constitution	does	not	contain	
provisions	 for	holding	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 In	 these	 countries,	 referendums	














reform.	 In	 Latvia,	 Lithuania	 and	 Slovenia,	 a	 referendum	was	 held	 on	 the	 post-1989	







and	citizenship	 legislation.	This	 is	mainly	due	 to	 the	 large	number	of	citizen-initiated	
referendums	which	generally	relate	to	soft	policy	issues	rather	than	politically	weighty	
ones	(which	are	often	excluded	from	a	veto	or	initiative).	
























Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.






Moreover,	 as	 shown	 in	figure 4.8,	 the	 relatively	 few	 referendums	held	 in	 this	 group	
of	 countries	 mainly	 related	 to	 institutional	 reform.	 An	 exception	 is	 Poland,	 where	







































Source:	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy;	see	appendix	2	for	an	overview.
 
4.5 CONCLUSION: REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS
In	this	chapter,	I	have	shown	that	referendum	provisions	were	adopted	and	extended	in	
an	increasing	number	of	countries	throughout	the	twentieth	century.	On	an	aggregated	
level	 (including	 all	 28	 EU	 countries),	 referendums	were	 also	 increasingly	 used	 in	 the	
second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	the	largest	proportion	of	these	votes	were	






that	 truly	 reflect	popular	 sovereignty	–	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	–	are	only	held	
frequently	 in	 a	 few	 countries	 (most	 notably	 Italy	 and	 the	 CEECs).	 Thus,	 in	most	 EU	
countries,	 referendums	are	primarily	 instruments	of	party	democracy,	 and	 their	 use	
does	not	mark	a	generic	shift	towards	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	participation.
	 Those	 referendums	 and	 associated	 procedures	 that	 are	 institutionalized	 usually	













exception,	 but	 mandatory	 referendums	 were	 introduced	 there	 to	 protect	 minority	
groups	and	strict	quorums	underscore	the	Danish	consensual	democratic	tradition.
	 By	 contrast,	 while	 legislative	 majority	 referendums	 are	 also	 used	 in	 consensus	
countries,	more	consensus	democracies	than	majoritarian	democracies	have	provisions	
for	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 and	 citizen-initiated	 referendums.	 Since	 such	
referendums	 provide	 more	 scope	 for	 integrating	 minority	 preferences,	 this	 finding	
is	 consistent	 with	 the	 institutional	 fit	 thesis.	 In	 addition,	 referendums	 in	 consensus	
democracies,	 especially	 when	 triggered	 by	 minorities,	 are	 usually	 accompanied	 by	
quorums	to	ensure	the	proportionality	of	the	outcomes.	An	exception	is	Ireland,	which	
is	one	of	the	few	majoritarian	democracies	where	a	parliamentary	minority	can	trigger	
a	 referendum	 (on	 non-constitutional	 issues)	 and	where	 such	 referendums	 require	 a	
strict	quorum.	However,	accordingly,	this	quorum	was	essentially	introduced	in	Ireland	
to	 protect	 the	 political	majority,	 by	 ensuring	 that	 ‘the	will	 of	 the	 Dáil	 could	 not	 be	
overridden	by	a	small	but	committed	minority	with	the	majority	indifferent’	(Gallagher	
1996a,	88).	In	addition,	in	Ireland,	this	type	of	referendum	has	not	been	used.







number	of	 both	 institutional	 (i.e.	when	 there	 is	 a	 rigid	 constitution	 and	 a	 bicameral	
parliament)	and	partisan	veto	players,	which	impeded	referendum	institutionalization	
and	use.	 In	addition,	referendums	in	most	countries	are	restricted	to	one-off	events,	






potential	 authoritarian	 rule	 (Lijphart	 1992).	 In	 most	 CEECs,	 referendum	 provisions	










on	politically	weighty	 issues.	However,	also	 in	 the	CEECs,	 referendums	have	become	
instruments	of	political	parties	in	opposition,	rather	than	of	the	people	as	such.	
	 Cross-country	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 referendums	 are	 used	 and	 the	
nature	of	these	referendums	appear	to	support	the	observation	by	Butler	and	Ranney,	








France	 is	 an	 interesting	 case	 to	 examine	 the	 motives	 behind	 decision-promoting	
referendums.	 The	 French	 referendums	 will	 be	 compared	 with	 referendums	 held	 in	
the	more	 consensus-like	 country	 of	Denmark,	where	 referendums	have	 often	 had	 a	
decision-controlling	 function	 and	 have	 been	 pledged	 by	 opposition	 parties.	Chapter 

































the	 factors	 that	have	driven	 referendum	 institutionalization	and	use	 in	 two	of	 these	
countries,	France	and	Denmark.	Between	1950	and	2014,	France	held	ten	referendums,	
while	Denmark	held	no	 less	 than	eighteen,	and	 its	nineteenth	 in	December	2015.	 In	
these	two	countries,	the	political	authorities	have	played	a	substantive	role	in	triggering	
at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 referendums	 held.	 This	 stands	 in	 contrast	 with	 Ireland,	 where	
all	 referendums	held	were	triggered	by	the	constitution,	and	 Italy,	where	most	were	
citizens’	 vetoes.	The	comparison	of	France	and	Denmark	 follows	 the	 logic	of	a	Most	






makes	 referendums	 largely	 unavoidable.	 Indeed,	 in	 many	 of	 the	 countries	 where	
referendums	have	been	held	on	a	frequent	basis,	referendums	are	mandatory	on	major	
political	 issues	 like	constitutional	 reform	and	national	sovereignty	 transfer.	However,	
such	a	 constitutional	 requirement	 is	most	 certainly	not	a	 condition sine qua non, as 
shown	by	Italy,	where	there	is	no	constitutional	requirement	for	holding	referendums,	
but	 where	 they	 are	 nevertheless	 frequently	 held.	 More	 importantly,	 however,	 in	


















to	 the	 relative	 ease	with	which	 referendums	 are	 triggered,	 due	 to	 a	 low	number	 of	
veto	players.	 In	addition,	both	countries	have	a	pre-WWII	referendum	tradition.	This	
creates	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 referendums	 become	 feasible	 political	 options.	




















5.2 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN FRANCE
5.2.1 Referendum provisions in the French constitution
The	constitution	of	the	Fifth	Republic	provides	for	three	types	of	national	referendum:	
presidential	 referendums	 (Article 11-1),	 mandatory	 referendums	 (Article 89, on a 

















when	 the	presidential	 term	was	 two	years	 longer	 than	 the	parliamentary	 term),	 this	
could	have	resulted	in	a	conflict	over	referendum	calls.	However,	such	a	conflict	has	not	
taken	place	in	post-De	Gaulle	French	referendum	history	(Morel	1996,	71).	
 Provisions for mandatory referendums	 on	 constitutional	 revision	 are	 outlined	
in Article 89 of	 the	French	constitution.	A	proposal	 to	 revise	 the	constitution	can	be	
initiated	by	the	president	(at	the	request	of	the	prime	minister)	or	by	MPs.	A	referendum	







first	 change	was	 extension	 of	 the	 provisions	 for	 the	 presidential	 referendum	 under	
Article 11-1 in	1995,	and	then	again	in	2008.	Initially,	a	referendum	under	Article 11-1 
could	only	be	held	on	the	organization	of	public	powers	and	the	ratification	of	treaties	
that	are	not	unconstitutional	but	have	 implications	for	French	 institutions.	By	means	
of	 a	 constitutional	 revision	 under	 Jacques	 Chirac	 in	 1995,	 the	 scope	 of	Article 11-1 
was	extended	to	 include	economic	and	social	 reforms	and	related	public	services.	 In	
2008,	president	Nicolas	Sarkozy	further	extended	the	scope	of	Article 11-1 to include 
environmental	policy.	
	 A	 second	change	was	 the	 introduction	of	 the	 initially	mandatory	 referendum	on	





















	 The	most	 fundamental	 change	 in	 France’s	 referendum	 legislation	came	with	 the	
introduction	 of	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 under	 Article 11-3.	 These	 shared 
initiative referendums (in	French:	le référendum d’initiative partagée)	(Clavel	21.11.2013)	
were	 introduced	 under	 the	 presidency	 of	 Sarkozy	 (2007-2012)	 and	 were	 part	 of	 a	









2015.	Under	Article 11-3,	 a	 referendum	on	a	private	member’s	 initiative	 is	 triggered	
when	 requested	 by	 one-fifth	 of	 MPs	 and	 supported	 by	 signatures	 of	 one-tenth	 of	














5.2.2 Referendum use in France
Although	 France	 has	 witnessed	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	 national	 referendums	
compared	 to	 most	 EU	 countries,	 referendums	 are	 by	 no	 means	 part	 of	 day-to-













Table 5.1: Referendums in France, 1950-2014
Year Type Legal basis Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1958 Mandatory Article	90* Adoption	of	
constitution
Constitution Binding 80% Yes





1962 Presidential Article	11 The	Evian	Treaties Charles de 
Gaulle
Binding 75% Yes










1972 Presidential Article	11 EC	enlargement Georges	
Pompidou
Binding 60% Yes






1992 Presidential Article	11 Treaty	of	Maastricht François	
Mitterrand
Binding 70% Yes
2000 Presidential Article	89 Reduction	of	the	
presidential	term
Jacques	Chirac Binding 30% Yes
2005 Presidential Article	11 EU	constitutional	
treaty
Jacques	Chirac Binding 69% No
*Constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic
In	 1972	 De	 Gaulle’s	 successor,	 Georges	 Pompidou	 (in	 office:	 1969-1974),	 held	 a	
referendum	on	the	accession	of	Denmark,	Ireland,	Norway	and	the	UK	to	the	European	
Communities	 (EC).	 The	 turnout	 was	 60	 per	 cent,	 significantly	 lower	 than	 under	 De	
Gaulle.	Francois	Mitterrand	(in	office:	1981-1995)	pledged	two	referendums:	one	on	the	
Matignon	Agreements	on New	Caledonian	 self-determination	 in	1988	and	 the	other	










cent.	 Two	 referendums	were	 triggered	 by	Mitterrand’s	 successor,	 Jacques	 Chirac	 (in	
office:	1995-2007):	one	on	the	reduction	of	the	presidential	term	in	2000	and	the	other	








5.2.3 Explaining referendum practice in France








revisions,	 territorial	 changes	and	EU	 treaty	 reforms.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	only	five	
referendums	 were	 held	 after	 De	 Gaulle	 implies	 that	 presidents	 do	 not	 easily	 use	









elections,	 and	a	prime	minister,	who	must	have	 the	 confidence	of	 a	majority	of	 the	
members	of	the	French	lower	house,	the	Assemblée	Nationale.	The	French	executive,	
most	notably	the	president,	has	a	dominant	position	vis-à-vis	the	legislature.	This	is	the	
outcome	of	a	set	of	constitutional	instruments,	the	parliamentarisme rationalisé, that 
limited	the	controlling	and	legislative	powers	of	parliament	and	increased	the	control	









president is de facto	the	government	leader,	except	in	periods	of	cohabitation, when	
the	president	comes	from	a	different	political	party	than	the	one	that	holds	a	majority	
in the Assemblée. 
	 The	constitutional	reform	package	of	2008	aimed	to	shift	balance	in	the	relationship	
between	the	executive	and	the	legislature	in	favour	of	the	latter.	The	controlling	and	
legislative	 powers	 of	 parliament	 have	 been	 strengthened	 (for	 example,	 through	 the	
clause	that	legislative	proposals	submitted	by	the	government	need	to	be	accompanied	
by	 judicial,	 economic	 and	 social	 impact	 studies),	 somewhat	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	
executive	 powers	 of	 the	 government	 and	most	 notably	 the	 president	 (for	 example,	
the	president	is	no	longer	allowed	to	serve	more	than	two	consecutive	terms).	Despite	
these	changes,	 the	French	semi-presidential	 system	remains	 largely	characterized	by	
executive	dominance	rather	than	executive-legislative	balance	(Reestman	2010,	77).		











centre-left	(mainly	the Parti Socialiste	(PS)	and	the	Parti Communiste Française (PCF))	
competes	for	office	with	the	centre-right	(mainly	the	neo-Gaullists	–	which	have	had	
several	 different	 names,	 including	 the	Union des Democrates pour la Ve République 
(UDR),	 the	Rassemblement pour la République (RPR),	 the	Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire	(UMP)	and	recently	the	Républicains –	and	the	liberal	conservative	Union pour 
la Démocratie Française (UDF))	(cf.	Cole	2003,	12).	Recently,	the	radical-right	populist	
Front National	(FN)	has	gained	increased	popularity,	posing	a	challenge	to	the	bipolar	
structure.
	 French	 referendum	 practice	 is	 enshrined	 in	 these	 characteristics	 of	 the	 polity.	
Referendums	under	Article 11	 could,	at	 least	until	 January	2015,	only	be	 initiated	by	
the	 president,	 making	 the	 referendum	 initially	 decision-promotive.	 The	 mandatory	












introduction	of	the	clause	under	Article 88-5 that parliament	can	avoid	a	referendum	
on	EU	enlargement	by	adopting	a	motion	by	a	three-fifths	majority.	Triggering	such	a	
referendum	lies	thus	in	the	hands	of	parliament	rather	than	the	president.	Moreover,	
the fact that avoiding	a	referendum	requires	a	qualified	parliamentary	majority	does	
not	entirely	fit	the	majoritarian	principle,	as	this	means	that	a	parliamentary	minority	
(of	 two-fifths	 plus	 one)	 can	 indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 when	 a	 parliamentary	
















the	constitution	 involves	a	considerable	number	of	veto	players.	 It	 requires	majority	
support	 in	 both	 houses	 of	 parliament,	 as	well	 as	 approval	 by	 a	 referendum	or	 by	 a	
three-fifths	majority	in	Congress.	In	both	houses	of	parliament,	a	constitutional	revision	







rather	 contradictory,	 since	 the	 ruling	party	was	proposing	 the	new	constitution,	 the	
people	were	a	viable	veto	player	 (in	 fact,	 in	1946,	a	previous	constitutional	 text	was	
voted	down	by	the	people	in	a	referendum).	The	constitutional	reforms	that	allowed	for	






than	 to	a	 referendum.	This	means	 that	 in	 these	cases,	 the	opposition	–	or	at	 least	a	
certain	proportion	of	it	–	could	also	potentially	have	vetoed	the	reforms	by	preventing	a	
three-fifths	majority	in	support.	This	almost	happened	in	2008,	when	the	constitutional	
reform	package	was	 approved	 by	 just	 one	 vote	more	 than	 the	 required	 three-fifths	
majority.		
	 By	 contrast,	 triggering	 a	 referendum	 requires	 the	 support	 of	 remarkably	 fewer	
actors.	 In	 fact,	 an	 optional	 referendum	 de facto	 only	 requires	 the	 support	 of	 the	
president.	Formally,	the	constitution	states	that	the	president	can	trigger	a	referendum	
at the request of the government or parliament.	However,	given	the	fact	that,	especially	
after	 the	 constitutional	 reform	 of	 2000,	 the	 president	 usually	 has	 the	 support	 of	 a	
parliamentary	majority,	the	number	of	veto	players	is	still	small,	comprising	the	ruling	




































I	 (1804-1815)	 and	 Napoleon	 III	 (1852-1870)	 (Brouard	 and	 Tiberj	 2006).	 After	 the	
referendum	in	1800	on	the	constitution	drawn	up	by	Napoleon	I	after	his	coup of 18 
Brumaire in	1799,	six	other	referendums	took	place,	all	of	which	served	to	 legitimize	
Napoleon’s	power	 (Morel	1996,	67).	The	only	 referendum	that	 took	place	 in	a	more	
democratic	context	was	the	one	under	Napoleon	III	on	the	constitution	in	1870	(Morel	
1996,	67-68).	After	 this	 vote,	 referendums	were	not	part	of	 French	politics	 for	quite	
some	time	as	they	had	become	associated	with	authoritarianism	(Morel	1996,	69).60 As 
such,	they	played	no	role	in	the	Second	and	Third	Republics.	









	 The	 use	 of	 presidential	 referendums	 under	 Article 11	 follows	 the	 logic	 of	 path	
dependency.	 Due	 to	 the	 decision-promotive	 character	 of	 these	 referendums,	 they	
have	 primarily	 served	 to	 legitimize	 a	 certain	 policy	 course,	 or	 even	 the	 executive’s	
own	authority	 (Morel	1996).	This	was	most	obvious	under	De	Gaulle,	but	Pompidou,	
Mitterrand	 and	 Chirac	 also	 invoked	 referendums	 to	 legitimize	 their	 positions	 and	
policies.	 Such	 examples	 and	 the	 strong	 constitutional	 basis	make	 referendums	 thus	
viable	options	for	legitimizing	politically	weighty	issues.	This	being	said,	recent	changes	
in	 referendum	 legislation	have	 given	parliament	 considerably	more	 control	 over	 the	






In	 the	 literature,	 it	 is	 broadly	 assumed	 that	 referendums	 are	 an	 outcome	 of	 public	
pressures	 stemming	 from	either	a	process	of	 cognitive	mobilization,	associated	with	









three	proxies	 to	enable	 this	 social	 climate	 to	be	assessed:	 two	proxies	 to	assess	 the	
climate	for	referendums	in	general,	namely	the	level	of	political dissatisfaction in society 
(measured	 in	 terms	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 national	 democracy,	 distrust	 of	 political	
parties,	 distrust	 of	 parliament	 and	 distrust	 of	 government)	 and	 the	 level	 of	political 
interest;	 and	a	 third	proxy	 to	 assess	 the	 climate	 for	 referendums	on the EU,	 namely	








introduced	 in	France	 in	a	time	of	 increased	political	 interest	and	dissatisfaction	with	
national	 and	EU	politics.	Data	 from	 the	European	Values	 Study	 (EVS)	 reveal	 that	 the	
level	of	political	interest	among	the	French	electorate	increased	considerably	between	
1999	and	2008.	 In	1999,	only	36	per	cent	of	French	respondents	said	that	they	were	

















of	 2014,	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 French	 respondents	 said	 that	 they	were	 distrustful	 towards	
political	parties,	compared	to	82	per	cent	in	2003.	These	percentages	are	higher	than	
the	 EU	 average,	 where	 distrust	 towards	 political	 parties	 increased	 only	 moderately	
from	77	per	cent	in	2003	to	80	per	cent	in	2014	(not	shown	in	figure).	Distrust	towards	
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shows	 the	 levels	 of	 Euroscepticism	 among	 French	 citizens	 between	 1983	 and	 2011.	
The	proportion	of	respondents	that	perceived	France’s	EU	membership	as	a	bad	thing	




also	 increased	over	 the	past	decade,	and	 specially	 since	2007.	These	figures	 suggest	
that,	 over	 time,	 the	 French	 electorate	 has	 become	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical.	What	
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	 There	 are	 no	 comparative	 longitudinal	 data	 on	 support	 for	 referendums	 that	
allow	for	a	comparison	of	 levels	of	support	 for	referendums	between	countries	over	
time.	 In	 2004,	 the	 International	 Social	 Survey	 Programme	 (ISSP)	 incorporated	 the	
question	 in	 its	questionnaire	on	whether	referendums	(without	specifying	what	type	
of	 referendums)	 are	 a	 good	 way	 to	 decide	 important	 political	 matters.	 The	 survey	
indicated	 that	 three-quarters	of	French	 respondents	agreed	with	 the	statement.61	 In	

















to	 the	 EES	 survey	 data,	 support	 for	 EU	 referendums	 is	 considerably	 higher	 among	
respondents	who	 feel	 that	European	unification	has	gone	 too	 far	 (70	per	 cent)	 than	
among	respondents	who	feel	it	should	be	pushed	further	(53	per	cent).	In	addition,	in	




	 Yet,	 despite	 seemingly	 widespread	 public	 support	 for	 enhancing	 citizens’	 direct	
influence	 over	 political	 decision-making,	 elite	 control	 over	 the	 referendum	 as	 an	
instrument	has	 remained	 intact.	A	survey	conducted	 in	2011	by	 the	 Institut Français 
d’Opinion Publique	 (IFOP)	 found	that	72	per	cent	of	 the	French	public	supported	the	
idea	that	citizens	should	be	able	to	trigger	referendums	themselves	(Institut	Français	
d’Opinion	 Publique	 2011).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 recently	 introduced	 shared	 initiative	





makes	 the	 initiative	 thus	de facto	 an	 instrument	 to	 put	 issues	 on	 the	parliamentary	
agenda	rather	than	a	referendum	as	such	(Reestman	2010,	77).	While	support	for	the	
citizens’	 initiative	is	shared	by	a	considerable	number	of	political	parties	that	are	not	
represented	 in	 the	 Assemblée,	 support	 among	 mainstream	 political	 parties	 is	 low	
(Article	3	18.11.2014).	Both	the	centre-right	and	centre-left	have	occasionally	expressed	
support	for	the	 initiative,	mainly	 in	election	times,	but	neither	have	 launched	bills	to	
implement	it.	Among	parties	in	parliament,	the	citizens’	initiative	is	only	supported	by	





Amsterdam	Treaty,	 the	 euro	or	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 despite	 public	 demands	 to	 do	 so.	
Chirac’s	 reluctance	 to	pledge	 referendums	on	Amsterdam	and	 the	euro	 is	 especially	


























	 The	 first	 set	 of	 instrumental	 arguments	 have	 indeed	been	 commonly	 expressed	
in	 French	 referendum	 debates.	 Most	 notably,	 De	 Gaulle	 established	 a	 convention	
that	 the	 legitimacy	 of	major	 political	 decisions	 affecting	 French	 institutions	 (such	 as	














Ireland	and	 the	UK.	 In	case	of	 the	Maastricht	Treaty,	 the	Conseil Constitutionnel had 
ruled	that	adoption	of	the	treaty	required	an	amendment	of	the	French	constitution,	
illustrating	the	treaty’s	importance	(Stone	1993,	73).	This	was	underscored	by	president	
Mitterrand,	 who	 said	 that	 ‘rarely	 in	 our	 history	 has	 an	 issue	 affected	 the	 future	









referendum.	Moreover,	 referendums	on	 the	TCE	were	pledged	 in	a	number	of	other	
countries,	most	notably	the	UK,	placing	peer	pressure	on	Chirac	to	do	the	same	(Closa	
2007,	1326).	
	 Another	 notable	 example	 of	 a	 referendum	 pledge	 in	which	 instrumental	 values	
played	an	important	role	was	the	1988	referendum	on	the	Matignon	Agreements	on	
New	Caledonia,	 held	 in	 France	 and	New	Caledonia.	 In	 this	 referendum,	 voters	were	
asked	whether	 they	agreed	with	allowing	New	Caledonian	residents	 to	vote	 for	 self-
determination	 in	1998	 (Legifrance	5.10.1988).	The	 referendum	was	 formally	pledged	
























likely	perceived	as	 too	high	given	 that,	on	Amsterdam	and	Lisbon,	 there	was	 indeed	




he	 referred	 to	 France’s	 Rousseauian	 republican	 tradition.	 As	 he	 put	 it,	 ‘the	 current	











	 Indeed,	 if	 participatory	 values	 were	 intended	 to	 be	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 French	
referendum	 practice,	 a	 more	 participatory	 type	 of	 referendum	 would	 have	 been	








that	 could	 be	 triggered	 by	 citizens.	 Hence,	 these	 qualifications	make	 it	 unlikely	 that	
participatory	values	have	played	a	decisive	role	in	French	referendum	practice.	
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
The	 fact	 that	 referendum	 use	 is	 France	 is	 largely	 elite-driven	 feeds	 the	 assumption	





(Varley	19.5.1995)	 and	 guaranteeing	 a	public	 voice	 in	 such	 important	policy	matters	
also	clearly	seem	to	have	fulfilled	a	legitimizing	purpose.	In	addition,	the	introduction	
of	a	referendum	on	EU	enlargement	under	Article 88-5	should	be	understood	in	terms	








that,	 three	years	 later,	 Sarkozy	 introduced	a	clause	 that	enables	parliament	 to	avoid	
a	 referendum	 indeed	 suggests	 that	 legitimacy	or	 participatory	 concerns	 are	unlikely	
















during	 his	 presidential	 election	 campaign	 in	 2007,	 he	made	 no	 strong	 efforts	 to	 do	





that,	 in	 the	following	five	years,	a	minority	referendum	would	benefit	 the	right-wing	
opposition	(Hamon	2014,	253;	L’Express	10.1.2012).
	 As	 I	will	argue	below,	 the	same	applies	 to	actually	held	 referendums.	Except	 for	
the	1958	referendum	on	the	adoption	of	the	new	constitution	–	which	was	mandatory	
under	the	constitution	of	the	Fourth	Republic	–	all	French	referendums	were	triggered	
by	 the	 president.	 Based	 on	my	 typology	 of	 referendum	motivations,	 as	 outlined	 in	




























































































POLICY-SEEKING.	 Policy-seeking	 motives	 played	 a	 role	 in	 four	 of	 the	 ten	 French	
referendums:	 the	 two	 referendums	 on	 Algeria	 in	 1961	 and	 1962	 and	 the	 two	 on	
constitutional	reform	in	1962	and	1969,	all	pledged	by	De	Gaulle.	These	referendums	
were	used	by	De	Gaulle	 to	obstruct	parliament	and	enforce	a	 certain	outcome	with	










in	1961	and	1962,	when	he	pledged	 two	 referendums	on	Algeria’s	 independence.	 In	
1958,	he	was	elected	as	president	specifically	to	find	a	solution	to	the	Algerian	crisis.	As	
parliament	was	heavily	divided	on	both	self-determination	and	eventual	independence,	
he	was	unlikely	 to	obtain	 the	 support	of	 a	parliamentary	majority	 (Morel	 1996,	73).	
By	 pledging	 these	 referendums,	De	Gaulle	 could	 pursue	his	 plans	 and	 adhere	 to	 his	
mandate.	
	 The	other	two	referendums	triggered	by	De	Gaulle	–	in	1962	and	1969	–	were	even	
clearer	examples	of	his	use	of	 referendums	 to	bypass	parliament	 (Walker	2003,	32).	
These	referendums	related	to	legislative	proposals	were	heavily	opposed	by	parliament	
























policy	proposal	 is	 small,	 given	 that	 the	president	usually	holds	a	majority	 support	 in	
parliament.	Yet,	during	periods	of	cohabitation,	during	which	the	president	 is	 from	a	
different	political	party	 than	 the	one	holding	a	majority	 in	parliament,	 the	president	
could, in theory,	 use	 a	 referendum	as	 a	minority	weapon.	However,	 this	 situation	 is	
highly	unlikely	as,	in	practice,	the	president	needs	the	endorsement	of	the	government	






















	 The	 most	 notable	 examples	 of	 such	 a	 strategic	 use	 of	 the	 popular	 vote	 are	
the	 referendums	 triggered	 by	 president	 De	 Gaulle.	 Though	 for	 De	 Gaulle	 these	
referendums	could	be	considered	necessary	due	to	insufficient	parliamentary	support,	
his	 anticipation	 of	 a	 ‘yes’	 vote	make	 it	 plausible	 that	 these	 popular	 votes	 served	 to	
strengthen	his	public	 legitimacy	and	his	power	vis-à-vis	parliament	 (Morel	1996,	73;	
Cole	2014,	23).	By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	the	independence	of	Algeria	was	supported	




































































Article 11.	Again,	one	plausible	motivation	was	 to	expose	divisions	 in	 the	competing	










–	who	 succeeded	Mitterrand	 in	 1995	–	on	 the	 reduction	of	 the	presidential	 term	 in	
2000	 most	 likely	 also	 served	 empowerment	 interests.	 The	 referendum	 was	 again	







by	 the	 fact	 that	 only	 30	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 French	 electorate	made	 the	 effort	 to	 vote	







EU	EMPOWERMENT.	The	aim	of	enhancing	France’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	EU	arena	 likely	
played	an	important	role	in	all	three	referendums	held	in	France	on	the	EU.	This	motive	
becomes	plausible	when	leaders	anticipate	a	confirmative	outcome,	since	the	outcome	
increases	a	government’s	 credibility	 in	 the	EU	arena.	This	was	a	 strong	 incentive	 for	
Pompidou	when	he	pledged	the	referendum	on	EC	enlargement.	His	predecessor	De	
Gaulle	had	been	a	firm	Eurosceptic;	in	1965,	he	had	caused	the	so-called	‘empty	chair	
crisis’	when	he	boycotted	 the	meetings	of	 the	Council	 after	disagreements	over	 the	
financing	 of	 the	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (Moravcsik	 1998).	 In	 addition,	 in	 1963,	
De	Gaulle	had	vetoed	Britain’s	first	application	for	EC	membership.	For	Pompidou,	an	
anticipated	French	‘yes’	to	EC	enlargement	provided	a	clear	break	with	the	troublesome	











	 Arguably,	 also	 for	 Mitterrand,	 a	 French	 popular	 ‘yes’	 to	 Maastricht	 implied	 a	
strengthening	of	France’s	 legitimacy	 in	Europe	 (IPS	 Inter	Press	Service	7.5.1992).	The	
Maastricht	Treaty	was	a	 joint	Franco-German	 initiative,	and	a	public	endorsement	of	
the	treaty	would	certainly	strengthen	France’s	position	vis-à-vis	Germany,	and	reinforce	




CONFLICT	 MEDIATION.	 Conflict	 mediation	 likely	 played	 a	 role	 in	 three	 referendum	
pledges,	 all	 on	 EU	 affairs.	 Indeed,	 the	 persistent	 divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 within	 the	
mainstream	 political	 parties	 in	 France	 (Evans	 2003,	 156)	 make	 it	 likely	 that	 French	
referendums	on	 ‘Europe’	were	motivated	by	the	aim	to	mediate	 intra-party	conflict.	















his	 authority	within	 the	 party.	 For	Mitterrand	 too,	 the	 1992	Maastricht	 referendum	













that	demanded	a	 referendum	on	 ‘Europe’	 (Hainsworth	2006,	98),	while	at	 the	 same	










The	promise	 to	organize	 such	 a	 referendum	dated	back	 to	 1995	when,	 immediately	
after	 the	meagre	French	support	 for	Maastricht,	Chirac	was	pushed	by	Eurosceptical	
competition	 from	 the	 radical-right	 FN	 towards	 promising	 a	 referendum	 on	 future	















EU	accession.	When	he	pledged	 the	 referendum	on	 the	 TCE	 in	 2002,	 public	 opinion	
towards	Europe	was	still	 largely	favourable	(Standard	Eurobarometer	Reports	56-57).	
By	 2005,	 however,	 only	 a	 small	majority	 of	 the	 French	 public	 perceived	 France’s	 EU	
membership	as	a	good	thing,	and	support	for	the	EU	Constitution	had	declined	after	













5.2.4 The future of French referendums?
The	 use	 of	 referendums	 in	 France	 as	 a	 legitimizing	 or	 conflict-mediating	 instrument	
was	 encouraged	 by	 the	 long	 stable	 bipolar	 electoral	 arena	 in	 which	 the	 centre-left	
and	 the	 centre-right	 competed	 for	 office.	 However,	 from	 the	 1990s	 onwards,	 the	
French	 party	 system	 became	more	 fragmented	 due	 to	 the	 pluralization	 of	 the	 left,	
and	above	all,	the	increased	success	of	the	populist	radical-right	FN,	which	competes	
for	votes	on	a	nationalist	and	Eurosceptical	agenda	 (Andersen	and	Evans	2003).	This	
increased	 fragmentation	 has	 also	 affected	 French	 conduct	 on	 referendums.	 While	
French	 presidents	 long	 used	 the	 device	 offensively	 to	 pursue	 certain	 political	 goals,	
or defensively	to	mediate	conflict	over	Europe,	these	strategies	have	become	risky	in	
an	 increasingly	 Eurosceptical	 context.	 Chirac’s	 pledge	 on	 the	 TCE	was	motivated	 by	
the	 desire	 to	 remove	 the	 controversial	 issue	 from	 the	 electoral	 campaign;	 the	 risks	
associated	with	such	a	strategy	are	 illustrated	by	the	popular	rejection	of	the	TCE	 in	
2005.	And	indeed,	no	referendums	have	been	held	since	then.	
	 There	 are,	 however,	 some	 signs	 that,	 after	 a	 period	 of	 supposed	 “referendum	
fatigue”,	referendums	might	play	a	more	important	role	in	France	in	the	future.	First,	

























would	 like	 to	have	a	 referendum	on	France’s	EU	membership	 (Eichhorn,	Hübner	and	
Kenealy	2016,	24-25).
	 For	 future	 French	 presidents,	 such	 referendum	 calls	 might	 be	 more	 difficult	 to	
neglect,	especially	given	the	increasingly	politicized	character	of	the	issues.	Moreover,	
FN’s	mobilizing	potential	 is	 likely	 to	 increase,	as	 the	disproportionality	of	 the	French	
electoral	system	leaves	its	supporters	feeling	largely	unrepresented.	In	2015,	the	two-
round	electoral	 system	prevented	 the	 FN	 from	gaining	 control	 of	 any	 regions	 in	 the	
final	round	of	the	regional	elections	despite	a	historically	high	number	of	votes	in	the	
first	round.	In	this	context,	referendums	portray	an	effective	tool	to	mobilize	electoral	











5.3 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN DENMARK
5.3.1 Referendum provisions in the Danish constitution




constitution	 to	 add	 an	 article	 regulating	 the	 reunification	 of	 North	 Schleswig	 with	
Denmark.	 The	first	Danish	 referendum	had	 actually	 been	held	 in	 1916,	 but	 this	was	
an	ad	hoc	advisory	 referendum	on	 the	 sale	of	 the	Danish	West	 Indies	 to	 the	United	











on	 constitutional	 revision	 must	 be	 held	 within	 six	 months	 of	 new	 parliamentary	
elections,	and	after	the	bill	 is	passed	unamended	by	the	newly	elected	Folketing, the 
Danish	parliament.	The	constitutional	 revision	 is	approved	when	a	majority	of	 those	
taking	part	in	the	voting	has	voted	in	favour,	and	when	they	amount	to	at	least	40	per	
cent	of	the	electorate.	
	 Second,	Article 20	 states	 that	 a	 referendum	must	 be	 held	 on	 the	 delegation	 of	





of	 Danish	 sovereignty	 to	 the	 EU.	 It	 was	 specifically	 introduced	 to	 avoid	 having	 to	




treaty	change	entails	a	 transfer	of	Danish	sovereignty,	and	hence	whether	Article 20 
applies.	Moreover,	 if	 the	government	 judges	that	 it	does	apply,	a	referendum	is	only	
held	when	where	 is	no	5/6	majority	support	 for	 ratifying	the	treaty	 in	 the	Folketing.	
This	means	that	a	referendum	on	the	EU	can	be	indirectly	induced	by	opposition	parties	
by	not	supporting	ratification	 in	the	Folketing	 (Körkemeyer	1995,	41).	Thus,	although	
this	 type	of	 referendum	 is	mandatory,	political	parties	 still	have	considerable	power	




















	 The	 provisions	 for	 holding	 a	 legislative	 minority	 referendum	 are	 outlined	 in	
Article 42,	which	was	introduced	during	the	full	revision	of	the	Danish	constitution	in	
1953.	It	states	that,	after	parliament	passes	a	bill,	one-third	of	MPs	may	request	that	
it	 be	 submitted	 to	 a	 referendum.	 Again,	 a	 rejection	 quorum	of	 30	 per	 cent	 applies,	
which	provides	a	restriction	to	simple	majority	rule,	as	 it	makes	 it	 rather	difficult	 for	
the	majority	of	 voters	 to	actually	 reject	a	bill.	 This	 type	of	 referendum	first	entered	
the	political	debate	 in	 the	1930s	as	a	 substitute	 for	abolishing	 the	Upper	House.67 A 
motion	 to	 abolish	 the	 Upper	 House	 was	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 reformist	 government	
of	 Social	 Democrats	 (in	 Danish:	 Socialdemokraterne)	 and	 the	 Social	 Liberal	 Party	
(Radikale Venstre),	and	was	opposed	by	the	Conservative	People’s	Party	(Konservative 
Folkeparti)	and	the	Liberal	Party	(Venstre).	During	the	negotiations,	a	compromise	was	





the	 introduction	 of	 the	minority	 referendum	were	 revitalized	 during	 the	 post-WWII	
negotiations	on	constitutional	revision.	The	compromised	proposal	that	would	abolish	
the	 Upper	 House	 and	 introduce	 the	 legislative	 minority	 referendum	 was	 initiated	
by	a	broad	block	of	 leftist	 and	 rightist	parties	 (Christoffersen,	Beyeler,	 Eichenberger,	
Nannestad	and	Paldam	2014,	159).	It	was	approved	in	the	1953	mandatory	referendum	
on	constitutional	revision.







As	 in	 France,	 referendums	are	only	held	on	major	political	 events	 like	 constitutional	















succession	to	the	throne.	Four	mandatory	referendums	were	held	under	Article 20: in 








	 Six	 votes	were	 held	 that	were	 strictly	 optional.	 Remarkably,	 although	 legislative	
minority	 referendums	 are,	 in	 principle,	 easily	 initiated,	 Article 42	 has	 only	 been	
successfully	 invoked	 once,	 namely	 in	 1963	 on	 land	 reforms.	 The	 other	 two	optional	
referendums	were	the	votes	on	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty	and	the	Single	European	
Act	 (SEA),	 the	first	 of	which	was	 induced	 indirectly	by	 the	opposition	as	part	 of	 the	
Edinburgh	Protocol,	and	the	second	was	triggered	ad	hoc	by	the	government.	
	 The	turnout	in	Danish	referendums	is	significantly	lower	than	in	general	elections,	
which	 is	 consistently	 around	 85	 per	 cent.70 This is especially true in the case of 
referendums	on	the	constitution	and	voting	age.	In	2009,	only	58	per	cent	of	the	Danes	



















Table 5.3: Referendums in Denmark, 1950-2014














Centre-right	opposition Binding 73% No	
(4x)
1969 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 64% No
1971 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 86% Yes




1978 Mandatory Article	29 Voting	age Constitution Binding 63% Yes































2009 Mandatory Article	88 Throne 
succession
Constitution Binding 58% Yes








5.3.3 Explaining referendum practice in Denmark
Popular	votes	have	played	a	relatively	prominent	role	in	Danish	politics	throughout	the	
twentieth	 century.	 To	 a	 large	 extent,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	Articles 20, 29 and 
88	make	referendums	largely	unavoidable.	How	can	the	strong	constitutional	basis	for	
referendums	be	explained?	And	what	explains	the	 instances	 in	which	political	actors	







The	 way	 in	 which	 Danish	 referendum	 provisions	 are	 crafted,	 so	 that	 referendums	
can	 only	 be	 triggered	 by	 representatives,	 largely	 fits	 the	 Danish	 representative	
polity.	 As	 Svensson	 (1996,	 49)	 concludes,	 ‘the	 principles	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	
people	 and	 direct	 democracy	 have	 been	 favoured	 only	moderately,	 compared	with	
the	 principles	 of	 minority	 protection	 and	 representative	 democracy’.	 Denmark	 is	 a	
consensus	democracy,	marked	by	a	multiparty	system	and	an	electoral	system	based	
on	proportional	representation	(PR).	As	a	constitutional	monarchy,	the	function	of	the	
head	of	 state	 is	 purely	 ceremonial.	Unlike	 France,	Danish	democracy	 is	 furthermore	
characterized	 by	 a	 balanced	 relationship	 between	 the	 legislature	 and	 the	 executive.	
Danish	governments	are	not	dependent	on	a	formal	vote	of	confidence	when	assuming	
office	 (Slomp	 2011,	 416)	 –	 known	 as	 negative	 parliamentarianism	 –	 and	 minority	
governments	are	the	norm.	 In	fact,	since	WWII,	Denmark	has	only	had	four	majority	
governments	 (Strøm	 1990;	 Arter	 2006).72	 This	 means	 that	 Danish	 political	 decision-
making	 is	 strongly	 opposition-oriented,	 and	 that	 political	 decision-making	 is	 based	
on	constant	deliberation	and	bargaining	between	the	government	and	the	opposition	





	 On	paper,	Danish	referendums	are	above	all	minority	 instruments.	First,	 through	
the	initiation	of	referendums:	Article 42	gives	minority	parties	a	direct	tool	to	trigger	
a	referendum	on	a	 legislative	proposal	 that	 is	passed	by	a	majority	 in	parliament,	as	
this	only	requires	the	support	of	one-third	of	MPs	(Svensson	1996,	36).	As	I	argued	in	
chapters 2 and 4,	this	type	of	referendum	is	rather	exceptional	and	typically	found	in	
consensus	democracies,	 since	 it	provides	smaller	parties	 in	parliament	with	a	 strong	
tool	at	the	expense	of	the	parliamentary	majority.	In	addition,	under	Article 20, political	
minorities	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 to	 the	
EU	 indirectly	 by	preventing	 a	five-sixths	majority	 support	 in	 the	Folketing, and have 
frequently	done	so.	However,	the	power	of	political	minorities	to	do	this	is	considerable	
weaker	than	under	Article 42, as Article 20	can	be	circumvented	(and	thus	a	referendum	
avoided)	if	the	government	asserts	that	a	specific	EU	treaty	change	does	not	signify	a	
transfer	of	sovereignty,	as	it	did	in	the	cases	of	the	Treaties	of	Nice	and	Lisbon.	











and	 legislative	minority	 referendums	 (Article 42).	 This	means	 that,	 for	 the	 bill	 to	 be	











40	per	 cent	of	 the	electorate.	 This	was	 successfully	done	 in	1939,	when	 the	 liberals	
urged	their	followers	not	to	vote	in	the	referendum	on	constitutional	reform,	thereby	
preventing	 the	 threshold,	which	was	 then	 45	 per	 cent,	 being	 achieved	 (Miller	 1982,	





protection,	 since	 quorums	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 a	 voting	 majority	 to	 pursue	 a	
referendum	outcome.	 In	practice	though,	 it	 is	 too	simplistic	to	say	that	referendums	












Danish	governments	have	avoided	a	 referendum	by	not	 invoking	Article 20	 at	 all.	 In	
practice,	Danish	referendums	have	served	the	interests	of	the	government	more	than	
those	of	the	opposition.	Only	on	four	occasions	did	Danish	citizens	oppose	the	decision	






















only	a	few	players.	Referendums	under	Article 88 and Article 29	are	triggered	only	by	the	
constitution.	This	partly	applies	to	referendums	under	Article 20,	which	are	mandatory	




























As outlined in chapter 4,	Denmark	is	one	of	the	few	countries	where	the	referendum	
was	 introduced	before	 the	 Second	World	War.	Of	 the	other	EU	member	 states,	 this	
only	applies	to	Austria,	Ireland,	Luxembourg	and	Sweden.	Three	pre-WWII	referendums	
























contrary to the dissatisfaction thesis,	which	argues	that	support	for	referendums	comes	














having	 referendums	with a higher frequency,	 as	 this	 was	 supported	 by	 only	 45	 per	
cent	of	respondents	(Sonar	1998;	Bock	and	Larsen	29.12.1998;	Buch	and	Hansen	2002,	
11-12).	Moreover,	a	 survey	by	GfK	Denmark	 in	1999	 revealed	 that	 ‘only’	47	per	cent	











on	 the	 EU	 (Buch	 and	 Hansen	 2002,	 11).	 Moreover,	 the	 survey	 revealed	 a	 strong	




were	of	 the	opinion	that	EU	treaty	changes	should	be	decided	by	referendum.74 And 








	 Opinion	data	presented	here	suggests	an	absence	of	a	 strong	societal	basis	 that	
pressures	political	elites	 to	hold	 referendums,	except	when	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 transfer	
of	 sovereignty	 to	 the	 EU.	 As	 shown	 in	 figure 5.4,	 dissatisfaction	 with	 democracy	 is	
considerably	 lower	 than	 the	 EU	 average,75	 and	 has	 declined	 in	 recent	 decades.	 The	
European	Values	Study	(EVS)	revealed	that	in	1999,	33	per	cent	of	Danish	respondents	












of	 political	 institutions	 has	 slightly	 increased	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years,	 and	 since	 2008	
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such	support	 is	 lower	(and	below	the	EU	average)	when	it	relates	to	 issues	on	which	
Denmark	currently	has	opt-outs,	such	as	the	euro,	security	and	defence,	immigration	
policy	 and	 justice	 (Laursen	 2006,	 57;	 2012).	 Hence,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 Danes’	
exceptional	position	 in	the	EU,	Eurosceptical	sentiments	 indeed	provide	solid	ground	
for	referendum	demands.










EU membership a bad thing
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the	 Christian	 People’s	 Party	 (Kristeligt Folkeparti)	 and	 the	 Red–Green	 Alliance	
(Enhedslisten).	 However,	 the	 salience	 of	Nice	 in	 the	 public	 debate	was	 not	 strikingly	












	 A	 different	 situation	 applied	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 on	 which	









and	extension	of	 referendum	 legislation	 in	Denmark	 is	more	 likely	 to	have	been	 the	
outcome	 of	 opposition-government	 dynamics	 rather	 than	 normative	 motives	 as	
such.	 As	 Svensson	 (1996,	 33)	 argues,	 the	 Danish	 polity,	 with	 its	 various	 options	 for	
organizing	 referendums,	was	part	of	a	democratization	process	 ‘where	various	 ideas	
and	group	interests	have	confronted	one	another’.	The	initial	driving	forces	behind	the	























from	 the	 1990s	 onward	 by	 radical	 parties	 founded	 later,	 including	 the	 radical	 left-
wing	Red-Green	Alliance,	 the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	 the	 radical	 right-wing	Progress	
Party	 and	 later	 the	Danish	People’s	 Party	 (a	 splinter	 group	 from	 the	Progress	Party)	
(cf.	Svensson	1996,	50;	Christoffersen,	Beyeler,	Eichenberger,	Nannestad	and	Paldam	
2014).	 Such	 limited	 support	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum	 for	 the	 referendum	 as	 an	





political	 parties,	 i.e.	 the	 Danish	 People’s	 Party	 (100%),	 the	 Socialist	 People’s	 Party	
















support	 for	 referendums	 is	primarily	motivated	by	an	output-legitimacy	perspective,	






referendums	with	anti-elitist	arguments,	and	as	a	means	 to	give	politics	back	 to	 the	
ordinary	people.	For	this	party,	support	for	referendums	is	grounded	in	its	radical-right	
nationalist	ideology,	as	shown	by	its	calls	for	a	referendum	on	Danish	immigration	policy	










as	a	means	to	protect	the	Danes’	exceptional	position	in	the	EU.	Article 20 has indeed 
introduced	 a	 constitutional	 provision	 that	 decisions	 to	 transfer	 Danish	 sovereignty	
to	 the	 EU	 must	 be	 legitimized	 by	 a	 popular	 vote.	 Such	 an	 instrumental	 argument	
was,	 for	example,	put	 forward	by	prime	minister	Rasmussen	when	he	motivated	the	





championed	 the	 government’s	 referendum	 pledge	 on	 the	 European	 Constitutional	
Treaty	and	reiterated	the	strict	guarantee	that	the	Danish	exemptions	from	the	EU	‘can	
only	be	repealed	or	amended	by	a	subsequent,	separate	referendum’	(DKF	2005,	6).












decide	whether	an	EU	 treaty	change	 falls	under	Article 20 and	 thus	would	 require	a	




	 The	 fact	 that	Danish	 governments	managed	 to	 avoid	 a	 referendum	on	Nice	 and	
Lisbon	 is	probably	the	main	evidence	against	the	argument	that	there	 is	an	effective	










	 Moreover,	 the	 reluctance	 of	 the	 Rasmussen	 government	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	
on	Lisbon	can	especially	be	considered	remarkable,	given	the	fact	that	a	referendum	












opposition	 dynamics	 rather	 than	 political	 values	 as	 such.	 In	 the	 introduction	 of	
referendum	 legislation,	 outcome-contingent	 motives	 played	 an	 important	 role:	
referendum	legislation	was	adopted	and	extended	because	parties	expected	to	benefit	
from	 it.	 Referendum	 provisions	 have	 indeed	 been	 crafted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 they	
provide	 the	 opposition	with	 an	 extra	mechanism	 to	 influence	 decision-making.	 The	


























tracing,	 meaning	 that	 they	 were	 likely	 at	 play	 in	 Danish	 referendum	 pledges	 made	




given	that	 it	 is	 the	government	that	decides	whether	an	EU	treaty	falls	under	Article	
20	in	the	first	place,	and	 in	the	above-mentioned	cases,	the	government	pledged	the	
referendum	 regardless	of	 the	 vote	 in	parliament.	 For	 the	Danish	opposition,	 control	
over	the	initiation	of	referendums	is	constitutionally	grounded	in	Article 42 and in the 
provisions under Article 20, which	allow	a	popular	vote	to	be	triggered	indirectly.	Five	
votes	were	directly	triggered	by	the	opposition:	the	four	votes	on	land	reforms	in	1963	
and	 the	 referendum	on	 the	 revised	Maastricht	 Treaty.	 In	 three	additional	 cases,	 the	
opposition	played	an	 indirect	 triggering	role	by	preventing	a	five-sixths	majority	 (EC-





and	 the	 1986	 referendum	on	 the	 SEA	 that	was	 triggered	by	 the	 government.	When	
referendums	are	 initiated	by	the	opposition,	they	have	a	policy-seeking	character	by	























on	which	a	political	minority	was	able	 to	halt	bills	by	 triggering	a	 referendum	under	
Article 42.





































NO NO YES NO n/a Policy-seeking
EC	accession		
(1972)
NO YES YES NO YES Required under 
Article 20
Conflict	mediation
SEA	(1986) NO YES YES YES YES Policy-seeking
Maastricht		
(1992)



































2001,	 223),	 the	 Eurosceptic	 opposition	 was	 able	 to	 indirectly	 trigger	 a	 referendum	








In	1992,	 the	Danish	government	was	unable	 to	mobilize	a	five-sixths	majority	 in	 the	
Folketing	 to	 support	 ratification	 of	 the	 Treaty.	 Despite	 the	 Treaty	 being	 supported	







to	effectuate	a	certain	policy	outcome	when	support	 in	parliament	 is	 insufficient.	 In	
Denmark,	most	post-WWII	governments	have	in	fact	been	minority	governments.	All	
referendums	on	 the	EU	have	 indeed	been	pledged	by	minority	governments	 (except	
the	vote	on	the	revised	Maastricht	Treaty,	which	was	the	outcome	of	a	deal	between	
opposition	parties).	 Rather	 than	 an	 offensive	 policy-seeking	 strategy,	 such	 votes	 are	





parliament.	 EC	 leaders	pushed	 the	Poul	 Schlüter	 government	 to	find	a	 solution,	 and	
subsequently,	it	called	an	ad	hoc	advisory	referendum	so	as	to	effectuate	a	confirmative	




on	 the	 EU	 regardless	 of	 the	 Folketing	 vote,	 a	 likely	motivation	was	 to	 separate	 the	
issue	at	stake	 from	national	elections.	As	shown	 in	 table 5.4,	evidence	 for	 this	claim	
was	 found	 in	 the	 case	 of	 both	 Amsterdam	 and	 the	 TCE,	 as	well	 as	 the	most	 recent	
















(Agence	France	Presse	19.2.1998).	 Yet,	with	 the	guarantee	 that	 the	electorate	 could	
cast	 their	 vote	 directly	 on	 the	 issue	 after	 the	 elections,	 the	 Social	 Democrat-Social	









	 In	 the	case	of	 the	TCE,	 it	would	have	been	difficult	 for	 the	government	 to	 claim	
that	the	treaty	did	not	signify	a	transfer	of	sovereignty.	Subsequently,	support	 in	the	
Folketing	did	not	reach	a	five-sixths	majority	due	to	opposition	from	the	populist	right	








several	public	opinion	polls	 suggested	 that	public	 enthusiasm	 for	 an	EU	constitution	
was	waning	(Sørensen	and	Vestergaard	2005).	Thus,	by	openly	committing	to	a	popular	
vote,	it	is	plausible	that	the	government	aimed	to	separate	the	issue	from	the	electoral	
campaign	 for	 the	Folketing	 elections	 in	 February	2005,	 and	make	 sure	 that	 it	would	
not	 lose	 votes	over	 the	 issue	 in	 the	EP	elections	 in	2004.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	discourse	
surrounding	the	Constitutional	Treaty	would	have	made	it	very	difficult	for	Rasmussen	
to	avoid	the	referendum	in	the	first	place	(Laursen	2008,	273).	
	 The	 referendum	 held	 in	 December	 2015	 on	 the	 Danish	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	
of	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	 was	 also	 not	 devoid	 of	 a	 depoliticization	 strategy.	




a	 referendum	was	 the	 only	way	 in	which	 it	 could	 have	 pursued	 its	 commitment	 to	






However,	 it	 is	not	as	much	the	 fact	 that	 the	referendum	was	held,	as	 its	timing that 
makes	 it	 likely	that	strategic	 interests	played	a	role.	The	decision	by	the	government	
parties	 (which	 was	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 Liberal	 Party,	 the	 Conservative	 People’s	
Party,	and	the	Socialist	People’s	Party	in	opposition)	to	hold	the	referendum	after the 
2015	general	elections	 (The	Local	7.10.2014),	 suggests	 that	 it	 aimed	 to	 separate	 this	
controversial	issue	from	the	electoral	campaign.	
CONFLICT	 MEDIATION.	 Especially	 for	 the	 Social	 Democrats,	 referendums	 on	 the	
EU	serve	not	only	as	a	depoliticization	mechanism,	but	also	 to	mediate	conflict	over	
Europe	 within	 their	 own	 party	 and	 with	 their	 Eurosceptic	 leftist	 counterpart,	 the	
Socialist	People’s	Party.	The	1916	referendum	on	the	sale	of	Danish	West	Indies	already	









elections	upcoming,	 	 the	Social	Democrats	had	a	clear	 stake	 in	calling	a	 referendum	
to	 prevent	 a	 party	 split	 over	 the	 issue	 (Martens	 1979,	 28).	 Exposure	 of	 intra-party	
divisions	over	Europe	during	the	election	campaign	would	not	be	beneficial	to	the	Social	
Democrats,	especially	 since	 the	Eurosceptic	Socialist	People’s	Party	could	easily	 take	
advantage	of	the	divisions	and	mobilize	anti-membership	sentiments	(Hug	2002,	33).	




People’s	Party	and	 the	Social	 Liberals	 strongly	opposing	 ratification	of	 the	accession	






Treaty	 and	 future	 Danish	 opt-ins	 –	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 required	 five-sixths	







This	 solution	 was	 found	 in	 a	 ‘national	 compromise’	 (Hug	 2002,	 34),	 referred	 to	 as	
the	Edinburgh	Protocol,	which	 included	Danish	 ‘op-outs’	 from	particular	parts	of	 the	


















given	 Denmark	 considerable	 bargaining	 power.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 negotiations	 on	
the	Nice	 Treaty,	 the	Danish	 government	 stated	 that	 ‘The	Danish	 opt-outs	 contained	
in	the	Edinburgh	Decision	and	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	are	not	up	for	negotiation	at	the	
Conference.	 They	have	been	determined	by	 referendum	and	 can	only	be	altered	by	
the	Danish	population	by	a	further	referendum’	(Laursen	2006,	63).	Another	example	
is	 the	 role	 Denmark	 played	 in	 the	 de-constitutionalization	 of	 the	 TCE.	 In	 this	 case,	




	 However,	 the	 negotiated	 Danish	 opt-outs	 also	 impose	 constraints	 on	 Danish	










EMPOWERMENT.	Given	 the	 rejective	character	of	Danish	 referendums	 it	 is,	unlike	 in	









Not	keeping	 this	promise	would	have	 thus	been	political	 suicide.	However,	 this	does	
not	alter	the	fact	that	the	referendum	had	some	anticipated	advantages.	Rasmussen’s	
victory	in	the	1998	elections	was	only	small,	and	he	was	certainly	in	need	of	a	domestic	
success	 (Downs	 2001).	 Moreover,	 he	 was	 confident	 that	 the	 referendum	 could	 be	
won.	 Two	 years	 earlier,	 under	 his	 leadership,	 the	Danes	 had	 approved	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Amsterdam	 and	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 Danes	 adopted	 a	 more	 favourable	 attitude	
towards	their	country’s	EU	membership	(recall	figure 5.6).	Opinion	polls	held	in	1999	












EU	 patent	 jurisdiction.	 The	 vote	 was	 held	 alongside	 the	 elections	 for	 the	 European	




from	 Danish	 business	 and	 industry.	 Moreover,	 public	 ratification	 of	 the	 UPC	 would	
certainly	be	a	 success	 for	 the	government	of	Thorning-Schmidt and	 raise	Denmark’s	
legitimacy	 at	 EU	 level.	 The	 decision	 to	 set	 up	 an	 EU	Patent	 Court	 had	 already	 been	
made	in	2012,	and	was	one	of	Denmark’s	victories	during	its	EU	Presidency	in	the	first	
















about	 their	 country’s	 membership	 over	 time,	 Eurobarometer	 data	 show	 consistent	
ambivalence	among	the	Danish	public	when	it	comes	to	policies	that	affect	Denmark’s	
autonomy.	 In	 the	early	days,	Euroscepticism	came	mainly	 from	the	Socialist	People’s	
Party	and	 the	Communist	Party,	who	 focused	 their	opposition	on	concerns	over	 the	
loss	 of	 Denmark’s	 social	model.81	More	 recently,	 left-wing	 opposition	 has	 expanded	
through	 the	 Red-Green	 Alliance,	 which	 strongly	 opposes	 the	 political	 economy	 of	
the	EU.	 In	addition,	as	elsewhere	 in	Europe,	Euroscepticism	has	also	gained	a	strong	
populist	 right-wing	 character.	Most	 notably	 the	Danish	 People’s	 Party	 has	mobilized	
Euroscepticism	with	 concerns	 over	 immigration	 becoming	 the	main	mobilizing	 force	
(Fitzgibbon	2013).	The	promise	to	hold	referendums	on	the	EU,	and	the	role	they	play	





5.3.4 The future of Danish referendums?
The	strong	constitutional	basis	for	holding	referendums	makes	them	largely	unavoidable.	
Indeed,	even	when	it	is	not	legally	obligatory,	it	might	be	political	suicide	not	to	invoke	
Article 20,	 especially	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 significant	 Danish	 Eurosceptic	 opposition.	
And	 given	 the	 consistent	 gap	 between	 a	 relatively	 pro-European	 political	 elite	 and	














on	a	Eurosceptic	agenda,	especially	when	such	an	agenda	 is	 linked	 to	other	national	
sovereignty	 issues,	 like	 immigration.	 And	 with	 the	 electoral	 victory	 of	 the	 Danish	
People’s	Party	–	which	pushed	 for	 referendums	on	 the	European	banking	union	and	
on	Denmark’s	 renewed	EU	membership	 (following	 the	example	of	 the	Conservatives	
in	Britain),	 referendums	are	back	on	 the	Danish	political	agenda	 (Levring	16.6.2015). 
And	 indeed,	 at	 the	time	of	writing	 this	 study,	 in	December	2015,	Denmark	has	held	
a	 referendum	on	ending	 its	 exemption	 from	EU	 justice	 rules.	According	 to	 the	1992	
Edinburgh	Protocol,	such	opt-ins	can	only	be	decided	by	referendum	(BBC	Monitoring	
Europe	11.12.2014).	Since	 the	Danes	voted	 in	December	2015	against	changing	 their	
rigid	 opt-out	 from	 the	 area	of	 freedom,	 security	 and	 justice	 into	 a	 flexible	 opt-in,	 it	
remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 earlier	 announced	 referendum	 on	 Denmark’s	 opt-
out	from	the	EU’s	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy	will	be	held	(cf.	Rynning	and	
Clemmensen	20.1.2015).
5.4 FRENCH AND DANISH REFERENDUMS COMPARED 




constitutional	 revisions.	 More	 importantly,	 in	 both	 France	 and	 Denmark,	 political	
representatives	 largely	 control	 the	 referendum	 process.	 Central	 questions	 in	 this	
chapter	were	how	 to	 explain	 political	 decisions	 to	 hold	 national	 referendums	 in	 the	
two	countries,	and	how	to	explain	why	referendums	are	held	with	a	higher	frequency	in	
these	countries	than	in	others,	like	the	UK	and	Sweden.
	 A	 first	 factor	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 referendums	 in	
these	countries	 is	 the	presence	of	a	 strong	constitutional	basis.	 The	constitutions	of	
both	France	and	Denmark	provide	 for	mandatory	 referendums	and	 for	 referendums	
triggered	by	the	government.	A	second	factor	is	that	both	France	and	Denmark	have	
a	 referendum	 tradition.	 A	 final	 factor	 that	 explains	 why	 referendums	 have	 played	
a	 recurrent	 role	 in	French	and	Danish	politics	 is	 the	small	number	of	veto	players	 in	
the	 process	 of	 triggering	 them.	 In	 France,	 until	 recently,	 referendums	 could	 only	 be	
triggered	by	the	president.	In	Denmark,	referendums	are	triggered	by	the	constitution,	
or	 –	 in	 case	 of	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications	 –	 by	 the	 government,	which	 decides	whether	
ratification	 implies	 a	 transfer	 of	 Danish	 sovereignty	 and	 whether	 it	 is	 thus	 suitable	









	 This	 chapter	has	 shown	 that	both	governments	have	had	various	motivations	 to	
call	referendums.	There	is	a	strong	tendency	in	the	academic	referendum	literature	to	
explain	referendum	use	in	terms	of	concerns	about	the	sustainability	of	representative	







On	 several	 occasions,	 political	 leaders	 have	been	 reluctant	 to	 organize	 referendums	
on	comparable	weighty	 issues,	and	despite	public	demands	to	do	so.	The	reluctance	
of	leaders	in	both	countries	to	organize	a	referendum	on	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	despite	





In	 both	 countries,	 referendums	 have	 served	 primarily	 to	 mediate	 conflict	 about	
controversial	 issues,	most	notably	 the	EU,	and	 to	depoliticize	 these	 issues	 in	general	
election	campaigns.	Indeed,	in	both	France	and	Denmark,	referendum	use	on	‘Europe’	
should	mainly	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	difficulties	of	 integrating	EU	affairs	 into	
normal	 party	 politics.	 In	 France,	 both	 the	 centre-left	 and	 centre-right	 have	 been	
consistently	divided	on	Europe,	and	both	face	opposition	on	the	issue	from	the	growing	
support	for	the	Eurosceptic	and	nationalist	FN.	In	Denmark,	Euroscepticism	had	always	




in	 the	Edinburgh	Protocol	 to	have	 future	Danish	opt-ins	 submitted	 to	a	 referendum.	
Second,	 when	 the	 authorities	 anticipate	 a	 ‘yes’	 vote,	 referendums	 on	 the	 EU	 can	





in	 their	 respective	 political	 systems.	 In	 France,	 referendum	 practice	 is	 strongly	
embedded	 in	 the	 semi-presidential	 majoritarian	 system,	 where	 the	 president	 holds	






based	on	majoritarian	rule.	At	least	until	2015,	referendums	under	Article 11 could only 






































THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SWEDEN
6.1 INTRODUCTION






EU	membership	 on	 23	 June	 2016.82	 Despite	 this	 low	 level	 of	 UK-wide	 votes,	 several	
referendums	have	been	held	in	Northern	Ireland	(1973	and	1998),	Scotland	(1979,	1997	














and	 the	 persistent	 ability	 of	 a	 mainstream	 political	 party	 to	 veto	 referendum	
proposals.	 In	 the	 UK,	 both	 Labour	 and	 Conservatives	 were	 long	 able	 to	 withdraw	













The United Kingdom and Sweden
salient	and	have	been	given	formal	status	 in	the	2000	Political	Parties,	Elections	and	
Referendums	Act	 (hereafter	 the	 PPERA)	 and	 the	 2011	 European	Union	Act	 (EUA).	 In	
Sweden,	the	referendum	was	 introduced	as	early	as	1922,	but	has	nevertheless	only	
been	modestly	used	because	mainstream	parties,	most	notably	the	Social	Democratic	
Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	–	SAP)	and	the	conservative	Moderate	
Party (Moderata samlingspartiet),	 have	 used	 their	 dominant	 positions	 to	 veto	
referendum	 proposals.	 Due	 to	 the	 increased	 electoral	 success	 of	 the	 populist-right	




countries.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 vital	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 countries’	 polities,	 which	
provide	different	 incentives	(and	disincentives)	 for	political	representatives	to	pledge	
referendums.	Section 6.2	 of	 this	 chapter	 deals	with	 the	UK,	where	 referendums	 are	
elite-driven	 instruments	 invoked	 by	 political	 parties	 to	 depoliticize	 controversial	
issues	and	 strengthen	 their	position	vis-à-vis	 competing	parties.	Section 6.3 looks at 





referendum	 pledges	 are	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 concerns	 about	 the	 sustainability	
of	 representative	 democracy	 and/or	 citizens’	 demands,	 or	 whether	 they	 should	 be	
understood	purely	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 strategic	 function	of	 referendums	 in	 the	 political	
game.	Additionally,	I	provide	a	cautious	forecast	about	future	referendum	use	in	both	
countries.
6.2 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
6.2.1 Referendum provisions in the UK
The	UK	does	not	have	a	codified	constitution,	but	an	‘unwritten’	one	comprised	of	Acts	of	
Parliament	(International	Constitutional	Law	1992).	This	means	that	there	is	no	codified 
constitutional	 basis	 for	 holding	 referendums.	 Consequently,	 UK-wide	 referendums	
are	 triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 act	 that	 has	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 a	majority	 in	 the	
Westminster	parliament.	For	a	long	time,	there	was	no	legislation	that	regulated	the	use	
of	referendums.	This	changed	in	2000	with	the	signing	of	the	PPERA	(Parliament	of	the	










	 In	2011,	 referendums	on	 the	EU	acquired	 formal	 status	with	 the	amendment	of	
the	EUA.	Part	of	 the	2010	coalition	agreement	of	 the	Conservative	Party	and	Liberal	
Democrats	 was	 a	 commitment	 to	 amend	 the	 European	 Communities	 Act	 of	 1972,	
to	 make	 sure	 that	 ‘any	 proposed	 future	 treaty	 that	 transferred	 areas	 of	 power,	 or	
competences,	would	be	subject	to	a	referendum	on	that	treaty	–	a	“referendum	lock”’	
(Cameron	and	Clegg	2010,	19).	Under	the	reformed	EUA,	a	broad	range	of	EU	treaty	
changes	 can	only	be	 ratified	by	parliament	when	approved	by	 the	British	electorate	
in	 a	 binding	 referendum.	 The	 EUA	has	 three	 sections	 that	 contain	 such	 referendum	
locks: section 2 prescribes	a	referendum	in	the	case	of	amendments	or	replacements	
of	 the	existing	EU	 treaties	 that	 fall	 under	 the	ordinary	 revision	procedure;	 section 3 
prescribes	 a	 referendum	 in	 the	 case	 of	 amendments	 that	 fall	 under	 the	 simplified	
revision	procedure;	 and	finally,	 section 6	 lists	 a	 number	of	 events,	 like	 changing	 the	
voting	procedures	in	the	Council	or	adoption	of	the	euro,	that	automatically	trigger	a	
referendum	(Parliament	of	the	United	Kingdom	2011).	
	 The	 referendum	 locks	 in	 the	 EUA	 mark	 a	 clear	 break	 from	 the	 parliamentary	
ratification	 of	 EU	 treaty	 changes	 (Gordon	 and	 Dougan	 2012).	 However,	 even	 the	




of	 new	member	 states.	 Finally,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 referendum	 locks	 are	 crafted	
leaves	considerable	scope	for	political	 interpretation.	 In	 fact,	 the	EUA	of	2011	states	
that	a	 referendum	 is	only	necessary	when	an	EU	treaty	amendment	or	a	 transfer	of	
competences	under	sections 2 and 3 signify a significant	transfer	of	British	sovereignty.	
If	the	government	rules	that	this	is	not	the	case,	a	referendum	is	not	required	(Murkens	
2012,	 398;	 Gordon	 and	 Dougan	 2012).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 such	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 British	
government,	a	majority	 in	 the	British	parliament	can	 ‘second-guess’	 the	government	




6.2.2 Use of UK-wide referendums
With	 only	 two	 UK-wide	 referendums	 held	 between	 1950	 and	 2014	 (see	 table 6.1),	
the	UK	is	one	of	the	many	European	countries	where	referendum	use	 is	exceptional.	

















Table 6.1: UK-wide referendums 1950-2014
Year Type Legal 
basis
Topic Initiator Effect Turnout Outcome
1975 Legislative	
Majority	







several	 occasions	 on	 which	 a	 referendum	 was	 called	 either	 by	 the	 government	 or	
opposition,	but	was	not	ultimately	held.	These	include	calls	by	former	prime	minister	






a	 referendum	 on	 Britain’s	 EU	 membership,	 which	 was	 rejected	 by	 parliament.	 A	
referendum	was	also	scheduled	on	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	(TCE)	in	2005,	
but	was	cancelled	after	the	French	and	Dutch	‘no’	vote.	These	examples	indeed	mark	






















from	 playing	 a	 major	 role,	 namely	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 parliamentary	
sovereignty	over	direct	participatory	decision-making	and	the	UK’s	majoritarian	system,	
with	the	long-dominance	of	two	parties,	no	longer	automatically	apply.	In	the	changed	




The	way	 in	which	 referendum	 legislation	 is	 crafted	 and	 invoked	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	
British	majoritarian	system.	The	British	Single	Member	Plurality	(SMP)	–	or	‘first-past-
the-post’	 –	 electoral	 system	 for	 a	 long	 time	 enabled	 the	 dominance	 of	 two	 major	




























The United Kingdom and Sweden
















quorum.	 The	 amendment	was	 rejected	 by	 the	House	 of	 Commons,	 the	 government	
stating	that	a	quorum	‘goes	against	our	view	that	people	should	get	what	they	vote	for’	





EU	 treaty	 reform	does	not	 signify	a	 transfer	of	British	 sovereignty	or	 is	 insignificant, 
a	referendum	is	not	required	(Murkens	2012).	In	addition,	the	EUA	was	signed	by	the	




Compared	 to	 France	 and	 Denmark,	 where	 referendums	 are	 primarily	 triggered	 by	























to	achieve	certain	policy	outcomes,	and	are	moreover	 risky	as,	 in	practice,	 they	 risk	
a	 vote-of-confidence.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	main	 competitors,	 subsequent	 British	
governments	have	long	had	few	incentives	to	actually	schedule	referendums.	
	 From	the	1990s	onwards,	the	British	political	landscape	became	more	fragmented,	
due	 to	 the	 rising	 popularity	 of	 parties	 like	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats,	 the	 SNP	 and	 the	
populist	UK	Independence	Party	(UKIP).	The	2010	elections	were	the	first	time	in	the	
post-WWII	era	that	neither	of	the	two	main	parties	was	able	to	gain	a	majority	in	the	




	 Changes	 in	 British	 referendum	 practice	 should	 clearly	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	
of	 these	 broader	 changes.	 Notably,	 consistent	 with	 findings	 from	 Rahat	 (2008),	 the	




After	1998,	when	 the	Scottish	parliament	was	established	 (the	outcome	of	 the	1997	
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with	 the	 act	 of	 pledging	 referendums	 in	 itself.	 For	 opposition	 parties,	 referendums	




to	 curb	Eurosceptic	 rebels	within	 their	own	parties.	Prime	minister	David	Cameron’s	
recent	 referendum	call	 on	British	 EU	membership	 is	 a	 clear	 example	of	 this	 difficult	
choice	facing	current	British	governments.	
PAST	EXPERIENCE
The	 recent	 formalization	of	 the	 referendum	 in	 the	PPERA	and	 the	EUA	mark	 a	 clear	
departure	from	the	UK’s	long-lasting	reluctance	to	hold	referendums.	For	a	long	time,	














party’	 (quoted	 in	 Cosgrove	1981,	 108).	Dicey	was	 referring	 to	 the	persisting	 conflict	
among	political	parties	over	Irish	independence	in	the	1890s,	and	he	saw	a	referendum	
as	a	remedy	for	the	deadlock.	The	referendums	on	devolution	and	sovereignty	affairs	




salience	 of	 issues	 concerning	 devolution	 and	 independence	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	






and	 devolution	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 disagreement	 between	 citizens’	 groups	
and	 political	 parties,	 and	 referendums	 have	 been	 used	 to	 settle	 the	 issue	 (Balsom	
1996).	Given	the	commitment	of	several	political	parties	 from	the	1990s	onwards	to	
hold	 referendums	 on	 these	 issues,	 both	 political	 representatives	 and	 constitutional	
experts	called	for	referendum	regulations,	so	as	to	guarantee	that	future	referendums	
are	conducted	 fairly	and	efficiently.	 In	1996,	 the	UK	Constitutional	Unit	–	a	 research	
institution	 on	 constitutional	 change	 –	 and	 the	 Electoral	 Reform	 Society	 –	 Britain’s	
largest	 pressure	 group	on	 electoral	 reform	–	 set	 up	 an	 independent	Commission on 








to	 constitutional	 EU	 referendum	 requirements	 elsewhere,	 for	 example	 in	 Denmark,	
they	can	be	repealed	by	a	subsequent	ruling	majority	(Gordon	and	Dougan	2012,	12).	





more	favourable	to	referendums,	notably	where	the	EU	 is	concerned.	 In	chapter 3,	 I	
conceptualized	three	proxies	to	enable	this	social	climate	to	be	assessed,	two	to	assess	
the	climate	for	referendums	in	general,	namely	the	level	of	political dissatisfaction in 
society and the level of political interest;	 and	a	 third	proxy	 to	assess	 the	climate	 for	
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in	a	change	in	the	ruling	party	for	the	first	time	in	eighteen	years),	the	proportion	of	
British	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	the	way	democracy	works	

















As	 shown	 in	figure 6.2,	 the	proportion	of	 respondents	 that	have	 little	or	no	 trust	 in	









in	politics	 is,	at	 least	on	 the	basis	of	 such	aggregated	data,	very	 tenuous.	Moreover,	
no	referendums	were	held	when	almost	a	majority	of	the	British	people	said	that	they	
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of	 respondents	who	believe	that	 the	UK	has	not	benefitted	from	EU	membership:	 in	
1991	38	per	cent	held	this	opinion,	while	 in	2011	this	was	54	per	cent	 (compared	to	
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Such	sentiments	of	political	interest	and	dissatisfaction	with	national	and	EU	politics	are	
generally	linked	to	support	for	referendums.	As	longitudinal	comparative	data	on	public	






















	 Other	 survey	 data	 seem	 to	 support	 this	 claim.	 When	 Cameron	 announced	 the	






















that	 in	principle	 supports	 referendums	–	supported	 the	 referendum,	compared	with	
54	per	cent	of	Labour	voters	(TNS	BMRB	27.1.2013).	The	Conservative	Party’s	decision	
in	2015	to	keep	its	electoral	promise	therefore	coincides	with	the	high	level	of	support	














	 Moreover,	 the	 refusal	of	Gordon	Brown’s	government	 to	organize	a	 referendum	
on	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	despite	the	referendum	scheduled	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty	
in	 2005	 and	 despite	 public	 demand,	 is	 clear	 evidence	 against	 the	 argument	 that	




























2009,	 14-15).	 However,	 that	 such	 participatory	 arguments	 were	 indeed	motivations	
behind	British	referendum	practice	is	hardly	likely,	given	the	fact	that	the	conduct	of	
British	referendums	is	primarily	elite-driven.














British	 sovereignty	 and	 legitimizing	proposals	 that	 affect	 the	British	political	 system,	
rather	than	intrinsically	as	participatory	instruments	(Baimbridge,	Whyman	and	Mullen	
2006,	35).	 Such	an	 instrumental	perception	of	 referendums	fits	 in	with	 the	 tradition	
of	Dicey,	who	 stated	 that	 they	 serve	 to	protect	 ‘the	 rights	of	 the	nation	against	 the	
usurpation	of	national	authority	of	any	party	which	happens	to	have	a	parliamentary	
majority’	 (quoted	 in	 Cosgrove	 1981,	 106).	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 1997	 parliamentary	










have	 all	 been	 concerned	with	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 irreversibly	 transferring	 the	 powers	









	 Referendums	 on	 the	 EU	 also	 fit	 in	 with	 Dicey’s	 tradition.	 As	 such,	 instrumental	




















Spain	have	been	asked	 their	views	on	crucial	aspects	of	 their	country’s	 relationships	
with	the	EU	in	more	than	30	different	national	referendums	–	but	not	in	the	UK’	(House	
of	Commons	9.6.2015,	column	1048).
	 Although	 these	 arguments	 are	 compelling,	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Labour	 and	 the	
Conservatives	have	ambiguously	pledged	referendums	suggests	that	reference	to	such	
normative	 instrumental	 values	 made	 in	 the	 debate	 are	 only	 indicative,	 rather	 than	
representing	decisive	evidence.	Labour	only	embraced	the	referendum	in	its	election	
manifesto	of	1997	–	despite	vigorously	opposing	it	before	the	1970s	–	after	eighteen	
years	of	Conservative	 rule	 (1979-1997),	when	 it	 felt	 increasing	competition	 from	the	
SNP.	And,	although	under	Labour	rule	several	referendums	were	held	on	devolution,	
important	EU	treaty	ratifications,	like	Nice	and	Lisbon,	were	not	submitted	to	a	popular	
vote.	 The	 Conservatives,	 too,	 were	 ambiguous	 in	 their	 referendum	 calls.	 They	 did	
not	 pledge	 a	 referendum	on	 the	 far-reaching	Maastricht	 Treaty	when	 in	 power,	 but	







The United Kingdom and Sweden
and	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	and	there	are	vastly	greater	extensions	of	qualified	majority	























parties	 in	 the	UK,	 feeds	 the	assumption	 that	 referendums	pledges	are	motivated	by	
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CONFLICT	MEDIATION. As	 shown	 in	 table 6.2,	 all	 British	 referendum	pledges	 related	








	 From	 the	 moment	 that	 the	 Conservative	 government	 of	 Edward	 Heath	 signed	
the	 accession	 agreement	 with	 the	 EC,	 ‘Europe’	 caused	 persistent	 disagreement	
within	 the	 Labour	 Party.	 The	 official	 party	 line	was	 to	 oppose	 accession,	 but	 in	 the	
first	 parliamentary	 reading	 on	 EC	membership	 in	 1971,	 Roy	 Jenkins	 –	 then	 Shadow	
Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	–	and	68	Labour	MPs	deviated	and	voted	in	favour	(Miller	




















British	 adoption	 of	 the	 euro,	 conflict	 mediation	 was	 also	 a	 likely	 motivation.	While	
the	‘yes’	vote	of	1975	had	softened	Euroscepticism	in	the	Labour	party,	the	party	did	
not	adopt	a	more	explicit	pro-EU	stance	until	the	1990s,	and	even	then	many	of	the	
traditional	 left	 remained	 opposed	 to	 the	 UK’s	 EU	membership,	 especially	when	 this	
concerned	 economic	 integration	 (George	 and	 Haythorne	 1996).	 British	 adoption	 of	
the	euro	was	something	Blair	clearly	desired,	but	his	position	was	opposed	by	Labour	
Eurosceptics	(Wintour	23.1.2012).	Finance	minister	Gordon	Brown	was	more	hesitant	





	 As	 shown	 in	 table 6.2,	when	Blair	had	 to	 ratify	 the	TCE	 in	2005,	 there	were	 still	
divisions	 over	 ‘Europe’	 within	 the	 Labour	 party	 and	 he	was	 faced	with	 referendum	
demands	from	the	Conservatives,	the	Liberal	Democrats	and	even	from	within	his	own	
party	 (Seldon,	 Snowdon	 and	 Collings	 2007,	 263-265).	 At	 that	 time,	 Blair’s	 authority	
within	the	party	had	been	damaged	by	his	decision	to	support	British	participation	in	
the	Iraq	war	and	the	increasing	success	of	the	Conservative	Party	in	the	polls	(Qvortrup	
2006,	 67).	 These	 divisions	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 that	 Blair’s	 referendum	 pledge	
was	motivated	by	a	desire	to	smooth	over	party	divisions	and	restore	his	 legitimacy.	
Moreover,	 as	 table 6.2	 shows,	 at	 the	time	when	he	pledged	 the	 vote	 in	April	 2004,	
opinion	polls	revealed	that,	despite	the	controversy	over	the	 issue,	a	majority	of	the	




	 ‘Europe’	had	also	 caused	persistent	divisions	among	 the	Conservatives.	Notably,	



































 As argued in chapter 3,	the	anticipation	that	a	referendum	will	be	won	is	a	necessary	
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persistent	 divisions	 within	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 since	 over	 80	 Tories	 defied	 the	
government’s	 three-line	whip	 to	 veto	 the	bill	 (BBC	25.10.2011).	Although	Cameron’s	
majority	was	 still	 large	enough	 to	block	 the	bill,	 it	 came	 to	be	 known	as	 the	 largest	
rebellion	against	a	Conservative	prime	minister	over	‘Europe’.	
	 These	divisions	drove	Cameron	to	a	remarkable	U-turn	in	January	2013,	when	he	

















although	 not	 within	 the	 mainstream	 parties	 but	 within	 the	 governing	 coalition.	 As	
such,	it	was	the	direct	outcome	of	the	changes	in	the	British	political	landscape	after	
the	2010	elections	when,	for	the	first	time	in	the	post-WWII	era,	parties	were	forced	
to	 form	a	coalition	government	to	secure	a	majority	 in	 the	House	of	Commons.	This	
referendum	is	an	odd	one,	as	it	risked	an	outcome	that	both	coalition	partners	actually	
did	 not	 want	 –	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats	 preferred	 a	 more	 proportional	 system,	 such	
as	 the	 Single	 Transferable	 Vote	 (STV),	 while	 the	 Conservatives	 preferred	 the	 status	
quo	(BBC	7.9.2010).	When	no	party	gained	a	majority	in	the	2010	elections,	both	the	
Conservatives	and	Labour	 tried	 to	 form	a	coalition	with	Liberal	Democrats.	Electoral	
reform	proved	to	be	an	important	issue	in	the	negotiations	and	served	as	bait	to	woo	
the	 Liberal	 Democrats	 as	 a	 coalition	 party	 (Laycock,	 Renwick,	 Stevens	 and	 Vowles	
2013,	212).	Labour	 leader	Gordon	Brown	–	who	had	already	called	for	a	referendum	
on	 the	 electoral	 system	 in	 a	 speech	 at	 the	 Labour	 conference	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	














coalition	partners	 ‘whipped’	 their	MPs	to	vote	 in	 favour.	As	such,	 it	offered	the	new	
government	a	possibility	to	deflate	internal	disagreements	as,	 in	Cameron’s	words,	 it	
provided	a	‘resounding	answer	that	settles	the	question’	(BBC	7.5.2011b).	




member	states.	 In	 fact,	 there	has	 rarely	been	a	majority	of	 the	British	citizenry	 fully	
supportive	of	Britain’s	EU	membership.	In	addition,	compared	to	other	EU	countries,	a	
large	part	of	the	population	(around	30	per	cent)	holds	an	ambivalent	position	towards	
Britain’s	 EU	 membership.	 This	 consistent	 gap	 between	 pro-European	 governments	
and	the	more	Eurosceptical	electorates	puts	pressures	on	any	government	that	aims	
to	 further	 the	European	 integration	process	and	 the	UK’s	 ’s	 role	 in	 it.	 It	 provides	an	













Alastair	Campbell,	Blair	had	clear	hopes	 that,	 in	 the	meantime,	he	could	push	public	
opinion	 towards	a	more	pro-euro	position	 (Campbell	 and	Stott	2008,	553).	A	 similar	















is	 an	 emergency	measure,	 notably	 in	 the	 face	 of	 UKIP	 competition	 (The	 Economist	
16.5.2013).	







no	British	 referendum	had	been	held	on	 the	more	 far-reaching	SEA	or	 the	Treaty	of	
Maastricht	(BBC	6.6.2001). 















position	 is	 substantively	different	 to	 that	of	 its	 EU	counterparts	 (Miller	2013).	 These	
demands	included	a	British	opt-out	from	the	EU’s	founding	ambition	to	forge	an	‘ever	
closer	 union’,	 strengthening	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 national	 parliaments,	 cuts	 in	 welfare	
benefits	to	EU	migrants,	explicit	recognition	that	the	euro	is	not	the	only	EU	currency,	
guarantees	 that	 steps	 to	 further	 the	 financial	 union	 cannot	 be	 imposed	 on	 non-
eurozone	countries	and	that	the	UK	will	not	have	to	contribute	to	eurozone	bailouts,	
and	a	target	for	the	reduction	of	red	tape,	 i.e.	regulations	that	the	UK	feels	 limit	the	
competitiveness	 of	 EU	member	 states.	 The	 fact	 that	 Cameron	 particularly	 stressed	













the	 EU	 unless	 his	 reform	 demands	were	 agreed	 (BBC	 28.5.2015).	 Immediately	 after	
Cameron’s	re-election	 in	May	2015,	both	the	president	of	 the	European	Commission	
Jean-Claude	 Juncker	 and	 German	 Chancellor	 Angela	Merkel	 promised	 to	 work	 with	
David	Cameron	to	negotiate	an	acceptable	agreement	that	would	secure	Britain’s	EU	
membership	(Kirkup	and	Holehouse	9.5.2015).	As	Cameron	stated	in	a	speech	before	

















	 These	 risks	 indeed	 explain	 why	 British	 leaders	 have	 not	 held	 more	 ‘red-lining’	






















DOMESTIC	 EMPOWERMENT.	 Equally	 interesting	 as	 the	 few	 calls	 that	 actually	 led	 to	
a	 referendum,	 or	 at	 least	 to	 a	 parliamentary	 vote	 on	 a	 referendum	bill,	 is	 the	 large	
number	of	calls	for	a	referendum	from	opposition	parties	which	did	not	lead	to	a	formal	
referendum	bill.	 Referendum	pledges	by	opposition	parties	on	 issues	on	which	 they	
anticipate	support	from	a	considerable	part	of	the	electorate	are	likely	motivated	by	




when	 elected	 gives	 a	 party	 an	 extra	 empowering	 tool,	 and	 an	 advantage	 over	 the	
governing	 party,	 which	 is	more	 bound	 to	maintain	 a	 pragmatic	 pro-EU	 approach	 in	
European	negotiations.	This	 is	most	clearly	shown	by	the	Conservatives,	who	ratified	
EC	accession,	the	SEA	and	the	Maastricht	Treaty	without	a	popular	vote	while	in	office	
(although	 the	 Eurosceptic	 wing	 of	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 the	 ‘Maastricht	 Rebels’	
did	 call	 for	a	popular	vote	on	Maastricht),	and	 then,	during	 the	subsequent	 thirteen	
years	of	Labour	rule,	consistently	called	for	referendums	on	all	EU	treaty	ratifications	




parties	 on	 the	 extremes	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 first	 the	 Referendum	 Party	 and	


























After	 the	 TCE	 was	 rejected	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 Labour	 prime	 minister	










interests.	Yet,	 just	 like	 the	 two	EU	membership	 referendums	 (of	1975	and	2016)	 the	
referendum	 locks	 in	 the	EUA	are	 indicative	of	 a	 convention	 that	 any	 future	 changes	
in	Britain’s	relationship	with	the	EU	are	to	be	submitted	to	a	referendum.	The	second	
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majority	support,	Cameron’s	pledge	 to	hold	a	 referendum	on	EU	membership	was	a	
consequence	of	increased	competition	from	UKIP	and	persisting	Euroscepticism	within	













6.3 REFERENDUM PRACTICE IN SWEDEN




















































	 Two	 referendums	were	held	 relating	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	 1994,	 the	 Swedish	 electorate	
was	 able	 to	 vote	 on	 their	 country’s	 accession	 to	 the	 EU.	 Only	 a	 narrow	majority	 of	
52.3	per	cent	voted	in	favour	of	EU	membership.	Nine	years	later,	a	referendum	was	
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Table 6.3: Referendums in Sweden, 1950-2014

















































outlined in chapter 2.	I	will	show	that	Sweden’s	limited	referendum	track	record	should	
primarily	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	long-dominant	position	of	the	SAP,	which	was	




Due	 to	 its	 proportional	 representation	 (PR)	 electoral	 system,	 Sweden	 has	 a	 multi-
party	system	and	a	fragmented	parliament:	eight	different	parties	currently	have	seats	
in the Riksdag,	 the	 Swedish	 unicameral	 parliament.	 Swedish	 parliamentary	 politics	
is	 characterized	 by	 negative parliamentarism,	 meaning	 that	 new	 governments	 are	
not	dependent	on	the	majority	approval	of	 the	Riksdag	but	must	only	be	 ‘tolerated’	
















	 As	 shown	 in	chapter 4,	 Sweden	belongs	 to	 a	 small	 group	of	 –	mainly	 consensus	





These	 votes	 served	 to	 advise	 government	 and	 parliament	 rather	 than	 to	 control	














The	 Swedish	 constitution	 had	 been	 amended	 twice	 to	 introduce	 (1922)	 and	 extend	
(1980)	 referendum	 legislation.	 Before	 1971	 –	 when	 Sweden	 abandoned	 the	 Upper	
House	 –	 such	 a	 constitutional	 revision	 required	 the	 approval	 of	 both	 parliamentary	
houses	with	a	simple	majority	in	two	readings,	with	elections	in	between.	This	created	








	 Unlike	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 advisory	 majority	 referendum,	 the	 road	 to	
institutionalization	 of	 binding	 minority	 legislative	 referendums	 was	 not	 without	 its	
problems.	Proposals	were	put	forward	by	the	centre-right	opposition	parties	with	the	




The United Kingdom and Sweden
which	 included	 installing	 broad	 coalition	 governments,	 abolishing	 the	 first	 chamber	
and,	 as	 compensation,	 introducing	 binding	 legislative	 minority	 referendums	 (Suksi	







in	 parliament.	 A	 proposal	 to	 revise	 the	 constitution	 to	 allow	 for	 binding	 minority	
referendums	was	 not	 adopted	 in	 the	Riksdag	 until	 1974,	 in	 the	 first	 reading,	 when	
the	position	of	 the	SAP	was	 seriously	weakened.	Moreover,	at	 that	time,	parliament	






a	 referendum	 on	 non-constitutional	 issues	 is	 considerably	 higher,	 as	 this	 requires	











prohibition	 in	1922	consolidated	 the	 referendum	 instrument	 in	 the	constitution,	but	
political	interest	in	the	referendum	issue	did	not	resume	until	after	the	Second	World	
War	(Ruin	1996,	174).	Then,	both	the	Social	Democratic	Party	and	the	Moderate	Party	















that	 ratification	of	EU	 treaties	 that	 signify	a	 transfer	of	 sovereignty	 require	approval	
of	three-quarters	of	those	voting	and	at	least	half	of	the	total	MPs	(Chapter 10, Article 










reveals	 that	 levels	 of	 dissatisfaction	 with	 Swedish	 democracy	 lie	 far	 below	 the	 EU	
average	and	have	decreased	over	time:	 in	1997,	40	per	cent	of	Swedish	respondents	
who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	democracy	while,	 in	2014,	this	was	only	18	
per	 cent.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 data	 from	 the	 European	 Values	 Study	 (EVS)	 which	
reveals	that	the	proportion	of	respondents	who	said	that	they	were	dissatisfied	with	
democracy	fell	 from	41	per	cent	 in	1999	to	31	per	cent	 in	2008.	 In	addition,	distrust	
of	political	 institutions	has	decreased	over	time	(figure 6.5).	Although	a	considerable	
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over	 time,	 although	 the	 degree	 of	 Euroscepticism	 fluctuates	 and	 generally	 higher	
than	the	EU	average.	As	shown	in	figure 6.6,	until	2005,	between	40	and	60	per	cent	
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are	 generally	 linked	 to	 support	 for	 referendums.	 As	 public	 opinion	 data	 is	 not	
available	 for	 this	 period,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 analyse	 whether	 the	 introduction	 of	
referendum	legislation	in	Sweden,	in	1922	and	1980,	was	indeed	favoured	by	citizens	
as	well.	 However,	 later	 survey	 data	 does	 not	 show	 overwhelming	 support	 for	more	










(ISSP	2004).	These	data,	which	are	inconsistent	with	the	cognitive mobilization thesis, 
revealed	no	difference	between	 respondents	who	 said	 that	 they	were	 satisfied	with	
democracy	and	those	who	were	dissatisfied.
	 Although	 the	 data	 are	 not	 comparable,	 in	 2009	 the	 European	 Elections	 Survey	














(EES	2009).	This	finding	is	therefore	inconsistent	with	the	cognitive mobilization thesis, 
on	the	basis	of	which	we	would	assume	that	support	specifically	comes	from	politically	






















citizenry,	 governments	might	 feel	 little	 pressure	 to	 pledge	 a	 referendum.	 This	 being	
said,	when	there	were	explicit	demands	from	society	to	hold	a	referendum,	they	were	
refused	by	 the	 Swedish	 government.	 This	was	particularly	 the	 case	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	
ratification	of	the	TCE,	when	support	for	the	treaty	was	considerably	 low	among	the	
Swedes.	 The	 Eurobarometer	 survey	 conducted	 in	 the	 spring	of	 2005	 confirmed	 that	
only	 38	 per	 cent	 of	 Swedish	 respondents	 said	 that	 they	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 TCE	
(Standard	Eurobarometer	63,	134).	More	 importantly,	 in	a	 survey	by	SIFO,	nearly	60	
per	cent	of	respondents	said	that	the	decision	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty	should	be	









a	 gap	 between	 the	 Swedish	 public	 and	 the	 position	 taken	 by	 prime	minister	 Göran	
Persson,	who	gave	primacy	to	parliamentary	ratification.	As	he	put	it,	‘When	the	people	
vote	in	national	elections,	they	also	vote	on	EU	issues,	and	it	is	immensely	important	
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introducing	citizens’	initiatives	(Miljöpartiet	2006).	For	the	Left	Party	(Vänsterpartiet),	
too,	 support	 for	 the	use	of	 referendums	 is	 grounded	 in	participatory	 arguments.	As	





	 The	 populist	 right	 Sweden	 Democrats	 are	 also	 consistent	 in	 their	 support	 for	
referendums.	 For	 them,	 such	 support	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 populist	 and	 Eurosceptical	
discourse.	Their	2011	party	programme	states	‘We	adhere	to	the	classical	definition	of	
democracy,	where	the	concept	of	democracy	is	not	synonymous	with	the	individual’s	






	 While	 these	 parties	 have	 filed	 several	 proposals	 to	 organize	 referendums,	 the	
mainstream	political	parties	in	Sweden	have	supported	referendums	only	on	occasional	


























Government	has	 therefore	not	 considered	a	 referendum	concerning	 the	Amsterdam	
Treaty	necessary’	(Persson	and	Hjelm-Wallén	1998,	32,	translated	in	Bernitz	2001,	914).	
A	similar	argument	was	expressed	in	the	case	of	the	TCE,	on	which	social	democratic	







	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 euro	 was	 certainly	 perceived	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 substantial	
importance.	 The	 government	 stated	 it	 did	 signify	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 the	




Nevertheless,	 the	 Swedish	 government	 declared	 that	 Sweden	 reserved	 the	 right	 to	
subject	entry	in	the	third	phase	of	the	EMU	(i.e.	acceptance	of	the	single	currency)	to	a	
separate	decision,	possibly	by	referendum,	‘given	the	Swedish	peoples’	weak	support	
for	 the	 EMU’	 (Finansdepartementet	 1997,	 6).111	 As	 I	will	 argue	 below,	 the	 pledge	 to	
have	a	referendum	on	the	euro	was	not	devoid	of	strategic	considerations,	since	the	
issue	 had	 caused	 divisions	within	 the	 government	 party.	Moreover,	 the	 referendum	
legitimized	 the	Swedish	government’s	deliberate	choice	 to	not	meet	all	 convergence	




      
STRATEGIC	INTERESTS
As	I	argued	above,	the	institutionalization	of	the	advisory	referendum	was	motivated	




convictions.	Moreover,	 given	 the	 ambiguity	 with	 which	 referendums	 were	 pledged,	
it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	 the	 referendums	 held	 were	 also	 motivated	 more	 by	 strategic	
considerations	than	by	public	demands	or	values.	Indeed,	when	Swedish	governments	
pledged	a	referendum,	they	had	a	clear	interest	in	doing	so.	Based	on	the	typology	of	





The United Kingdom and Sweden
motivations	 that	passed	 the	hoop	 test	of	process-tracing,	meaning	 that	 it	 is	 at	 least	
likely	that	they	were	at	play	in	Swedish	referendum	pledges	made	between	1950	and	
2014.	
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parliament,	unable	 to	 come	 to	a	unified	proposal	on	 these	 issues	 that	would	obtain	











Table 6.5: Referendums and minority governments




EU	membership-1994 Bildt	-	Centre	Party	+	Liberals	+	Moderate	Party	+	Christian	Democrats 48.7 %




































The United Kingdom and Sweden
addition,	 the	opposition	of	 the	 conservatives	and	 liberals	 also	preferred	a	 voluntary	
system	 but,	 unlike	 the	 Centre	 Party,	 without	 government	 involvement.	 As	 none	 of	
the	proposals	enjoyed	the	support	of	a	parliamentary	majority,	 the	coalition	faced	a	





	 The	 nuclear	 energy	 issue	 also	 caused	 disagreements	 within	 the	 centre-right	
coalition.	The	issue	had	already	caused	a	breakdown	of	the	Fälldin	I	coalition	in	1978,	










	 In	 contrast	 to	 these	 referendums,	 the	 issue	 of	 EU	 membership	 was	 broadly	
supported	 by	 parliament,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Swedish	 government	 had	 long	




2000,	 221-224;	 Sitter	 2009,	 88).	 In	 the	 vote	 in	 parliament	 on	 EU	membership	 on	 15	






However,	 after	 1991,	 the	 tide	 had	 turned	 and	 Eurosceptic	 fractions	 emerged	within	
the	SAP.	Moreover,	in	the	run-up	to	the	1994	general	elections,	the	Swedish	electorate	




















referendum	 (Finansdepartementet	1997).	Persson’s	approach	 to	enforce	an	 informal	
opt-out	 from	 the	 eurozone	 received	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Swedish	 parliament	 on	 4	
December	 1997	 (Riksdagen	 4.12.1997).	While	 the	 SAP	 party	 leadership	 was	 largely,	
albeit	not	unanimously,	 in	favour	of	Sweden	adopting	the	euro,	Eurosceptic	fractions	









which	was	wholeheartedly	 in	 favour	of	 the	TCE,	 downplayed	 the	 importance	of	 this	
treaty	and	opted	for	parliamentary	ratification	(Kurpas,	Incerti,	Schönlau,	and	De	Clerck-
Sachsse	2005,	23-24).	








	 The	 same	applies	 to	 the	 referendums	on	EU	membership	 and	 the	euro.	 In	 both	
cases,	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 hold	 the	 referendum	 after	 the	 general	 elections	







The United Kingdom and Sweden
support	 for	EU	membership	was	 roughly	65	per	cent	 (Bjørklund	1996,	16).	However,	
in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	1994	elections,	polls	 revealed	a	drop	 in	 support	 to	only	33	per	
cent,	which	was	fostered	by	the	Danish	‘no’	to	Maastricht	in	1992	(LeDuc	2003,	88;	see	
also:	Bjørklund	1996,	15;	 Jenssen,	Pesonen	and	Gilljam	1998).	While,	 in	 the	end,	 the	





















	 In	 these	 two	cases,	 the	difference	 in	position	between	 the	Swedish	government	
and	its	European	counterparts,	makes	it	likely	that	referendums	on	these	issues	were	
pledged	 to	 strengthen	 Sweden’s	 bargaining	 position	 in	 the	 negotiations.114	 In	 the	
negotiations	on	EU	membership,	prime	minister	Carl	Bildt,	who	was	in	an	even	more	
favourable	 position	 as	 the	 referendum	 commitment	 had	 already	 been	made	 by	 his	
social	 democratic	 predecessor,	 was	 able	 to	 negotiate	 certain	 transitional	 rules	 and	
exemptions	in	the	accession	treaty,	most	prominently	with	respect	to	the	much	debated	
Swedish	‘snus’	tobacco	(Associated	Press	Worldstream	5.10.1993).	The	fact	that	there	















Rate	Mechanism	 II	 (ERM	 II),	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 the	 convergence	 criterion	 of	 exchange	
rate	stability	and	enter	the	third	EMU	stage	–	 i.e.	adoption	of	the	euro.	Sweden	had	
chosen	not	 to	 join	 this	mechanism	and	thus	did	not	 fulfil	 the	exchange	rate	stability	



















mobilizes	 voters	 on	 a	 strong	 Eurosceptical	 and	 anti-immigration	 agenda.	 For	 a	 long	
time,	no	radical	right	populist	party	was	able	to	successfully	enter	the	electoral	arena,	
despite	the	short-lived	New	Democracy	party	in	the	early	1990s	(cf.	Rydgren	2002).	This	




18.12.2014).	 With	 the	 SD’s	 increased	 electoral	 success,	 the	 chances	 that	 there	 will	








The United Kingdom and Sweden
European	affairs	from	future	electoral	campaigns.
	 Moreover,	with	 the	 increased	success	of	 the	SD,	 it	will	become	more	difficult	 to	
obtain	a	three-quarters	majority	in	parliament	to	support	future	EU	treaty	ratifications.	
In	 that	 case,	 future	 EU	 treaty	 ratifications	 could	 also	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 constitutional	





of	 the	Swedish	Democrats,	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	Eurosceptic	bloc	of	SD,	 the	Green	
Party	and	the	Left	Party	will	have	sufficient	seats	to	trigger	a	referendum	is	ever	greater,	
especially	if	they	are	joined	by	Eurosceptic	MPs	from	the	mainstream	parties.























referendum	 tradition,	 as	 is	 present	 in	 France,	 for	 example.	 Sweden	 had	 an	 early	






closely	 linked	 to	one	singular	 issue	 (the	prohibition	of	alcohol)	and	was	not	used	on	
other	issues	until	the	1950s.	In	the	UK,	the	first	UK-wide	referendum	was	held	in	1975.	
In	 both	 countries	 furthermore,	 the	main	 political	 parties	 underscore	 the	 primacy	 of	
parliamentary	 over	 popular	 sovereignty.	 A	 final	 factor	 that	 explains	 the	 limited	 role	
of	 the	 referendum	 in	 these	 countries	 is	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 veto	 players	
as	compared	to,	 for	example,	France	and	Denmark.	 In	the	UK,	referendums	can	only	
be	triggered	by	a	parliamentary	majority.	Given	the	British	political	 system,	majority	




increased	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	majority	 consists	of	more	political	parties	 than	 in	 the	
UK.	In	both	countries,	the	mainstream	parties	have	long	been	able	to	veto	referendum	
proposals.	






















an	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	 call	 a	 referendum	 to	 deflate	 intra-party	 or	 intra-coalition	
conflict,	 as	 occurred	 on	 EU	 membership	 and	 the	 euro.	 Finally,	 in	 both	 countries,	





The United Kingdom and Sweden












consistently	 called	 for	 referendums	 on	 ‘Europe’	 when	 in	 opposition	 as	 a	 way	 to	
strengthen	their	position	vis-à-vis	the	ruling	majority.	However,	both	parties	have	been	
able	to	withdraw	such	calls	once	in	office.	By	contrast,	in	Sweden,	the	referendum	issue	





right	 Sweden	Democrats	 in	 Sweden	–	has	made	 the	withdrawal	 of	 referendum	calls	














of	referendum	provisions	certainly	does	not	constitute	a	sine qua non for the use of 
referendums	since,	except	for	Germany,	these	countries	each	held	one	referendum	in	
the	period	between	1950	and	2014.	 In	addition,	during	 the	writing	of	 this	book,	 the	
Netherlands	held	its	second	national	referendum,	in	April	2016,	on	the	EU’s	Association	
Agreement	 with	 Ukraine.	 Nevertheless,	 absence	 of	 legislation	 does	 help	 to	 explain	
why	 referendums	 are	 hardly	 used	 in	 these	 countries	 at	 national	 level.	Whereas	 the	
previous	two	chapters	compared	different	countries	where	national	referendums	are	
institutionalized	and	used	regularly or occasionally,	this	chapter	examines	the	factors	
that	 prevent	 referendums	 from	 becoming	 institutionalized.	 It	 only	 deals	 with	 the	
Netherlands,	which	 I	 justified	 (in	chapter 3)	on	 the	basis	 that	Belgium,	Germany	and	
the	Netherlands	are	rather	comparable	in	terms	of	democracy	type	and	no	additional	
comparison	is	therefore	necessary	to	assess	whether	the	conclusions	apply	in	different	






of	 the	 theoretical	 considerations	 that	 have	 not	 been	 examined	 thoroughly	 in	 the	






ample	 and	 accessible	 material	 to	 examine	 the	 course	 of	 the	 political	 debate,	 and	
especially	the	position	taken	by	various,	ideologically	different	parties.	Finally,	in	2014,	
despite	several	failed	attempts,	the	Dutch	parliament	passed	a	bill	allowing	for	a	citizen-







politics.	As	of	 2015,	 the	Netherlands	belongs	 to	 a	 small	 group	of	 countries,	most	of	
which	are	 in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	where	citizens	have	an	 instrument	–	albeit	
non-binding	–	to	correct	decisions	by	political	representatives.	
	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 first	 outline	 the	 exact	 provisions	 under	 the	 recently	 approved	
referendum	law	(section	7.2).	In	section	7.3,	I	examine	the	only	referendum	that	took	
place	 in	 the	Netherlands	between	1950	and	2014,	namely	the	vote	on	the	European	











Appèl,	 CDA),	 the	 smaller	 confessional	 parties	 and	 the	 conservative	 Liberal	 Party	
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie,	VVD).	I	furthermore	investigate	what	enabled	
the	adoption	of	the	referendum	bill	that	provided	for	the	referendum	on	the	TCE,	and	




7.2 DUTCH REFERENDUM LEGISLATION
As	stated	above,	the	Netherlands	is	one	of	the	few	countries	where	the	constitution	does	
not	entail	provisions	for	holding	national	referendums	(International	Constitutional	Law	





(and	which	thus	also	apply	to	the	overseas	territories)	(Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden	2015).	Strictly	speaking,	it	is	not	a	veto,	since	the	outcome	is	only	advisory, 














	 Given	 that,	 for	 two	 centuries,	 referendums	 played	 virtually	 no	 role	 in	 Dutch	
politics,	the	introduction	of	this	type	of	referendum	can	be	considered	as	representing	
an	exceptional	shift	towards	a	potentially	enhanced	role	for	Dutch	citizens	in	political	
decision-making.	 Indeed,	 given	 the	 long	 absence	 of	 referendum	 legislation	 in	 the	
Netherlands,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 parliament	 approved	 legislation	 that	 is	 a	 rather	
strong	expression	of	popular rather than representative sovereignty.	This	shift	was	set	in	
motion	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	with	a	series	of	proposals	to	introduce	referendum	





Lastly,	 in	 2014,	 parliament	 also	 approved	 a	 bill	 to	 allow	 the	 organization	 of	binding 
citizens’	vetoes.	However,	as	 this	bill	–	which	would	 replace	 the	 law	on	 the	advisory	
referendum	 –	 requires	 an	 amendment	 of	 the	 constitution,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 approved	









	 The	 exceptional	 character	 of	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 in	 the	 Netherlands	
stems	mainly	from	their	exact	provisions.	First,	under	Dutch	referendum	law,	citizens	













Finally,	 compared	 to	 other	 countries	 where	 citizens	 can	 trigger	 a	 referendum,	 the	
signature	 threshold	 is	 considerably	 high.	 The	 collection	 of	 signatures	 to	 trigger	 an	
advisory	referendum	proceeds	 in	two	phases:	 in	the	first	phase	(of	4	weeks),	10,000	









commissions	were	 installed	 to	 examine	 the	 desirability	 of	 introducing	 referendums,	
but	 they	never	 led	 to	 actual	 reform.	 The	 commissions	were	 installed	 in	 response	 to	
persistent	 demands	 from	 society	 and	 progressive	 political	 parties	 to	 reform	 Dutch	
political	 decision-making	 by	 providing	more	 opportunities	 for	 citizens	 to	 participate	
(Koning	 1995).	 The	 Biesheuvel	 commission	 in	 1984	was	 the	 first	 to	 recommend	 the	
introduction	of	the	citizens’	veto.	This	recommendation	was	later	also	adopted	by	the	
De	Koning	commission	in	1992.	The	Biesheuvel	commission	was	especially	important,	
as	 it	 was	 the	 first	 to	 unanimously	 support	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 referendum	
(Biesheuvel	 1984).	 As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 table 7.1,	 the	 current	 law	 is	 largely	 based	 on	
this	 commission’s	 recommendations.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 current	 law,	 the	 commission	
proposed a binding	 referendum.	 It	 also	 recommended	 a	 rejection quorum	 (which	 is	
stricter	than	the	currently	applicable	turnout	quorum)	and	proposed	that,	for	legislation	
to	be	voted	down,	the	opposing	majority	needed	to	constitute	at	least	30	per	cent	of	
the	 total	electorate.	This	 implies	either	a	very	high	 turnout	or	a	very	 large	opposing	
majority.	Biesheuvel’s	referendum	proposals	did	not	have	an	immediate	impact	as	they	
were	 rejected	 by	 the	 government	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 1984).	 After	
that,	it	took	another	ten	years	for	a	breakthrough	in	the	referendum	debate	to	occur	
(see section 7.2.	for	the	full	timeline).	
	 In	 October	 1995,	 the	 Wim	 Kok	 government–	 consisting	 of	 the	 Labour	 Party	
(Partij van de Arbeid,	PvdA),	the	conservative	liberal	VVD	and	the	progressive	liberals	
(Democraten ’66,	 D66)	 –	 submitted	 a	 proposal	 to	 parliament	 to	 institutionalize	 the	
citizens’	 veto	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 1995).	 Table 7.1	 (second	 column)	
outlines	 the	proposed	provisions	 (Kok	and	Dijkstal	1996).	 In	 terms	of	 thresholds,	 the	
proposal	was	much	 stricter	 than	 the	Biesheuvel	 proposal.	 For	 a	 preliminary	 request	
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The	 TRA	 expired	 on	 1	 January	 2005,	 as	 the	 government	 of	 Jan	 Peter	 Balkenende,	







in	 2005,	 two	 separate	 referendum	bills	were	 initiated	 by	 parties	 in	 opposition.	One	
would	allow	 for	a	binding	citizens’	veto	and	was	 initiated	by	 the	GroenLinks and the 

























wishes	of	 the	government,	especially	of	 the	main	governing	party,	 the	CDA.117	Prime	
minister	 Jan	 Peter	 Balkenende	 fervently	 opposed	 the	 referendum	 and	 questioned	









obtained	 a	 majority	 in	 parliament	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 5.11.2002).	
Nevertheless,	the	government	–	consisting	of	the	CDA,	the	VVD	and	the	newly	founded	






















to	 the	 Council	 of	 State’s	 judgement	 and	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 bill	 (De	 Volkskrant	
11.9.2003).	This	 change	 in	position	was	mainly	due	 to	 the	 role	played	by	 the	party’s	
newly	 appointed	 leader,	 Jozias	 van	 Aartsen,	 who	 was	 a	 proponent	 of	 referendums	
in	 general	 and	most	 notably	 of	 a	 referendum	on	 the	 EU	 constitution.	His	 view	was,	
however,	certainly	not	widely	 supported	within	 the	party.	Although,	 in	 the	end,	Van	
Aartsen	 was	 able	 to	 convince	 his	 party	 members	 in	 parliament,	 VVD	 Minister	 of	
Finance	Gerrit	Zalm	called	a	referendum	on	Europe	‘too	complicated’	(De	Gelderlander	
11.9.2003),	while	party	member	and	State	Secretary	for	European	Affairs	Atzo	Nicolai	
argued	 that	 a	 referendum	was	 ‘risky’	 as	 it	would	put	 unwanted	pressure	on	 the	 EU	
negotiations	 and	 could	 easily	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence	 in	 the	 incumbent	
government	 rather	 than	 actually	 dealing	 with	 Europe	 (NRC	 Handelsblad	 1.10.2003).	
In	addition,	VVD	member	of	 the	European	Parliament	 (EP)	Hans	van	Baalen	 referred	

























per	 cent.	Although	 this	 referendum	was	advisory,	 the	Dutch	government	had	 stated	
beforehand	that	it	would	adhere	to	the	outcome	(ANP	12.6.2003).		












On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 institutional	 fit	 thesis,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	
the	 citizens’	 veto	 in	 the	Netherlands	was	 not	 especially	 remarkable.	 Although,	 after	




vetoing	 legislative	 proposals	 approved	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority.	 In	 this	 respect,	
citizens’	vetoes	therefore	fit	in	with	the	Dutch	consensus	democracy	based	on	power-
sharing	and	proportional	 representation.	Although	a	 legislative	minority	 referendum	
–	after	the	Danish	example	–	would	have	‘fitted’	better,	as	this	type	of	referendum	gives	
primacy	 to	 representative	 rather	 than	 popular	 sovereignty,	 the	Dutch	 case	 provides	
some	support	for	the	institutional	fit	thesis.	Indeed,	as	I	showed	in	chapter 4,	legislation	
for	holding	citizen-initiated	 referendums	 is	more	commonly	 found	among	consensus	
democracies	than	majoritarian	ones.	
	 The	application	of	a	 turnout	quorum	also	 supports	 the	 thesis,	 since	a	quorum	–	













quorum	of	30	per	 cent.	Under	Dutch	 referendum	 law,	 a	 fervent	minority can rather 
easily turn into a voting majority	in	the	referendum	and	thus	veto	a	legislative	proposal	
that	is	approved	by	the	parliamentary	majority,	especially	if	a	considerable	proportion	
of	 the	 electorate	 abstains.	 For	 example:	 under	 the	 current	 legislation,	 a	minority	 of	
16	per	 cent	of	 the	electorate	 is,	with	a	 turnout	of	31	per	 cent,	 sufficient	 to	win	 the	
referendum.	
	 Quorums	 have	 a	 strong	 effect	 on	 the	 proportionality	 of	 referendum	 outcomes,	
and	as	such	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	the	 issue	of	 the	turnout	quorum	was	debated	 in	













direct	consequence	of	 the	nature	of	 the	Dutch	polity,	which	provides	 for	a	relatively	
high	 number	 of	 partisan	 and	 non-partisan	 veto	 players.	 This	 is	 enshrined	 in	 both	






the	attempts	of	both	 the	Kok-I	 (1994-1998)	 and	 the	Kok-II	 (1998-2002)	 governments	
to	 introduce	 the	 citizens’	 veto	 ran	 aground	 in	 the	 complex	 process	 of	 revising	 the	
constitution.	The	first	proposal	(introduced	by	Kok-I	 in	1995)	was	rejected	 in	1999	in	
the	second	 reading	 in	 the	Upper	House,	after	a	16-hour	debate	 that	became	known	
as	the	‘Night	of	Wiegel’.	The	required	two-thirds	majority	fell	short	by	only	one	vote,	













fact that it did not	require	a	constitutional	revision	and	only	a	simple	majority	in	one	






Of	 particular	 importance	 is	 the	 role	 of	partisan	 veto	 players	 (i.e.	 political	 parties	 or	











































issue	had	been	debated	 in	 the	Dutch	parliament	 in	 the	1890s,	first	demands	 for	 the	
institutionalization	of	the	citizens’	veto	were	expressed	in	1903	by	the	Social	Democratic	
Labour	 Party	 (SDAP),	 which	 merged	 into	 the	 PvdA	 in	 1946.	 As	 in	 Switzerland,	 this	
proposal	to	introduce	the	citizens’	veto	was	linked	to	the	abolition	of	the	Upper	House.	
The	proposal	was,	however,	rejected	in	parliament	(Rosema	2009;	Lucardie	2010).	
	 In	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 referendum	 issue	 was	 discussed	 in	 five	 state	
commissions.	Installing	such	commissions	to	discuss	constitutional	reform	is	a	typical	
Dutch	way	 to	 discuss	 issues	 that	 fundamentally	 divide	 Dutch	 politics	 (Van	 Leeuwen	
2013a).	In	the	late	nineteenth	century,	introduction	of	the	referendum	on	constitutional	
reform	 (as	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	 second	 parliamentary	 reading)	was	 discussed	 by	 the	
Heemskerk	 commission,	which	 rejected	 the	 issue	 by	majority	 (Van	 Leeuwen	 2013b,	
41).	The	Ruijs	de	Beerenbrouck	commission,	installed	in	1918,	was	the	first	commission	
that	dealt	with	the	institutionalization	of	citizen-initiated	referendums.	The	commission	
rejected	 such	 referendums	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 were	 seen	 as	 incompatible	
with	parliamentary	decision-making	 and	would	undermine	 the	 legitimacy	of	 general	















on	 constitutional	 reform.	However,	 this	 did	not	 lead	 to	 concrete	proposals	 (Van	der	
Krieken	 2015,	 9).	 Two	 consecutive	 state	 commissions	 (Van	 Schaik	 (1950)	 and	 Cals/































































	 Path	dependency	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 institutionalization	of	 the	 citizens’	
veto.	The	proposal	by	the	first	Kok	government	to	introduce	the	referendum	into	the	
Dutch	constitution	was	based	on	the	proposal	formulated	by	the	Biesheuvel	commission.	
The	 only	 change	 it	 made	 was	 to	 significantly	 increase	 the	 signature	 thresholds	 for	






of	 demands	 from	progressive	 forces	 in	 society	 and	 parliament	 to	 reform	 the	 closed	
character	of	the	Dutch	political	system	(Elzinga	1985;	Koning	1995).	 In	 its	report,	the	
Cals/Donner	commission,	which	was	installed	in	response	to	the	heated	protests	in	the	
1960s,	 explicitly	 referred	 to	 such	demands,	by	 stating	 ‘it	 is	 of	high	 importance	 that,	







also	 due	 to	 new	modes	 of	mass	 communication,	many	 citizens	 are	 increasingly	 and	
suddenly	aware	of	these	changes	and	due	to	their	concerns	about	the	consequences,	
they	 increasingly	search	 for	ways	 to	express	 their	voice’	 (Cals	and	Donner	1971,	18).	
The	Biesheuvel	commission	was	also	installed	in	1982	in	response	to	reform	demands	
by	 both	 political	 parties	 and	 citizens.	 Notably,	 in	 1981,	 a	 petition	 was	 filed	 by	 the	
action	movement	Actiecomité Referendum: Ja,	to	introduce	a	referendum	on	politically	
weighty	 issues	 (Lucardie	 1997),	which	was	 subsequently	 discussed	 in	 the	Biesheuvel	




to	the	use	of	referendums,	notably	where	the	EU	is	concerned. Figures 7.1-7.3 provide an 
overview	of	the	levels	of	political	dissatisfaction,	distrust	of	representative	institutions	
and	Euroscepticism	over	time	on	 the	basis	 of	 Eurobarometer	data.	Figure 7.1	 shows	
levels	of	dissatisfaction	with	Dutch	democracy.	Dissatisfaction	with	democracy	in	the	
Netherlands	 is	relatively	 low	and	considerably	 lower	than	the	EU	average.	Moreover,	
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the	 initiators	stressed	 in	 their	memorandum,	 ‘More	 involvement	of	Dutch	citizens	 in	
the	EU	reform	process	is	urgently	required,	and	a	referendum	is	a	suitable	instrument	
to	realize	this’	(Karimi,	Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	3).124 










EU membership a bad thing
Not benefitted from EU membership
Distrust of the EU




The	 EVS	 indicates	 that	 between	 1981	 and	 2008,	 general	 levels	 of	 political	 interest	






to	61	per	 cent	 in	2008	 (with	a	 ‘peak’	of	67	per	 cent	 in	1999)	 (EVS	1981-2008).	 Such	
sentiments	 of	 increased	 interest	 in	 politics	 and	 dissatisfaction	with	 national	 and	 EU	


















Table 7.3: Referendum support according to Dutch Election Survey 2012
Year 1972 2002 2006 2010 2012
Support	for	referendums* 72% 76% 75% 69% 66%
Support	for	referendums	on	EU	treaties** - - 65% 60% 56%




Rather	 than	 an	 increase	 in	 support	 –	 which	 we	 would	 assume	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	






























on	 EU	 treaty	 reform	 (EES	 2009).	 Support	 for	 EU	 referendums	 is	 considerably	 higher	
among	Eurosceptics:	 71	per	 cent	of	 respondents	who	 feel	 that	 European	unification	
has	gone	 too	 far	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 future	 treaty	 reforms	 should	be	decided	by	
referendum,	as	opposed	to	40	per	cent	of	respondents	who	feel	European	unification	
can	be	pushed	further	(EES	2009).	This	suggests	that	such	support	for	EU	referendums	
is	 highly	 instrumentally	 motivated:	 especially	 those	 who	 want	 to	 stop	 European	
integration	support	EU	referendums.
	 The	 NKO	 survey	 data	 for	 2012	 allows	 the	 relationship	 between	 support	 for	
referendums	and	party	affiliation	 to	be	assessed.	Table 7.4	 provides	 some	 indicative	
conclusions.	As	the	table	shows,	support	for	referendums	in	general	seems	the	highest	




only	 26	per	 cent	 claim	 to	 support	 EU	 treaty	 referendums,	 compared	 to	 44	per	 cent	
of	D66	voters	and	53	of	PvdA	voters.	Moreover,	support	for	referendums	was	higher	









Table 7.4: Support for referendums by party affiliation NKO 2012
Important decisions made 
by referendum
Support for referendums 
on EU treaties
Support for referendums on 
EU enlargement







































The	 long-standing	 high	 levels	 of	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 among	 the	 Dutch	 public,	 in	
combination	 with	 a	 low	 salience	 of	 ‘Europe’	 in	 the	 public	 debate	 as	 such,	 largely	
explains	why	Dutch	governments	were	able	to	prevent	a	referendum	on	previous	EU	
treaty	 ratifications.	 Demands	 by	 the	 opposition–	 such	 as	 on	 the	Maastricht	 Treaty,	
on	 the	Amsterdam	Treaty,	and	on	 the	euro	–	were	 rejected	by	parliament	 (Nijeboer	
2005,	394).	However,	 this	was	no	 longer	 tenable	 in	2003,	when	 the	political	 context	
had	 changed	with	 the	 rise	 and	 assassination	 of	 populist	 politician	 Pim	 Fortuyn.	 Not	
only	did	Fortuyn	reject	Dutch	elitist	politics,	he	also	broke	with	the	Dutch	consensus	
on	‘Europe’.	In	his	book	‘Soulless Europe: Against a Europe of technocrats, bureaucracy, 
subsidies and inevitable fraud’,127	he	openly	attacked	the	EU’s	technocratic	and	elitist	





Takens	 and	 Van	 Atteveldt	 2005,	 127-128).	 The	 initiators	 of	 the	 referendum	 bill	 on	










by	 2003	 polls	 revealed	 even	 higher	 support	 for	 the	 EU	 referendum.	 For	 example,	 a	
poll	conducted	by	the	Dutch	government	in	2003	revealed	that	80	per	cent	of	Dutch	


















Christian	 democratic	 forerunners)	 and	 VVD	 have	 been	 coalition	 partners	 in	 a	 large	








	 In	 the	 various	 votes	 in	 parliament,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 VVD	 has	 been	 of	 vital	
importance.	In	general,	the	party	has	opposed	the	referendum	and	the	issue	has	hardly	
been	mentioned	in	its	manifestos.	The	party	reluctantly	accepted	the	referendum	bid	
in	 the	 coalition	 agreement	 during	 the	 two	 Kok	 governments	 (Kok	 1994;	 Kok	 1998).	
Remarkably,	 as	 shown	 in	 table 7.5,	 the	 VVD	 supported	 the	 referendum	 in	 its	 1998	
manifesto,	when	 it	was	aiming	 for	a	position	 in	a	 second	Kok	government.	 It	did	 so,	
despite	 raising	 principally	 objections,	 which	 were	 distinctively	 underscored	 by	 VVD	
senator	Hans	Wiegel,	who	stressed	 that	 the	 referendum	 is	 ‘at	odds’	with	 the	notion	



















as	 such.	 That	 is	 an	 official	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 as	 servant	 of	 God.	 It	 is	
this	 responsibility	 that	may	not	be	challenged	by	a	 judgement	of	 the	people’	 (Eerste	
Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	18.5.1999:	1347).	By	contrast,	as	 shown	 in	 table 7.5, the 
ChristenUnie	(CU)	was	cautiously	supportive	of	the	referendum	in	its	2010	manifesto.	
In	parliament,	however,	the	party	voted	against	the	various	referendum	bills	that	were	








with	 the	 literature	 (Mudde	2004,	543;	 Jacobs	2011,	34),	Dutch	populist	 right	parties	
–	the	Party	 for	Freedom	(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV)	 from	2006	onwards	and,	prior	
to	that,	the	Centre	Democrats	(Centrum Democraten,	CD)	and	the	LPF	(which	are	not	





















government	 (Kennedy	2004).	 Such	 concerns	especially	flourished	during	 the	 ‘roaring	








of	what	happens	here	 in	 this	House	and	at	other	 levels’	 (Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-
Generaal	14.2.1996,	4032).130	A	similar	view	was	expressed	thirteen	years	later	by	D66	
leader	Alexander	 Pechtold,	who	 said	 the	 referendum	 ‘would	 do	more	 justice	 to	 the	
position	of	 the	 emancipated	 citizens	 in	 our	 society	 and	would	 furthermore	 advance	
the	emancipation	of	better	educated	and	better	 informed	citizens.	 […]	 It	would	be	a	
beneficial	 incentive	 to	 promote	 public	 involvement	 and	 active	 citizenship’	 (Tweede	
Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	17.2.2009,	4455).131	Both	parties	were	also	supportive	of	
introducing	the	citizens’	initiative,	although	no	formal	proposal	was	drafted.	
	 In	 addition	 to	 participatory	 arguments,	 instrumental	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	
referendums	were	expressed	and,	especially	from	the	1980s	onwards,	the	referendum	










	 This	 discourse	 on	 the	 gap	 between	 citizens	 and	 politics	 intensified	 in	 the	 early	
2000s,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 rise	 and	 assassination	 of	 Pim	 Fortuyn	 and	
















to	 strengthen	 representative	 decision-making	 as	 to	 thwart	 representative	 decision-






















to	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 accommodate	 to	 the	 integration	 of	 Europe’	 (Beunderman	


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































European	 Convention	 TCE	 (Karimi,	 Dubbelboer	 and	 Van	 der	 Ham	 2003).	 This	 notion	
was	 shared	 by	 VVD	MP	 Van	 Aartsen,	 who	 underscored	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 ruling	
that	the	ratification	of	the	EU	Constitutional	Treaty	was	comparable	to	amending	the	








important	decisions	 in	 the	European	 integration	process	could	not	be	made	without	




	 The	argument	 that	values	played	a	crucial	 role	 in	both	 the	 institutionalization	of	



























	 Ambiguity	 can	 also	 be	 found	 among	 D66	 politicians,	 which	was	 founded	 in	 the	
1960s	primarily	on	 the	basis	of	 a	 strong	participatory	 reform	agenda.	Most	notably,	
founder	 of	 the	 party	Hans	 van	Mierlo	was	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 inclusion	 of	
citizen-initiated	 referendums	 in	 the	coalition	agreement	of	 the	first	Kok	government	
(Kok	1994).	However,	when	 it	held	a	position	 in	 the	second	Balkenende	government	












Kok	 governments	were	 known	as	 ‘purple	 governments’)	 (Tweede	Kamer	der	 Staten-
Generaal	14.2.1996,	4013).
	 Inconsistencies	can	also	be	found	in	the	PvdA’s	position	on	the	referendum,	which	
is	 also	 mainly	 due	 to	 internal	 party	 divisions	 on	 the	 issue.143	 More	 classical	 social	
democrats	gave	primacy	to	representative	sovereignty	and	argued	that	the	referendum	
is	at	odds	with	the	system	of	representation,	while	more	progressive	colleagues	argued	




	 This	 suggests	 that,	 also	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 support	 –	 or	 non-support	 –	 for	












referendum	on	 the	TCE.	The	 initiators	of	 the	 referendum	 (PvdA	and	D66)	motivated	
their	pledge	by	referring	to	the	constitutional	character	of	the	treaty,	while	all	previous	
EU	 treaties	 –	 including	 those	 ratified	 when	 the	 PvdA	 and	 D66	 were	 in	 government	
(Treaties	 of	 Amsterdam	 and	 Nice)	 –	 were	 ratified	 without	 a	 referendum.	Moreover	
for	the	PvdA	and	the	VVD,	the	normative	arguments	in	favour	of	the	TCE	referendum	
apparently	did	not	apply	to	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	since	neither	supported	a	referendum	
on	that	treaty.	Notably,	 the	PvdA	had	advocated	a	referendum	on	Lisbon	 in	 its	2006	
election	manifesto.	Yet,	when	it	was	in	government	with	the	CDA	and	CU	between	2007	
and	2010,	it	voted	against	a	referendum	on	Lisbon	(Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal	
3.6.2008).	According	to	party	prominent	Niesco	Dubbelboer,145 internal party divisions 
on	 the	 referendum	again	played	an	 important	 role.	Under	pressure	 from	opponents	





	 Given	these	inconsistencies,	 it	 is	 likely	that	strategic	considerations	also	played	a	
role	in	support	for	the	TCE	referendum.	To	an	important	extent,	the	Dutch	referendum	
pledge	on	the	TCE	was	the	‘odd-man-out’	in	Europe.	Rather	than	being	initiated	by	the	
government,	 this	 ad	hoc	 referendum	was	 initiated	by	opposition	parties	 against	 the	
initial	wishes	of	the	government.	This	means	that,	other	than	in	most	other	European	
legislative	 majority	 referendums,	 unravelling	 the	 strategic	 motivations	 behind	 the	
referendum	 pledge	 requires	 analysing	 the	 motivations	 of	 the	 initiating	 (opposition)	
parties,	rather	than	of	the	government.	However,	the	support	of	one	government	party,	
the	VVD,	was	decisive	in	the	eventual	triggering	of	the	referendum,	and	it	is	therefore	
particularly	 important	 to	 assess	 its	motivations	 in	 supporting	 the	 bill.	 Based	 on	my	
typology	 of	 referendum	motivations,	 as	 outlined	 in	 chapter 2, table 7.6 provides an 
overview	of	the	motivations	that	pass	the	hoop test	of	process-tracing,	meaning	that	it	
is	at	least	likely	that	they	were	at	play	in	the	context	of	the	TCE	referendum.	Especially	
for	 the	 three	 initiating	 parties,	 normative	 arguments	 seem	 to	 have	 outweighed	
strategic	political	aims.	For	the	PvdA,	strategic	interests	may	also	have	played	a	role,	
as	it	anticipated	that	a	vote	on	the	TCE	would	strengthen	its	position	vis-à-vis	the	two	
















































YES NO YES NO Not relevant Empowerment	
VVD	
(parliament)
YES YES YES NO Not relevant Conflict	mediation
DOMESTIC	 EMPOWERMENT.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 policy-seeking	 motives,	 the	
referendum	was	 superfluous,	 since	only	a	minority	 in	parliament	–	 consisting	of	 the	
CU,	the	SGP,	the	LPF	and	the	SP	–	was	wholeheartedly	opposed	to	the	TCE.	A	smooth	
parliamentary	 ratification	was	 therefore	ensured	 (Lucardie	2005,	106).	 The	 initiators	
of	 the	 referendum	 all	 embraced	 the	 TCE.	 As	 I	 stated	 above,	 for	 them,	 normative	
considerations	played	an	 important	 role,	 as	 they	anticipated	 that	a	 ‘yes’	 vote	would	
boost	the	‘the	legitimacy	of	the	decision-making	on	the	Constitutional	Treaty’	(Karimi,	
Dubbelboer	and	Van	der	Ham	2003,	1).	However,	it	is	likely	that	the	referendum	pledge	
was	 also	 motivated	 by	 an	 aim	 to	 legitimize	 the	 initiators’	 own	 pro-EU	 stance	 in	 a	
turbulent	period	in	Europe,	with	the	coming	enlargement	with	the	CEECs,	the	drafting	
of	a	European	Constitution	and	a	potential	Turkish	accession.	




was	still	 relatively	high.	 In	spring	2003,	the	Eurobarometer	revealed	that	support	 for	
EU	membership	was	73	per	cent	 (compared	to	54	per	cent	 in	the	EU	on	average).	 In	
addition,	another	71	per	cent	supported	the	idea	of	an	EU	constitution,	compared	to	
an	EU	average	of	 63	per	 cent	 (Standard	Eurobarometer	59).	 In	 the	autumn	of	 2003,	
























driven (see section 7.3.3.).	In	the	debate	on	the	bill	on	the	TCE	referendum,	SP	MP	Harry	
van	Bommel	welcomed	 the	 referendum	as	 a	way	of	 putting	a	halt	 to	 the	neoliberal	
nature	of	the	EU,	the	internal	market	and	the	militarization	of	Europe	(Tweede	Kamer	
der	Staten-Generaal	18.11.2003,	1731-1732).	The	party’s	 consistent	 referendum	calls	






Europe	 (Tweede	 Kamer	 der	 Staten-Generaal	 18.11.2003,	 1742).	 LPF	 representative	






CONFLICT	MEDIATION. For	 the	VVD	 the	 stakes	were	different.	 Initially,	 the	VVD	was	
not	 very	 enthusiastic	 about	 an	 EU	 referendum.	 However,	 in	 2003,	 pro-referendum	
Jozias	van	Aartsen	became	leader	of	the	parliamentary	party	and	was	able	to	persuade	
his	colleagues	in	parliament	to	vote	in	favour	of	a	referendum. As	shown	in	table 7.6, 
the	finding	 that	 the	VVD	was	 internally	 divided	 over	 the	 TCE	makes	 it	 likely	 that	 its	
eventual	 support	 for	 holding	 the	 referendum	 was	 motivated	 by	 an	 aim	 to	 deflate	
party	disagreements.	The	party	was	divided	between	those	who	accepted	the	TCE	as	
way	to	further	the	internal	market,	and	those	who	criticized	the	far-reaching	political	











	 These	 divisions	 over	 the	 TCE	 are	 illustrative	 of	 the	more	 fundamental	 divisions	
within	 the	 party	 over	 ‘Europe’	 in	 general.	 Especially	 with	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	
Maastricht	 Treaty	 –	 which	 considerably	 expanded	 the	 competences	 of	 the	 EP	 and	




minister	 Gerrit	 Zalm,	 who	 opposed	 increasing	 the	 Dutch	 contribution	 to	 the	 EU.	 In	
addition,	although	the	party	had	in	2002	approved	the	EU	accession	of	the	Central	and	
Eastern	European	countries,	this	enlargement	was	heavily	criticized	by	some	VVD	party	
members,	 most	 notably	 Bolkestein	 and	 his	 successor	 as	 party	 leader,	 Hans	 Dijkstal	
(Voerman	2005,	59).	
	 Divisions	over	 ‘Europe’	had	not	before	 led	 the	VVD	 to	 support	 referendum	calls	
on	 the	EU.	However,	until	2002,	 these	disagreements	had	not	harmed	 the	party.	All	
major	 political	 parties	 supported	 European	 integration,	 and	 the	 Dutch	 electorate	







to	deflate	 its	divisions	by	calling	a	 referendum.	The	elections	 for	 the	EP,	which	were	
scheduled	for	June	2004,	also	forced	the	VVD	to	fall	into	line.	
 
7.5 THE FUTURE OF DUTCH REFERENDUMS?
With	the	 implementation	of	 the	 law	on	the	citizen-initiated	referendum	in	2015,	 the	
options	for	organizing	referendums	in	the	Netherlands	were	expanded.	The	fact	that	
such	 referendums	 cannot	 be	 vetoed	 by	 political	 representatives	 provides	 a	 strong	
indicator	 that	 referendums	will	 gain	a	more	prominent	place	 in	Dutch	politics	 in	 the	











ratification	of	 the	agreement.	 In	 the	 referendum,	61	per	 cent	of	 the	voters	 rejected	
Dutch	ratification,	while	38	per	cent	voted	in	favour.	The	turnout	quorum	was	narrowly	
reached,	with	only	32	per	cent	of	the	Dutch	electorate	making	the	effort	to	vote.	
	 Whether	 the	 referendum	 law	 will	 continue	 in	 its	 current	 form	 depends	 on	 the	
aftermath	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 referendum.	 One	 day	 after	 the	 vote,	 some	 parties	












	 Potentially,	 the	use	of	 referendums	under	 the	current	 legislation	could	spill	over	
to	 the	 use	 of	 ad	 hoc	 advisory	 referendums	 on	 issues	 on	 which	 there	 is	 as	 yet	 no	
legislation	 (citizens’	 vetoes	 can	only	 be	 triggered	on	 approved	 legislation),	 on	 issues	































of	 the	dominant	parties	was	weakened,	 due	 to	political	 fragmentation	 (Sweden	and	
Denmark)	or	electoral	competition	from	usually	populist	newcomers	(UK	and	France).	
In	 the	Netherlands,	 opposition	 parties	 also	made	 several	 attempts	 to	 introduce	 the	
referendum	 into	 the	 Dutch	 constitution,	 but	were	 never	 successful.	 This	makes	 the	
Netherlands	rather	exceptional	when	compared	to	most	of	its	European	counterparts.	





	 As	 demonstrated,	 an	 important	 factor	 that	 explains	 the	 long	 absence	 of	
referendum	legislation	in	the	Netherlands	is	the	high	number	of	veto	players	involved	
in	the	process	of	revising	the	constitution,	which	requires	simple	majority	approval	in	
a	 first	 parliamentary	 reading	 and	 qualified	majority	 approval	 in	 the	 second	 reading,	




majority	 implies	 support	 from	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 ideologically	 different	 actors.	 The	
Christian	democrats	(CDA)	and	the	conservative	liberals	(VVD)	in	particular	have	used	
their	veto	power	to	block	the	introduction	of	the	citizens’	veto.	Such	a	complex	process	


















in	 the	political	debate.	This	 changed	 in	 the	early	2000s	when	 the	notion	of	 the	EU’s	
‘democratic	deficit’	gained	prominence,	and	when	there	were	strong	normative	pleas	
across	 the	EU	to	organize	popular	votes	on	 the	outcome	document	of	 the	European	



















referendums	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 and	 early	 twenty-first	








	 I	 show	 that,	 despite	 aggregated	 increases	 in	 the	 constitutional	 availability	 of	
referendum	provisions	and	use	of	national	referendums	in	the	28	EU	countries,	this	does	
not	signify	a	direct	EU-wide	participatory	shift.	In	most	EU	member	states,	referendums	
are	 primarily	 triggered	 by	 the	 authorities	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	
largely	controlled	by	the Prince rather than the People.	 In	contrast	to	a	broad	field	of	
referendum	 literature	 that	perceives	 referendums	as	 the	outcome	of	political	 elites’	
normative	responses	to	transformative	pressures,	I	show	that	referendums	are	above	
all used strategically	 in	 inter-	 and	 intra-party	 competition,	 especially	 in	 a	 context	of	
rising	 fragmentation	 in	 party	 systems	 and	 electoral	 volatility.	 The	 different	 ways	
in	 which	 referendums	 are	 designed	 and	 used	 affirm	 cross-country	 differences	 in	
party	 competition	 dynamics,	 rather	 than	 being	 illustrative	 of	 a	 generic	 democratic	
transformation.	
8.2 THE FALLACY OF A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SHIFT 




literature,	 variations	 in	 referendum	 types	 and	 the	 associated	 provisions	 within	 and	










mandatory)	 referendums	and	 the	number	of	EU	countries	where	 these	are	provided	
for	 in	 the	constitution.	These	four	types	of	 referendum	are	classified	on	the	basis	of	
two	 well-known	 theoretical	 dimensions.	 The	 first	 is	 whether	 citizens	 participate	 in	
democratic	decision-making	indirectly,	through	a	process	of	political	representation,	or	
directly.	The	second	dimension	determines	whether	decisions	are	made	by	aggregating	
preferences	 into	 a	 majority	 outcome	 or	 by	 integrating	 individual	 preferences,	 and	
thereby	 giving	 more	 room	 to	 minority	 representation.	 Since	 citizens’	 referendums	
are	triggered	by	popular minorities,	they	allow	for	 integrative	decision-making	rather	
than	being	 purely	majoritarian	 instruments.	 This	 is	 furthermore	underscored	by	 the	
applicability	of	turnout	quorums.	In	four	of	the	ten	countries	where	citizens	can	trigger	
referendums,	 they	 can,	 however,	 only	do	 so	 to	 veto	existing	 legislative	proposals	 or	
legislation,	not	to	promote	their	own	initiatives.	
	 By	way	of	comparison,	in	all	countries	where	the	constitution	contains	provisions	
for	 the	 use	 of	 national	 referendums,	 this	 can	 be	 done	 by	 political	 representatives,	
but	 in	 some	 cases	 only	 on	 politically	 weighty	 issues.	 In	 20	 EU	 member	 countries,	
the	constitution	allows	 the	political majority	 to	 trigger	a	 referendum;	 this	 is	either	a	
parliamentary	majority	(15	countries),	the	president	(3)	or	both	(2).147	Such	referendums	
are	mostly	advisory	and	therefore	majority	rule	is	not	restricted	by	quorums.	In	eleven	
–	mainly	consensus	–	EU	countries,	the	constitution	allows	a	political minority to trigger 
a	referendum.	Such	referendums	have	an	integrative	effect	on	decision-making,	which	
is	underscored	by	the	fact	that,	in	most	countries,	these	referendums	have	quorums.	
	 Mandatory	 referendums	 are	 provided	 for	 in	 thirteen	 EU	 countries.	 The	 role	 of	
these	referendums	 in	decision-making	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	
since	they	are	triggered	by	the	constitution	rather	than	by	political	actors.	On	paper,	

















Table 8.1: A two-dimensional classification of non-mandatory referendum provisions* 
WHO CONTROLS 


































rather	 than	 transforming	 representative	 democracy,	 they	 tend	 to	 confirm	 existing	

















By	 contrast,	 referendums	 in	 the	 CEECs	 are	 more	 often	 triggered	 by	 (political	 and	
citizens’)	opposition	 forces	 to	 influence	decision-making.	Only	29	per	 cent	of	 the	83	
non-mandatory	 referendums	 in	 the	 CEECs	 were	 triggered	 by	 the	 political	 majority	
(parliament	or	president),	compared	to	14	per	cent	by	political	minorities	and	57	per	
cent	 by	 citizens.	 Of	 the	 47	 citizens’	 referendums	 held	 in	 seven	 CEECs,	 37	were	 pre-
legislative,	held	on	citizens’	initiatives	(a	type	of	referendum	that	is	not	provided	for	in	
any	of	the	‘old’	EU	member	states).	Nevertheless,	over	55	per	cent	of	the	non-mandatory	











EU 28 31% 9% 60%
EU 17 33% 5% 62%
EU 15 89% 11% 0%
CEECs 29% 14% 57%
Moreover,	the	use	of	referendums	in	EU	member	countries	 is	restricted	to	politically	
weighty	issues.	It	peaks	around	unique	one-off	events,	like	democratic	and	constitutional	
consolidation	 in	 the	 Mediterranean	 and	 the	 CEECs,	 EU	 accessions	 and	 EU	 treaty	
reforms.	Therefore	 there	 is	certainly	no	gradual	 increase	 in	 the	use	of	 referendums,	
nor	are	referendums	a	political	routine.	Hence,	given	these	nuances,	the	question	of	




8.3 UNDERSTANDING REFERENDUM USE IN EU DEMOCRACIES
To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 examined	 six	 assumptions	 concerning	 the	 potential	
drivers	of	 referendums,	derived	 from	four	schools	of	 institutional	 thought	–	classical	
institutionalism,	 historical	 institutionalism,	 sociological	 institutionalism	 and	 rational	
choice	 institutionalism.	The	comparisons	of	five	countries	with	different	 referendum	
track	 records	 –	 France	 and	Denmark	 (where	 referendums	were	 relatively	 frequently	

























from	rational	choice	institutionalism,	that	the stronger the act-contingent and outcome-
contingent interests of political actors to support referendums, the more likely it is that 
referendums will be institutionalized and used,	is	thus	corroborated.	
	 The	motives	behind	referendum	pledges	are	often	mixed,	serving	both	outcome-	
and	 act-contingent	 interests.	 It	 is	 of	 course	 difficult	 to	 assess	 whether	 benefits	
associated	with	 referendums	 have	 been	 intentionally	 appealed	 to	 or	whether	 these	
were	 unintended	 consequences	 of	 referendum	 pledges.	 Yet,	 of	 the	 roughly	 40	
referendum	pledges	that	I	examined	in	five	countries,	there	were	few	deliberate pledges 
that	went	against	the	interests	of	the	initiators.	In	most	referendums,	it	is	not	merely	
the	anticipated	outcome	of	the	referendum,	but	the	anticipated	benefits	of the act of 
pledging the referendum	that	incentivizes	political	actors	to	pledge	referendums.		
 Outcome-contingent	motives	played	a	 likely	role	 in	nearly	fifteen	cases,	but	only	
five	 votes	 served	 an	outcome-contingent	 purpose,	 namely	 the	 four	Danish	 votes	 on	
land	reforms	pledged	by	the	opposition	in	1963,	and	the	1986	referendum	in	the	same	
country	 on	 the	 Single	 European	Act	 (SEA),	 pledged	by	 the	minority	 government.	 EU	
negotiations	created	an	additional	incentive	for	governments	to	pledge	referendums,	
since	 such	 votes	 can	 increase	 a	 government’s	 bargaining	 power,	 but	 this	 is	 often	 a	
supplementary	advantage	rather	than	the	primary	motivation	(a	clear	exception	is	the	
Swedish	referendum	to	keep	the	country	out	of	the	eurozone).





analysed	 in	 this	 study,	 except	 for	 the	 Danish	 votes	mentioned	 above.	 Referendums	
are	 sometimes	 used	offensively	 to	 empower	 the	 actors	who	 trigger	 them.	 Although	
such	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 associated	with	 dictatorial	 regimes,	 political	 and	
party	 leaders	 in	democracies	–	especially	majoritarian	ones	 like	France	and	the	UK	–	
have	also	been	 incentivized	to	pledge	a	 referendum	to	strengthen	their	position	vis-
à-vis	 their	 competitors.	Nevertheless,	 contemporary	 referendums	 have	mainly	 been	
pledged defensively,	to	shift	the	focus	from	controversial	issues	in	general	elections	or	
prevent	party	or	 coalition	 splits.	 From	 the	analysis	of	 referendums	 in	five	 countries,	
it	 is	 worthwhile	 discussing	 four	 general	 conclusions	 as	 to	what	 incentivizes	 political	
representatives	to	pledge	referendums.
Conclusion 1: Referendums as defence: deflating controversy over ‘Europe’ 
The	issue	of	European	integration	has	especially	fuelled	the	use	of	referendums	in	EU	
member	 states.	 Between	1950	and	2014,	 38	 referendums	were	held	 that	 related	 to	
the	EU:	29	in	the	EU17	and	nine	in	the	CEECs.	‘Europe’	tends	to	cut	across	traditional	




there	 is	 a	 high	 probability	 that	 such	 divisions	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 coalition	 or	 party	 split,	
especially	when	 there	are	general	elections	upcoming,	 there	 is	a	 strong	 incentive	 to	
submit	such	issues	to	‘the	people’.	
	 Governments	 are	 often	 faced	 with	 the	 dilemma	 of	 trying	 to	 be	 a	 reliable	 and	
constructive	 negotiation	 partner	while	 being	 pushed	 by	 Eurosceptic	 party	members	
and	 competitors,	 and/or	 volatile	 electorates,	 to	 do	otherwise.	 Referendums	provide	
a	way	 out	 of	 this	 impasse.	When	 a	 government	 faces	 criticism	 from	within	 its	 own	
party	or	parties,	a	referendum	can	the	flip	the	coin	to	one	side	or	the	other	without	the	
leader	losing	authority.	Electoral	dynamics	play	an	important	role	in	EU	referendums,	
since	 public	 opinion	 towards	 ‘Europe’	 is	 highly	 volatile.	 The	 ‘permissive	 consensus’	
which,	according	 to	Lindberg	and	Scheingold	 (1970),	characterized	 the	electorates	 in	
the	 founding	member	 states	 in	 the	 first	 30	 years	 of	 EU	 integration,	 has	 turned	 into	
what	Hooghe	and	Marks	 (2009)	call	a	 ‘constraining	dissensus’.	Especially	when	faced	
with	Eurosceptic	competitors,	‘Europe’	constitutes	an	issue	on	which	votes	can	be	lost	









Conclusion 2: Rising salience as the outcome of a populist appeal to referendums











	 Survey	 data	 suggest	 that,	 for	 populist	 parties,	 such	 referendum	 calls	 pay	 off	
electorally.	 Support	 for	 referendums	 is	 especially	 high	 among	 populist	 voters,	 and	
research	 suggests	 that,	 for	 citizens	 who	 feel	 alienated	 from	 politics,	 referendum	
promises	are	 important	motives	 to	vote	 for	populist	parties	 (Pauwels	2014,	159	and	
176).	Faced	by	populist	competitors,	mainstream	parties	feel	pressured	to	do	the	same,	
fearing	that	refraining	from	doing	so	would	mean	electoral	 losses.	Populist	pressures	
also	urge	mainstream	parties	 to	 take	positions	on	divisive	 issues,	 creating	 incentives	
to	depoliticize	these	issues	by	pledging	referendums.	This	underscores	the	conclusion	
of	 Susan	Scarrow	 (2001,	652)	 that	 the	 ‘push	 toward	direct	democracy’	 is	 a	 sign	 that	
‘populist	pressures	have	once	again	gained	momentum’.	





reform	 and	 EU	 treaty	 ratification,	 by	 referendum.	 In	 publicly	 justifying	 these	 votes,	
governments	generally	refer	to	the	necessity	to	have	such	decisions	directly	approved	
by	 the	 public.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 EU	 affairs,	 referendum	 proponents	 across	 the	
political	spectrum	generally	assert	that	direct	votes	will	help	decrease	the	EU’s	alleged	
‘democratic	 deficit’.	 However,	 although	 such	 normative	 arguments	 indeed	 increase	
the	salience	of	referendums,	they	do	not	necessarily	lead	to	them	actually	being	held.	
Moreover,	 the	 same	 actors	 that	 justify	 a	 referendum	 on	 a	 particular	 occasion	 on	
the	 basis	 of	 participatory	 or	 instrumental	 values	will	 easily	 jettison	 these	 normative	
considerations	in	comparable	occasions	when	faced	with	different	 incentives.	Hence,	
the	hypothesis	derived	from	sociological	institutionalism,	that	the stronger the intrinsic 
and instrumental values that political actors attach to referendums, the more likely it is 





	 A	 notable	 example	 of	 inconsistent	 adherence	 to	 values	 is	 the	 ratification	of	 the	
Lisbon	Treaty	(2007-2009).	At	the	time	of	the	European	Convention	(2002-2003),	there	
was	a	strong	normative	discourse	to	submit	the	Convention’s	outcome	document,	later	





rejected	the	TCE	 in	a	 referendum	 in	2005,	governments	 that	had	previously	pledged	
referendums	on	the	TCE	decided	not	to	do	so	on	the	subsequent	Lisbon	Treaty.	This	
was	 justified	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 treaty	 was	 de-constitutionalized, and therefore a 
referendum	was	perceived	as	unnecessary.	Concerns	about	the	EU’s	democratic	deficit	
and	 limited	 public	 involvement	 had	 certainly	 not	 declined,	 but	 they	were	 no	 longer	
linked	to	the	necessity	of	holding	a	referendum.	
	 The	mismatch	between	the	appeal	to	referendums	in	the	debate	and	their	actual	
use	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 especially	 when	 assessing	 the	 role	 of	 political	 ideology.	 On	
paper,	support	for	referendums	is	embedded	in	party	ideology	but,	in	practice,	parties	
have	 supported	and	opposed	 referendum	bills	 regardless	of	 their	 ideology.	Principal	
objections	 to	 referendums	 generally	 come	 from	 the	 conservative	 and	 confessional	
right,	which	usually	adhere	to	a	Machiavellian	notion	of	representative	democracy.	By	
contrast,	besides	 the	 radical	 right,	 support	 for	 referendums	 is	also	expressed	by	 the	
progressive-left,	which	tends	to	endorse	Rousseauian	notion	of	political	participation	
and	 empowerment.	 However,	 in	 practice,	 proposals	 to	 institutionalize	 and	 use	
referendums	have	come	from	both	the	left	and	right,	from	the	centre	and	the	radical	
extremes	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 and	 are	 primarily	 produced	 by	 –	 and	 confirm	 –	
existing	government-opposition	dynamics.	Hence,	 although	values	and	 ideology	play	
an	important	role	in	the	popular	justification	of	proposals	to	both	institutionalize	and	
use	 referendums,	parties	have	primarily	 initiated	 such	proposals	 to	 strengthen	 their	
position	 vis-à-vis	 their	 competitors	 or	 prevent	 electoral	 losses,	 or	 they	 have	 been	
the	outcome	of	 political	 compromises	between	mainstream	and	 smaller	 parties	 (for	
example,	to	compensate	for	the	abolition	of	the	upper	house	or	in	return	for	support	
for	a	specific	policy	proposal).
Conclusion 4: Despite the appeal to ‘the people’, we do not know if people want 
referendums
Research	 on	 referendums	 usually	 starts	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 advanced	
democracies	 increasingly	 use	 referendums	 and	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 value	 changes	 in	
Western	democratic	societies	resulting	in	increasing	public	referendum	demands.	The	
argument	goes	that	such	demands	come	either	from	highly	educated	and	cognitively	








which	politicians,	 in	 their	 turn,	 respond.	Attractive	as	 this	argument	may	be,	 I	 found	
no support for the hypothesis that the larger the public demands for referendums, the 
more likely it is that referendums will be institutionalized and used.	Indeed,	sentiments	
of	political	dissatisfaction	with	national	or	EU	politics	create	a	referendum-favourable 
discourse	on	the	part	of	politicians	for	whom	referendums	have	a	function	in	the	game	




we	must	 at	 least	 be	 certain	 about	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 demands.	 However,	we	 do	
not	know	whether	(and	which)	citizens	want	to	vote	in	referendums.	It	 is	remarkable	
that,	despite	the	appeal	 to	public	demands	on	the	part	of	both	referendum	scholars	
and	 decision-makers,	 there	 are	 no	 comparative	 longitudinal	 data	 on	 support	 for	
referendums	 available	 to	 validate	 these	 claims.	 The	 available	 comparative	 opinion	
surveys	(which	assess	support	for	referendums	in	different	countries)	that	I	used	in	this	
study	(the	ISSP	and	the	EES)	to	analyse	public	support	for	referendums	in	Europe	only	
include	general	questions	about	whether	 respondents	agree	 that	 referendums	are	a	














8.3.2 Cross-country variations in referendum provisions and use









and	historic	 context.	 Political	 actors	 in	different	 countries	 could	well	 have	 the	 same	
interest	in	adopting	referendum	legislation	or	holding	a	referendum,	but	the	incentive	
to	 actually	 do	 so	 varies,	 depending	 on	 differences	 in	 institutional	 set-up	 and	 past	
referendum	experience.	The	following	three	conclusions	can	be	drawn	as	to	how	such	
country-specific	factors	shape	referendum	legislation	and	use.
Conclusion 5: Different democratic traditions, different referendum practices
Cross-country	differences	in	referendum	provisions	and	the	way	in	which	referendums	
are	used	(though	not	the	frequency	with	which	they	are	used)	are	strongly	embedded	
in	 differences	 in	 democratic	 tradition.	 Hence,	 the	 hypothesis	 that	was	 derived	 from	
classical	 institutionalism,	that	the better the institutional fit between a country’s type 
of democracy and a particular referendum, the more likely that this type of referendum 
will be institutionalized and used,	is	largely	corroborated.	First,	legislative minority and 
citizen-initiated referendums	are	more	commonly	provided	for	in	consensus	democracies	




policy	 outcome	 –	 such	 as	 in	 Italy.	 Although	 such	 referendums	 have	 only	 been	 held	
frequently	 in	 Italy,	 the	 underlying	 principle	 coincides	 with	 the	 integrative	 decision-
making	logic	underlying	the	consensus	model	of	democracy.	In	addition,	referendums	
in	 consensus	 democracies,	 especially	 when	 triggered	 by	 minorities,	 usually	 have	 a	









exception	 of	 a	 consensus	 democracy	with	 provisions	 for	mandatory	 referendums	 is	
Denmark,	where	they	were	introduced	specifically	to	provide	a	constitutional	guarantee	
to	political	minorities,	which	is	consistent	with	the	highly	consensual	nature	of	Danish	
democracy.	 Unlike	 in	 other	 (majoritarian)	 countries	 with	 provisions	 for	 mandatory	
referendums,	in	Denmark	strict	quorums	apply,	which	also	underscores	the	notion	of	
minority	protection.	These	conclusions	debunk	the	claim	that	referendums	transform	








Conclusion 6: A high number of veto players either constrains or enables the use of 
referendums
The	second	hypothesis	derived	from	classical	institutionalism,	that	the fewer veto players 
there are present in the process of institutionalizing or triggering referendums, the more 





easily	 triggered	by	a	citizens’ minority.	By	contrast,	 the	high	number	of	 referendums	
in	Denmark	and	Ireland	is	mainly	due	to	the	fact	that	referendums	are	mandatory	on	





the	UK.	However,	 a	 small	 number	of	 veto	players	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 referendums	
are	frequently	held.	For	example,	in	Ireland,	Austria,	Luxembourg,	Spain	and	Sweden,	
legislative	 minorities	 have	 never	 effectively	 made	 use	 of	 their	 right	 to	 trigger	 a	
referendum.	Although	the	number	of	veto	players	shapes	actors’	room	for	manoeuvre,	
decisions	whether	to	hold	referendums	are	primarily	driven	by	actors’ preferences and 
incentives,	which	 vary	 per	 polity	 depending	 on	party competition dynamics and the 
presence of a referendum-favourable discourse.	
	 Indeed,	some	polities	have	more	potential	veto	players	than	others,	due	to	higher	
levels	 of	 political	 fragmentation.	 Whether	 high	 levels	 of	 political	 fragmentation	
frustrate	or	enable	decisions	to	institutionalize	or	use	referendums	depends	primarily	
on	the	preferences	of	veto	players.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	rigidity	of	the	constitution	
and	 the	existence	of	a	bicameral	parliament,	 together	with	a	 substantive	number	of	




Sweden,	a	parliamentary	majority	required	to	trigger a referendum consists of various 
ideologically	different	parties,	which	makes	 this	 essentially	more	difficult	 than	when	
it	only	requires	the	support	of	the	government	party,	such	as	for	example	in	the	UK.	









referendums.	 First,	 increased	 fragmentation	 increases	 the	 number	 of	 potential	 veto	
players	 and	makes	 it	more	difficult	 for	mainstream	parties	 to	 avoid	 referendums.	 In	
the	UK	for	example,	 increased	political	 fragmentation	due	to	the	rising	popularity	of	
pro-referendum	parties	(the	SNP	and	UKIP)	has	reduced	the	ability	of	the	mainstream	




Conclusion 7: Referendums in the past are no guarantee for the future
The	adoption	of	bills	on	either	the	institutionalization	or	use	of	referendums	is	usually	
preceded	by	a	long	political	process,	and	this	process	often	(though	not	always)	follows	
the	 logic	 of	 path	 dependency.	 An	 example	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	
consecutive	referendum	proposals	entailed	legislation	for	the	citizens’	veto	rather	than	
other	 referendum	 types.	 Thus,	 understanding	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 referendum	
debates	 is	 important	 to	understanding	current	ones.	There	 is,	however,	no	universal	
explanation	of	how	past	referendum	experience	shapes	future	practice.	The	hypothesis	
derived	from	historical	institutionalism,	that	when there is past referendum experience 
in a country, it is more likely that referendums will be institutionalized and used, does 
not	entirely	hold.	Having	experience	of	referendums	in	the	past	 is	no guarantee that 
particular	referendums	are	institutionalized	or	used.





tradition	 initiated	 by	 Napoleon	 I.	 Denmark	 and	 Sweden	 held	 several	 democratic	
referendums	prior	to	WWII,	already	using	them	to	solve	disagreements	on	issues	that	
cut	 across	 party	 lines	 and	 coalitions,	 such	 as	 foreign	 policy	 and	 alcohol	 prohibition.	
However,	early	experience	with	 referendums	 is	no	guarantee	of	 them	being	held	on	
a	 frequent	 basis,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 Austria	 and	 Luxembourg.	 In	 these	 two	 countries,	




	 There	 are	 several	 countries,	 including	 Spain	 and	 Germany,	 where	 experience	
with	 dictatorial	 referendums	 prevents	 referendums	 from	 playing	 an	 important	 role	
in	 contemporary	 decision-making.	 Yet,	 in	 a	 number	 of	 other	 countries,	 referendum	







and	 legislative	minority	 referendums	were	 introduced	 to	consolidate	post-dictatorial	










8.4 IMPLICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
These	 findings	 have	 implications	 for	 two	 common	 assumptions	 in	 the	 referendum	
literature.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 European	 citizens	 are	 increasingly	 gaining	 direct	 control	





used,	 they	are	mainly	 tools	 in	 inter-party	competition,	and	hence	strengthen	parties	






The People or the Prince?
The	 bias	 in	 the	 literature	 towards	 sociological	 institutionalism	 –	 which	 perceives	
referendums	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 either	 public	 demands	 or	 democratic	 values	 –	 has	















The	 notion	 that	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 is	 largely	 elite-driven	 and	 -controlled	
underscores	 the	 importance	 of	 political agency.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	




such	 divisions	 are	 played	 upon	 by	 populist-right	 Eurosceptic	 competitors.	 However,	
whether	a	referendum	is	held	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	democratic	polity	(which	







Directions for future research
Growing	 use	 of	 national	 referendums	 in	 some	 countries	 has	 led	 to	 a	 growth	 in	 the	
academic	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 My	




‘crisis	of	democracy’.	A	first	potential	direction	for	 future	research	 is	broadening the 
focus to the use of referendums in new democracies in Europe and in non-European 
democracies.	 I	have	analysed	 the	 functions	 that	 referendums	have	 in	established	EU	
democracies,	and	showed	that	they	are	largely	triggered	by	political	parties	as	a	weapon	













A	second	direction	for	future	research	is	guided	by	new referendum cases that will likely 








rising success of populist parties and its impact on the use of referendums.  























EPILOGUE: THE POLITICS OF FOUR RECENT EUROPEAN REFERENDUMS
Referendum	calls,	by	both	politicians	and	academics,	are	closely	 linked	to	an	alleged	
crisis of democracy.	Referendums	are	 seen	as	 instruments	 to	close	 the	assumed	gap	
between	citizens	and	politics,	and	 in	particular	between	citizens	and	 ‘Europe’,	or,	by	
Eurosceptics,	to	curtail	sovereignty	transfers	to	the	EU.	This	discourse	has,	however	not	
unequivocally	 translated	 into	 the	actual	use	of	 such	 referendums,	 since	 the	benefits	
of	not	holding	a	popular	vote	usually	outweigh	its	normative	appeal.	In	fact,	especially	








	 The	salience	of	referendums,	especially	on	the	EU,	 is	to	a	 large	extent	fuelled	by	
the	 rising	 electoral	 success	 of	 Eurosceptic	 populist	 parties,	 both	 on	 the	 radical-left	
and	 radical-right	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 These	 parties	 mobilize	 support	 on	 the	
basis	of	promises	to	hold	referendums,	which	they	portray	as	a	means	to	restore	the	
power	of	‘the	people’	at	the	expense	of	‘the	elites’.	Despite	this	normative	argument,	














Greece: ‘David versus Goliath’








Commentators	 –	 at	 least	 those	 on	 the	 political	 left	 –	 praised	 the	 referendum	 as	 a	
‘triumph	 for	 democracy’	 (Fotaki	 6.7.2015).	 The	Greeks	 had	 chosen	 ‘democracy	 over	




by	 former	finance	minister	Yanis	Varoufakis,	who	said	 that	 the	 referendum	provided	
a	boost	to	democracy,	and	that	Syriza	had	delivered	it	(BBC	27.6.2015).	Given	that	the	




	 The	 referendum	 pledge	 was	 grounded	 in	 a	 radical-left	 populist	 discourse.	 Both	
Tsipras	and	Varoufakis	referred	to	‘the	Greek	people’	as	opposed	to	the	economic	elites	
in	Brussels	and	 justified	 the	 referendum	as	a	means	 to	 restore	power	 to	 the	first	at	
the	 expense	of	 the	 latter.	Despite	 this	 normative	 appeal,	 the	 vote	was	 certainly	 not	
devoid	of	other	intentions.	In	fact,	Tsipras	himself	made	no	secret	of	the	fact	that	the	
referendum	 served	 to	 strengthen	 Greece’s	 bargaining	 position	 in	 the	 negotiations	


































have	been	pursued	without	a	 referendum,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	supported	by	
a	majority	of	Danish	political	parties,	on	both	 the	centre-left	and	centre-right	of	 the	
political	 spectrum.	This	 referendum,	 too,	was	not	devoid	of	political	 strategy,	not	as	
much	because	it	was	held,	but	because	of	its	timing.
	 The	 initial	 commitment	 to	hold	a	 referendum	on	 the	Danish	 justice	opt-out	had	
already	been	expressed	in	2011,	when	the	centre-left	government	of	Helle	Thorning-
Schmidt came	 into	 power. Thorning-Schmidt	 was	 also	 willing	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	



































The Netherlands: ‘Mobilizing Euroscepticism’
On	6	April	2016,	Dutch	citizens	voted	in	their	second	national	referendum	in	modern	











be	 ‘hijacked’	by	political	parties	or	groups	with	other	 intentions	 than	claimed	 in	 the	
justification	for	holding	the	referendum.	
	 The	Dutch	referendum	law	allows	for	citizen-initiated	referendums,	which	are,	 in	
principle,	 more	 directly	 participatory	 than	 other	 types	 of	 referendum.	 However,	 as	
with	 other	 country	 examples	 described	 in	 this	 study,	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 the	 direct	
participatory	nature	of	 the	 referendum	 is	curtailed	by	 the	design	of	 the	 referendum	
law.	 The	 Dutch	 referendum	 law	 is	 an	 odd-man-out	 in	 Europe,	 as	 it	 specifies	 that	
referendums	are	not	only	advisory,	but	also	require	a	turnout quorum.	This	means	that	






























	 Moreover,	 the	 discourse	 did	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	 initiators’	 actual	 intentions,	
which	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 referendum	 in	 a	 newspaper	 interview.	
The	initiators	stressed	that,	rather	than	giving	Dutch	citizens	a	democratic	say	on	the	
Ukraine	 agreement	 as	 such,	 their	 primary	 concern	was	 to	 distort	 relations	 between	
the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	 EU.	 As	 they	 put	 it,	 ‘we	 do	 not	 really	 care	 about	 Ukraine’	
(Heck	31.3.2016).	 In	fact,	they	had	been	waiting	for	the	first	opportunity	to	trigger	a	





The United Kingdom: ‘Saving the Conservative Party’
During	the	writing	of	this	study,	David	Cameron’s	Conservative	government	announced	
the	first	British	 EU	 referendum	 since	 its	 EC	membership	 referendum	 in	 1975.	 In	 the	
referendum,	 held	 on	 23	 June	 2016,	 the	 British	 people	 voted	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	with	 a	
narrow	majority	of	roughly	52	per	cent,	making	the	UK	likely	the	first	sovereign	country	
to	 leave	 the	 union.	 Regardless	 of	 this	 outcome,	 it	 is	 however	 arguable	whether	 the	
British	people	indeed	have	the	final	say.	
	 As	in	the	Netherlands,	before	the	vote,	British	voters	were	surrounded	by	insecurity	
about	what	their	vote	would	imply.	For	one,	the	referendum	was	not legally binding, 
which	means	that	the	British	parliament	has	the	final	say	when	it	comes	to	Brexit.	Of	
course,	not	adhering	to	a	referendum	outcome	is	politically	risky	but,	then	again,	the	
stakes	 are	 high.	 After	 the	 vote,	 and	 after	 David	 Cameron’s	 resignation,	 uncertainty	
about	what	will	happen	remained,	and	 it	became	clear	 that	 the	 leave	vote	does	not	








































John	 Major,	 ‘destroying	 the	 Conservative	 Party’	 (Major	 2013).	 If	 Cameron’s	 main	
concern	was	 indeed	 to	 give	 the	British	 people	 a	 vote	 on	 EU	membership,	 he	would	
have	voted	in	favour	of	the	‘People’s	Pledge’	in	2011,	which	demanded	a	referendum	








a	Conservative	prime	minister	over	 ‘Europe’.	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	2014	EP	elections	
and	2015	general	elections,	these	divisions	between	the	party	leadership	and	the	bulk	
of	Conservative	MPs	were	still	not	solved.	Moreover,	polls	suggested	rising	electoral	
success	 for	 the	Eurosceptic	UKIP,	especially	 in	 the	2013	 local	elections.	Hence,	when	
Cameron	 pledged	 in	 2013	 to	 hold	 a	 referendum	 on	 EU	membership	after	 the	 2015	
elections,	he	aimed	to	both	satisfy	the	Eurosceptics	in	his	party	and prevent a loss of 
Conservative	votes	to	UKIP.	Cameron’s	pledge	thus	supports	the	conclusion	of	this	study	
that	referendums	are	primarily	pledged	defensively,	to	mediate	conflict	and	depoliticize	
controversial	 issues	 so	 as	 to	 guarantee	 party	 unity	 and	 power.	 Nevertheless,	 given	
that	 the	decision	whether	or	 not	 to	 leave	 the	EU	ultimately	 remains	 a political one, 
controversy	 over	 the	 issue,	 also	within	 the	 Conservative	 Party,	 is	 likely	 to	 continue,	
regardless	of	the	outcome	of	the	vote.
Claims	that	referendums	restore	the	power	of	the	people	constitute	a	strong	discourse,	
which	finds	 resonance	among	a	 large	number	of	 voters,	 especially	 those	of	populist	
parties,	 who	 feel	 detached	 from	 political	 decision-making,	 and	 among	 especially	
populist	 parties	 aiming	 to	 ‘win’	 votes	on	promises	 to	 grant	 citizens	 a	direct	 vote	on	
important	matters.	It	also	finds	resonance	among	academics	who	favour	referendums	
and	 other	 forms	 of	 direct	 citizens’	 participation,	 and	 study	 the	 phenomenon	with	 a	
normative	preference.	However,	the	normative	appeal	of	referendums	tends	to	mask	
their	 strategic	 functions	 in	 the	 political	 game.	 This	 applies	 especially	 to	 deliberately	
pledged	referendums,	as	the	examples	above	demonstrate.	But	even	mandatory	votes	
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revisions.	 Although	 enthusiasm	 for	 referendums	 declined	 markedly	 among	 political	
leaders	after	the	French	and	Dutch	public	rejected	the	European	Constitutional	Treaty	
in	2005,	today	they	are	back	on	the	agenda.	In	2015	and	the	first	half	of	2016,	no	less	
than	four	referendums	relating	to	EU	policies	 took	place	 in	EU	member	countries:	 in	
July	2015,	Greece	held	a	referendum	on	the	country’s	bailout	deal	with	the	European	
Commission,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 and	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund;	 in	
December	that	same	year,	Denmark	held	a	referendum	on	whether	to	change	its	opt-
out	from	the	EU	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice	into	a	flexible	opt-in;	in	April	2016,	





of	 academic	 books	 and	 journal	 articles	 on	 the	 subject.	 These	 include	 descriptive	 or	
comparative	 studies	 on	 the	 use	 of	 referendums	 around	 the	world,	 analyses	 of	 their	
effects	on	decision-making	processes,	or	normative	arguments	for	or	against	them.	A	
common	denominator	in	this	literature	is	that	the	increase	in	the	number	of	national	
referendums	 is	 largely	 interpreted	 as	 signifying	 a	 transformation	 of	 democracy:	 a	
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to	remedy	flaws	in	representative	decision-making.	The	following	questions	guided	the	
research:	1)	Did	Europe	experience	an	 increase	 in	 the	 institutionalization	and	use	of	
national	referendums	between	1950	and	2014?	2)	If	so,	does	this	increase	mark	a	shift	
from	national	decision-making	by	representation	to	decision-making	by	direct	citizens’	
participation?	And	 3)	Which	 factors	 contribute	 to	 the	 institutionalization	 and	use	 of	
national	referendums	in	European	democracies? 






level,	 since	 regional	and	 local	 referendums	have	a	 fundamentally	different	character	
than	 national	 ones.	 To	 answer	 the	 third	 research	 question,	 I	 examine	 the	 impact	 of	
structural factors and	political	agency.	The	third	aim	of	this	study	is	therefore	to	assess	



















one	 referendum	was	held	between	1950	and	2014	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	 This	 country	
selection	also	allows	me	to	compare	(implicitly	in	chapter	8)	institutionally-comparable	
countries in a Most Similar Systems Design	(Denmark	with	Sweden	and	the	Netherlands;	








The	 argument	 that	 referendum	 use	 in	 Europe	 represents	 a	 direct	 democracy	 shift		
stems	 from	 the	 tendency	 to	 perceive	 referendums	 as	 pure	 instruments	 of	 direct	
democracy.	As	 such,	 referendums	are	 contrasted	 to	 representative	democracy,	with	












or	 directly	 (by	 making	 decisions	 themselves).	 The	 second	 dimension	 distinguishes	




them.	 	And	 in	all	 referendums	 the	majority	ultimately	decides.	Not	all	 referendums,	
however,	 are	a	pure	 reflection	of	popular	 sovereignty	or	of	 strict	majority	 rule.	 This	
depends	primarily	on	the	question	of	who	triggers	the	referendum.
Based	on	 this	criterion,	 I	distinguish	five	different	 types	of	 referendum:	1)	 legislative	
majority	 referendums	 (triggered	 by	 a	 parliamentary	 majority);	 2)	 presidential	
referendums (triggered	by	the	president);	3)	legislative	minority	referendums (triggered 
by	 a	 parliamentary	minority);	 4)	 citizen-initiated	 referendums	 (triggered	by	 citizens);	








referendums	 are	 not	 easily	 placed	within	 this	 two-dimensional	 framework,	 because	








binding	or	advisory,	and	whether	quorums	apply	 (with	respect	 to	the	turnout	or	 the	
required	majority).	Citizens’	control	over	the	referendum	process,	and	eventually	the	
decision-making	process,	 is	 limited	when	 referendums	are	only	 advisory,	when	 they	
can	only	be	held	in	exceptional	cases,	and	when	a	quorum	applies.	If	there	is	a	turnout	
quorum,	 the	outcome	of	 the	 referendum	 is	 not	 simply	 determined	by	 a	majority	 of	
votes;	a	certain	proportion	of	the	electorate	must	have	participated	in	the	vote.	In	case	
of	 an	 approval	 quorum	 (or	 a	 rejection	quorum),	 the	 voting	majority	must	 represent	
a	certain	proportion	of	 the	electorate	 for	 the	proposal	 te	be	approved	(or	rejected).	
Referendums	with	a	quorum	are	 thus	more	protective	of	minority	 views	 than	 those	




















The	distinction	 is	 even	more	 important	when	 it	 comes	 to	actual	 referendum	use.	 In	
a	 large	group	of	 countries,	 referendums	are	held	only	exceptionally.	The	aggregated	
increase	 in	 referendums	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 their	 frequent	 use	 in	 a	 limited	
number	 of	 countries,	 most	 notably	 Ireland	 and	 Italy.	 Yet,	 even	 in	 these	 countries,	










CEECs,	 a	 relatively	 large	 number	 of	 citizens’	 referendums	were	 held,	 but	 these	 also	
were	primarily	an	instrument	in	the	hands	of	political	parties.	My	research	shows	that	
in	 the	remaining	fifteen	EU	member	states,	34	of	 the	38	optional	 referendums	were	
triggered	by	a	political	majority.	Rather	than	heralding	a	shift	towards	direct	democracy,	






To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 examine	 six	 assumptions	 concerning	 the	 potential	
factors	 that	 affect	 referendum	 use.	 These	 assumptions	 are	 derived	 from	 four	
schools	of	 institutional	 thought	–	classical	 institutionalism,	historical	 institutionalism,	
sociological	 institutionalism	 and	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism.	 Derived	 from	
classical	 institutionalism,	 I	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	which	 referendum	 legislation	 ‘fits’	
in	 the	 broader	 institutional	 context.	 From	 historical	 institutionalism,	 I	 examine	 the	
role	 of	 path	 dependency	 in	 referendum	 choices.	 From	 sociological	 institutionalism,	
I	 examine	 whether,	 in	 these	 choices,	 politicians	 are	 driven	 by	 public	 opinion	 or	
normative	convictions.	Finally,	derived	from	rational	choice	institutionalism,	I	examine	











power.	 Most	 countries	 ultimately	 adopt	 legislation	 that	 only	 allows	 the	 authorities	
to	 trigger	 referendums,	mostly	 by	majority.	 The	 conclusion	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	
authorities	only	decide	to	hold	a	referendum	when	this	fits	their	immediate	interests.	
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Controversy	 over	 European	 integration	 and	 the	 rising	 electoral	 success	 of	 populist	












Such	 defensive	 use	 of	 EU	 referendums	 is	 especially	 fuelled	 by	 the	 rising	 electoral	
success	of	populist	Eurosceptic	parties.	These	parties	advocate	the	use	of	referendums	
on	issues	relating	to	national	sovereignty	and	immigration.	They	stress	that	‘ordinary	
citizens’	 have	 become	 increasingly	 alienated	 from	 the	 political	 elite,	 mainly	 due	 to	
a	 loss	of	national	 sovereignty	 to	Europe	and	 rising	 immigration.	These	are	 issues	on	
which	mainstream	political	parties	largely	fail	to	take	an	unequivocal	position	and	on	
which	 parts	 of	 the	 citizenry	 do	 not	 feel	 represented.	 Populist	 parties	 tend	 to	 claim	




major	 decisions	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 sovereignty	 transfer	 or	 constitutional	 reform	
directly	legitimized	by	the	public.	For	example,	when	it	comes	to	EU	affairs,	referendum	
proponents	 across	 the	political	 spectrum	generally	 assert	 that	 direct	 votes	will	 help	
decrease	 the	 EU’s	 alleged	 ‘democratic	 deficit’.	 Although	 such	 normative	 arguments	












I	 also	 found	 little	 evidence	 for	 the	 claim	 that	political	 actors	 are	primarily	 driven	by	
public	 demands	 for	 referendums.	 While	 disaffection	 with	 national	 or	 EU	 politics	
creates	a	context	that	is	susceptible	to	referendum	promises,	politicians	rarely	pledge	
referendums	 when	 this	 is	 not	 in	 their	 interest,	 regardless	 of	 public	 demand.	 More	
importantly	 however,	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 longitudinal	 and	 comparative	 survey	 data	 on	
referendum	 support,	 we	 simply	 do	 not	 know	whether	 (and	 which)	 citizens	 want	 to	
vote	in	referendums	and	in	what	type	of	referendum.		This	makes	statistical	analyses	
on	whether	there	is	strong	public	support	for	referendums	almost	impossible.	Claims	





are	 held	more	 often	 in	 some	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	Understanding	 cross-country	
variations	in	referendum	provisions	and	use	requires	above	all	an	understanding	of	each	
country’s	institutional	and	historic	context.	First,	the	nature	of	referendum	provisions	
is	strongly	embedded	in	democratic	tradition.	Legislative minority and citizen-initiated 
referendums	 are	 more	 commonly	 provided	 for	 in	 consensus	 than	 in	 majoritarian	
democracies.	Such	referendums	allow	more	space	for	the	integration	of	minority	views	
in	decision-making,	which	is	also	a	basic	principle	of	consensus	democracy.	Moreover,	
referendums	 in	 consensus	 democracies,	 especially	when	 triggered	 by	 the	 legislative	
minority	or	citizens,	usually	have	a	turnout,	approval	or	rejection	quorum.	Such	quorums	
make	 it	more	difficult	 for	 the	voting	majority	 to	 control	 a	 referendum	outcome.	For	
that	 reason,	quorums	do	not	usually	apply	 in	majoritarian	democracies,	 for	example	
in	the	UK	and	France.	Finally,	of	the	few	typical	majoritarian	democracies,	only	Greece	
and	Cyprus	 lack	provisions	 for	mandatory	referendums.	Mandatory	referendums	are	




Referendum	use	 (and	 institutionalization)	 is	also	 influenced	by	 the	number	of	actors	
whose	support	is	necessary	to	trigger	a	referendum	(or	to	institutionalize	referendum	
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players.	 In	countries	where	 referendums	are	held	 frequently,	 this	 is	primarily	due	 to	
the	fact	that	triggering	referendums	requires	the	approval	of	only	a	few	players,	such	





primarily	driven	by	actors’ preferences and incentives.	For	example,	due	to	the	rigidity	of	
the	Dutch	constitution	and	the	high	degree	of	fragmentation	of	the	Dutch	party	system,	





Understanding	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 referendum	 debates	 is	 important	 to	
understanding	current	ones.	There	is,	however,	no	universally	applicable	relationship	







contemporary	 politics.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 there	 are	 some	 countries,	 like	 Italy,	 Latvia	
and	Lithuania,	where	citizens’	referendums	and	legislative	minority	referendums	were	
introduced	to	break	with	the	dictatorial	use	of	referendums	in	the	past.	Yet,	in	Portugal	
and	 Romania,	 referendums	 can	 still	 be	 issued	 by	 the	 president,	 despite	 their	 past	
dictatorial	referendum	usage.
RESEARCH	IMPLICATIONS	AND	DIRECTIONS	FOR	FUTURE	RESEARCH



















On	 the	 contrary,	 referendum	are	 generally	 only	 called	 if	 the	 triggering	 actor	 has	 an	
interest	in	doing	so,	and	these	interests	rarely	match	the	justification	given	in	the	public	
debate.
Although	 most	 referendum	 scholars	 consent	 that	 there	 are	 differences	 between	
referendums	and	between	countries,	they	generally	go	along	with	the	discourse	that	
representative	 democracy	 is	 transformed	 by	 the	 use	 of	 referendums,	 and	 that	 this	
is	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 changing	 political	 values	 and	 public	 demands.	 I	 argue	 that	 such	
a	 discourse	 offers	 no	 insight	 into	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 referendum	use	 in	 Europe.	
In	 fact,	 the	 strategic	 role	 played	 by	 referendums	 is	 often	 obscured	 by	 the	 strong	
normative	appeal	typical	of	referendums.	Unravelling	referendum	strategies	is	crucial	
to	understanding	the	impact	of	referendums	on	democratic	decision-making.
In	 my	 research,	 I	 have	 analysed	 referendum	 strategies	 in	 five	 established Western 






A	second	direction	 for	 future	 research	 is	 guided	by	new	 referendums	 that	will	 likely	




discourse,	 which	 places	 mainstream	 parties	 on	 the	 defensive.	 Future	 research	 on	
referendums	should	therefore	focus	particularly	on	the	rising	success	of	populist	parties	
and	their	impact	on	referendum	use	and	discourse.	






















SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
HET VOLK OF DE VORST 
DE	POLITIEK	VAN	HET	GEBRUIK	VAN	REFERENDA	IN	EUROPESE	DEMOCRATIEËN	
In	 de	 afgelopen	 decennia	 is	 er	 vanuit	 de	 academische	 wereld,	 zowel	 in	 Europa	 als	
daarbuiten,	 steeds	 meer	 aandacht	 uitgegaan	 naar	 referenda.	 Deze	 interesse	 wordt	
gevoed	 door	 een	 toegenomen	 aantal	 nationale	 referenda	 in	 de	 lidstaten	 van	 de	
Europese	Unie	 (EU)	met	name	 sinds	de	 jaren	90.	Veel	 referenda	 zijn	 gehouden	over	
het	lidmaatschap	van	de	EU	en	EU-verdragswijzigingen.	Hoewel	het	enthousiasme	van	
regeringsleiders	 over	 referenda	 duidelijk	 was	 afgenomen	 nadat	 zowel	 de	 Franse	 als	



















door	 middel	 van	 vertegenwoordiging	 naar	 besluitvorming	 door	 middel	 van	 directe	




daadwerkelijk	 te	 vertegenwoordigen,	 waardoor	 belangrijke	 besluiten	 onvoldoende	









markeert.	 Ten	 tweede	 de	 veronderstelling	 dat	 deze	 verschuiving	wordt	 veroorzaakt	
door	een	normatieve	overtuiging	dat	belangrijke	beslissingen	direct	door	de	bevolking	
gelegitimeerd	 dienen	 te	 worden.	 Drie	 vragen	 staan	 centraal	 in	 mijn	 onderzoek:	









onderzoek	 doen	 naar	 het	 bestaan	 van	 referendumwetgeving	 en	 de	 mate	 waarin	
referenda	zijn	gehouden.	 In	mijn	onderzoek	betrek	 ik	alleen	referenda	die	gehouden	
zijn	 op	nationaal	 niveau,	 aangezien	 regionale	 en	 lokale	 referenda	een	 fundamenteel	
ander	 karakter	 hebben.	 Om	 de	 derde	 onderzoeksvraag	 te	 kunnen	 beantwoorden,	
kijk	 ik	naar	de	 impact	van	zowel	structurele	 factoren	als	politieke	agency,	Een	derde	
doelstelling	van	mijn	onderzoek	is	daarom	te	onderzoeken	met	welke	motieven	politici	
referenda	houden,	waarbij	ik	een	onderscheid	maak	tussen	norm-gedreven	en	rationele	
motieven.	 Een	 laatste	 doelstelling	 is	 het	 verklaren	 van	 internationale	 verschillen	 in	
nationale	referendumwetgeving	en	–gebruik.	




waarmee	 referenda	 zijn	 gehouden	 in	 vijf	 landen,	 te	 weten	 Frankrijk,	 Denemarken,	
het	 Verenigd	 Koninkrijk,	 Zweden	 en	 Nederland.	 Eerst	 vergelijk	 ik	 Frankrijk	 met	
Denemarken	(hoofdstuk	5);	twee	landen	waar	de	grondwet	bepalingen	bevat	voor	het	
houden	 van	 nationale	 referenda	 en	waar	 referenda	 relatief	 vaak	 zijn	 gehouden.	 Dit	
zijn	twee	landen	met	een	verschillende	politiek-institutionele	context:	Frankrijk	is	een	
meerderheidsdemocratie	terwijl	Denemarken	een	consensusdemocratie	is.	Door	middel	








met	 Zweden	 (hoofdstuk	 6);	 eveneens	 landen	 met	 nationale	 referendumwetgeving,	






referendum	gehouden	 is.	Deze	selectie	van	 landen	stelt	mij	 tevens	 in	staat	(impliciet	
in	hoofdstuk	8)	 een	vergelijkend	onderzoek	 te	doen	naar	 institutioneel	 vergelijkbare	




Het	 argument	 dat	 referenda	 worden	 gehouden	 om	 tekortkomingen	 van	 de	
vertegenwoordigende	 democratie	 te	 compenseren,	 komt	 voort	 uit	 een	 neiging	 het	
referendum	puur	als	instrument	van	de	directe	democratie	te	beschouwen.	Als	zodanig	




theoretische	 onverenigbaarheid	 dikwijls	 als	 uitgangspunt	 om	 te	 beargumenteren	
dat	 referenda	 de	 legitimiteit	 van	 volksvertegenwoordigers	 ondermijnen.	 Echter,	




en	 de	 representatieve	 democratie	 geen	 recht	 doet	 aan	 de	 verscheidenheid	 in	
referendumtypes,	-procedures	en	-gebruik	in	Europese	democratieën.	
In	hoofdstuk	2	presenteer	ik	een	classificatie	van	referenda	op	basis	van	twee	politiek-
theoretische	 dimensies.	 De	 eerste	 dimensie	 onderscheidt	 de	 liberaal-democratische	
notie	 van	 representatieve	 besluitvorming	 van	 de	 klassiek-democratische	 notie	
















Op	 basis	 van	 dit	 criterium	 onderscheid	 ik	 vijf	 verschillende	 typen	 referenda:	 1)	
parlementaire	 meerderheidsreferenda	 (getriggerd	 door	 een	 meerderheid	 van	
volksvertegenwoordigers);	 2)	 presidentiële	 referenda	 (getriggerd	door	de	president);	














gevallen	 bepaalt	 de	 regering	 echter	 of	 ‘verplichte’	 volksraadplegingen	 daadwerkelijk	
gehouden	moeten	worden.	
De	plaatsing	van	verschillende	typen	referenda	in	het	tweedimensionale	kader	is	ook	




wordt	 beperkt	 wanneer	 referenda	 louter	 adviserend	 zijn	 en	 alleen	 in	 uitzonderlijke	
gevallen	gehouden	kunnen	worden.	De	invloed	van	burgers	is	ook	kleiner	wanneer	er	
een	opkomstdrempel	van	toepassing	 is.	 In	zulke	gevallen	wordt	de	uitkomst	van	een	
referendum	 niet	 simpelweg	 bepaald	 door	 een	 gewone	 meerderheid	 van	 stemmen,	








vertegenwoordigen	 om	 een	 voorstel	 goed	 te	 keuren	 (of	 te	 verwerpen).	 Referenda	
met	 drempels	 bieden	 derhalve	 meer	 bescherming	 aan	 minderheidsstandpunten	
dan	 referenda	 zonder	 drempels.	 Daarmee	 zijn	 dus	 niet	 alle	 referenda	 een	 pure	
weerspiegeling	van	de	twee	noties	die	ten	grondslag	liggen	aan	de	directe	democratie:	
volkssoevereiniteit	 en	het	meerderheidsbeginstel.	 Sommige referenda versterken de 
directe	participatie	van	het	Volk,	terwijl	andere	referenda	de	positie	van	de	politieke	
meerderheid	 versterken,	 meestal	 de	 uitvoerende	 macht	 ofwel	 Machiavelli’s	 Vorst.	
Sommige	 referenda	 onderstrepen	 primair	 het	 meerderheidsbeginsel,	 terwijl	 andere	
referenda	meer	ruimte	bieden	voor	het	beschermen	van	minderheidsstandpunten.	
EEN	VERSCHUIVING	VAN	DE	VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE	NAAR	DE	DIRECTE	DEMOCRATIE?
Dit	 onderscheid	 is	 belangrijk	 in	 een	 onderzoek	 naar	 de	 beschikbaarheid	 van	
referendumwetgeving	 in	 Europa	 en	 het	 daadwerkelijke	 referendumgebruik.	 Mijn	
onderzoek	 laat	 zien	 dat	 in	 alle	 24	 EU-landen	 waar	 de	 grondwet	 bepalingen	 bevat	
voor	het	gebruik	van	nationale	referenda,	referenda	getriggerd	kunnen	worden	door	
politici	(parlementariërs	of	de	president),	terwijl	in	slechts	tien	EU-landen,	voornamelijk	
in	 Centraal-	 en	 Oost-Europa,	 referenda	 getriggerd	 kunnen	 worden	 door	 burgers.	
In	 20	 EU-landen	 bepaalt	 de	 grondwet	 dat	 de	 politieke	 meerderheid	 (parlementaire	
of	presidentiële)	 referenda	kan	uitschrijven,	 terwijl	 in	 slechts	elf	 -	 vooral	 consensus-	
–	 democratieën	 parlementaire	 minderheden	 dit	 kunnen	 doen.	 Zelfs	 bij	 de	 meeste	
‘verplichte’	 referenda	 bepaalt	 de	 regering	 uiteindelijk	 of	 het	 referendum	 doorgang	
vindt	 of	 niet.	 Daarom	 concludeer	 ik	 in	mijn	 proefschrift	 dat,	 hoewel	 er	 slechts	 vier	
EU	 landen	 zijn	 waar	 de	 grondwet	 geen	 bepalingen	 bevat	 voor	 het	 houden	 van	
nationale	 referenda,	 er	 geen	 sprake	 is	 van	 een	 substantiële	 EU-brede	 verschuiving	
van	de	vertegenwoordigende	naar	de	directe	democratie	in	termen	van	het	karakter	
van	beschikbare	 referendumwetgeving:	 over	 het	 algemeen	 ligt	 de	 controle	 over	 het	
referendumproces,	 en	 daarmee	 het	 besluitvormingsproces,	 in	 de	 handen	 van	 de	
regerende	meerderheid.
Het	onderscheid	is	nog	belangrijker	wanneer	het	gaat	om	het	daadwerkelijke	gebruik	
van	 referenda.	 In	 de	 meeste	 lidstaten	 worden	 referenda	 slechts	 bij	 uitzondering	
gehouden.	 Het	 toegenomen	 aantal	 referenda	 in	 de	 EU	 als	 geheel	 is	 dan	 ook	 vooral	
toe	te	schrijven	aan	frequent	gebruik	van	referenda	in	een	beperkt	aantal	landen,	met	




over	 constitutionele	 kwesties	 waarover	 politieke	 partijen	 intern	 verdeeld	 waren.	
Door	 burgers	 direct	 over	 zulke	 controversiële	 kwesties	 te	 laten	 beslissen,	 konden	
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Europese	landen,	zijn	relatief	veel	volksreferenda	gehouden,	maar	ook	deze	zijn	in	de	
eerste	plaats	instrumenten	in	handen	van	politieke	partijen.	In	de	overige	15	lidstaten	
werden,	zo	toont	mijn	onderzoek	aan,	34	van	de	38	optionele referenda uitgeschreven 
door	 een	 parlementaire	meerderheid	 of	 de	 president.	 Het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	
de	EU-lidstaten	markeert	dus	geenszins	een	verschuiving	naar	de	directe	democratie,	







Om	 deze	 vraag	 te	 beantwoorden,	 onderzoek	 ik	 zes	 aannames	 over	 de	 mogelijke	
factoren	 die	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 beïnvloeden.	 Deze	 aannames	 komen	 voort	
uit	 vier	 stromingen	 in	 de	 institutionele	 theorie:	 het	 klassiek	 institutionalisme,	 het	
historisch	 institutionalisme,	 het	 sociologisch	 institutionalisme	en	het	 rationele-keuze	
institutionalisme.	 Vanuit	 het	 klassiek	 institutionalisme	 onderzoek	 ik	 in	 welke	 mate	
referenda	 ‘passen’	 binnen	 de	 algemene	 politiek-institutionele	 context.	 Vanuit	 het	
historisch	 institutionalisme	 onderzoek	 ik	 de	 rol	 van	 ‘padafhankelijkheid’	 in	 politieke	













uit	 dat	 het	 al	 dan	 niet	 invoeren	 van	 referendumwetgeving	 meestal	 het	 resultaat	 is	
van	een	strijd	om	de	politieke	macht	 tussen	oppositiepartijen	enerzijds	–	die	menen	
dat	 zij	 hierdoor	 hun	 politieke	 invloed	 kunnen	 vergroten	 –	 en	 de	 regerende	 partijen	
anderzijds	 –	 die	 over	 het	 algemeen	 tegen	 de	 invoering	 van	 referendumwetgeving	
















van	 referenda.	 Europese	 kwesties	 hebben	 de	 neiging	 de	 traditionele	 politieke	
scheidslijnen	te	doorsnijden,	met	name	in	de	‘oude’	EU-lidstaten.	Als	zodanig	hebben	
veel	gevestigde	politieke	partijen	moeite	met	het	 integreren	van	EU-kwesties	 in	hun	












electorale	 succes	 van	 populistische	 partijen.	 Deze	 partijen	 pleiten	 met	 name	 voor	
referenda	over	soevereiniteitskwesties	en	immigratie.	Ze	benadrukken	dat	de	‹gewone	
burgers›	steeds	meer	vervreemd	zijn	van	de	politieke	elite	als	gevolg	van	een	verlies	
van	nationale	 soevereiniteit	 aan	de	EU	en	 toenemende	 immigratie.	Dit	 zijn	 kwesties	
waarover	 ‘het	 establishment’	 doorgaans	 niet	 tot	 een	 eenduidig	 standpunt	 komt	 en	




In	 de	 publiekelijke	 rechtvaardiging	 van	 referenda,	 verwijzen	 politici	 vaak	 naar	 de	
noodzaak	dat	beslissingen	over	belangrijke	onderwerpen	als	soevereiniteitsoverdracht	of	
grondwetswijzigingen	rechtstreeks	door	het	volk	worden	gelegitimeerd.	Met	betrekking	
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zullen	bijdragen	aan	het	verminderen	van	het	vermeende	 ‹democratisch	 tekort›	 van	
de	EU.	Hoewel	dergelijke	normatieve	argumenten	 inderdaad	de	 rol	 van	 referenda	 in	
het	debat	 vergroten,	hebben	 ze	niet	 tot	 gevolg	dat	 referenda	daadwerkelijk	worden	
gehouden.		Opvallend	is,	zo	laat	mijn	onderzoek	zien,	dat	de	actoren	die	een	referendum	
over	een	bepaald	onderwerp	rechtvaardigden	met	dergelijke	normatieve	argumenten,	
deze	 argumenten	 gemakkelijk	 loslieten	wanneer	 een	 referendum	niet	 in	 hun	belang	
was.	Een	duidelijk	voorbeeld	is	dat	geen	enkele	lidstaat	behalve	Ierland	een	referendum	
heeft	gehouden	over	het	Verdrag	van	Lissabon	(getekend	in	2007),	terwijl	verschillende	









vanuit	de	bevolking.	Nog	belangrijker	 is	het	 feit	dat	we	simpelweg	niet	weten	of	 (en	
welke)	burgers	willen	stemmen	in	referenda	en	in	wat	voor	soort	referenda.	Dit	komt	
doordat	er	een	gebrek	is	aan	longitudinale	en	vergelijkbare	opiniedata	over	referenda.	





Hoewel	 het	 rationele-keuze	 institutionalisme	 ons	 in	 staat	 stelt	 te	 begrijpen	waarom	
politici	 besluiten	 een	 referendum	 te	 organiseren,	 kan	 het	 niet	 volledig	 verklaren	
waarom	 referenda	 in	 sommige	 landen	 vaker	 worden	 gehouden	 dan	 in	 andere	
landen.	 Dit	 vereist	 bovenal	 een	 begrip	 van	 de	 institutionele	 en	 historische	 context	
van	 deze	 landen.	 In	 de	 eerste	 plaats	 is	 het	 karakter	 van	 de	 referendumwetgeving	
dat	 in	 een	 land	 beschikbaar	 is	 sterk	 verankerd	 in	 de	 democratische	 traditie	 van	 dit	
land.	 Parlementaire	 minderheidsreferenda	 en	 volksreferenda	 komen	 bijvoorbeeld	
vaker	 voor	 in	 consensusdemocratieën	 dan	 in	 meerderheidsdemocratieën.	 Dit	
is	 logisch	 omdat	 zulke	 referenda	 meer	 ruimte	 bieden	 voor	 het	 integreren	 van	
minderheidsstandpunten	 in	 de	 besluitvorming,	 hetgeen	 ten	 grondslag	 ligt	 aan	 de	
consensusdemocratie.	 Referenda	 in	 consensusdemocratieën	 hebben	 bovendien,	
vooral	 wanneer	 deze	 getriggerd	worden	 door	 een	 parlementaire	minderheid	 of	 het	
electoraat,	 meestal	 een	 opkomst-,	 goedkeurings-,	 of	 afkeuringsdrempel.	 Omdat	 in	







toegepast	 in	meerderheidsdemocratieën,	 zoals	 het	 Verenigd	 Koninkrijk	 en	 Frankrijk.	
Tot	 slot,	 van	 de	 weinige	 meerderheidsdemocratieën	 in	 de	 EU,	 ontbreekt	 alleen	 in	
Griekenland	 en	 Cyprus	 wetgeving	 voor	 verplichte	 referenda.	 Verplichte	 referenda	
maken	 het	 de	 regering	 moeilijker	 om	 grote	 institutionele	 wijzigingen	 (bijvoorbeeld	
grondwetswijzigingen)	 door	 te	 voeren.	 Ongetwijfeld	 is	 een	 dergelijk	 referendum	
noodzakelijker	 in	 meederheidsdemocratieën	 dan	 in	 consensusdemocratieën,	 omdat	
grote	 institutionele	wijzigingen	 in	meederheidsdemocratieën	 anders	 zouden	worden	
doorgevoerd	met	een	gewone	meerderheid	van	stemmen.
Het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 (of	 de	 invoering	 van	 referendumwetgeving)	 wordt	 ook	
beïnvloed	door	het	aantal	actoren	die	nodig	zijn	om	een	referendum	uit	te	schrijven	
(of	 referendumwetgeving	 aan	 te	 nemen)	 en	 die	 referenda	 dus	 mogelijk	 kunnen	





electoraat	 (Italië),	de	president	 (Frankrijk),	of	de	grondwet	 (Ierland	en	Denemarken).	
Referenda	worden	minder	vaak	gehouden	in	landen	waar	een	referendum	vrijwel	alleen	
kan	 worden	 uitgeschreven	 door	 de	 parlementaire	 meerderheid,	 zoals	 het	 Verenigd	
Koninkrijk.	Maar	hoewel	 het	 aantal	 vetospelers	bepalend	 is	 voor	de	 speelruimte	die	
actoren	hebben	 in	het	 implementeren	van	 referendumwetgeving	of	het	houden	van	
referenda,	worden	zulke	beslissingen	toch	vooral	gedreven	door	politieke	voorkeuren	
en	 belangen.	 Bijvoorbeeld,	 door	 de	 rigiditeit	 van	 de	 Nederlandse	 Grondwet	 en	 de	
hoge	 mate	 van	 fragmentatie	 van	 het	 Nederlandse	 partijenstelsel,	 zijn	 invloedrijke	
referendumtegenstanders	 er	 herhaaldelijk	 in	 geslaagd	 referendumwetgeving	 te	
blokkeren.	Een	groot	aantal	vetospelers	verklaart	ook	waarom	referenda	in	Nederland	
nauwelijks	 zijn	 gehouden.	 Het	 referendum	 over	 de	 Europese	 Grondwet,	 gehouden	
in	 2005,	 werd	 gehouden	 omdat	 potentiële	 vetospelers	 een	 belang	 hadden	 bij	 de	
volksraadpleging.
Het	 begrijpen	 van	 de	 debatten	 over	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden	 is	 belangrijk	 om	
huidige	 debatten	 te	 kunnen	 duiden.	 Het	 verband	 tussen	 ervaring	 met	 referenda	 in	
het	verleden	en	het	huidige	gebruik	van	referenda	verschilt	echter	van	land	tot	land.	
Ervaring	met	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden	 is	 geen	 garantie	dat	 referenda	 later	worden	
geïnstitutionaliseerd	of	gebruikt.	Een	voorbeeld	is	Nederland,	waar		in	de	late	achttiende	
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dictatoriale	 referenda	de	 reden	 is	dat	nationale	 referenda	nauwelijks	 een	 rol	 spelen	
in	de	hedendaagse	politiek.	Daarnaast	is	er	een	aantal	landen,	zoals	Italië,	Letland	en	
Litouwen,	waar	volksreferenda	en	parlementaire	minderheidsreferenda	zijn	ingevoerd	
om	 te	 breken	met	 het	 dictatoriale	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	 het	 verleden.	 Echter,	 in	
Portugal	en	Roemenië,	 kunnen	 referenda	nog	 steeds	worden	uitgeschreven	door	de	
president,	ondanks	hun	verleden	van	dictatoriaal	gebruik	van	referenda.
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zien	 dat	 dit	 niet	 het	 geval	 is.	 In	 de	meeste	 EU-landen	 is	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	
beperkt	 tot	 eenmalige	 gebeurtenissen,	 zoals	 de	 hervorming	 van	 de	 grondwet,	 EU-
lidmaatschap,	 en/of	 herziening	 van	 EU-verdragen.	 Referenda	 zijn	 daarnaast	 zelden	












Hoewel	 de	meeste	 referendumonderzoekers	 toegeven	 dat	 er	 verschillen	 zijn	 tussen	
referenda,	 en	 tussen	 het	 gebruik	 ervan	 in	 verschillende	 landen,	 gaan	 zij	 over	 het	
algemeen	 mee	 in	 het	 discours	 dat	 de	 vertegenwoordigende	 democratie	 door	 het	
gebruik	van	 referenda	aan	verandering	onderhevig	 is,	en	dat	dit	een	direct	gevolg	 is	
van	 veranderende	 politieke	 waarden	 en	 vraag	 naar	 referenda	 vanuit	 de	 bevolking.	
Ik	 beargumenteer	 in	 mijn	 proefschrift	 dat	 een	 dergelijk	 discours	 geen	 inzicht	 biedt	
in	 het	werkelijke	 karakter	 van	 het	 gebruik	 van	 referenda	 in	 Europa.	 Sterker	 nog,	 de	
strategische	 rol	 van	 referenda	wordt	 dikwijls	 verbloemd	 door	 de	 sterke	 normatieve	
aantrekkingskracht	van	referenda.	Het	ontrafelen	van	referendumstrategieën	is	daarom	
cruciaal	om	het	effect	van	referenda	op	de	democratische	besluitvorming	te	begrijpen.











Een	 tweede	 richting	 voor	 toekomstig	 onderzoek	 is	 gekoppeld	 aan	mogelijke	 nieuwe	
referenda	 in	 de	 (nabije)	 toekomst,	 met	 name	 over	 prangende	 Europese	 kwesties,	
zoals	 de	 schulden-	 en	migratiecrises	 en	mogelijke	 EU-uittredingen.	 Het	 onvermogen	
van	gevestigde	politieke	partijen	om	een	duidelijk	 standpunt	 in	 te	nemen	over	deze	





Een	 laatste	 en	 noodzakelijke	 onderzoeksrichting	 voor	 de	 toekomst	 is	 diepgaand	
onderzoek	naar	de	publieke	opinie	 ten	aanzien	van	 referenda.	 In	het	publieke	debat	
wordt	vaak	benadrukt	dat	‘het	volk’	de	wens	heeft	te	kunnen	stemmen	in	referenda.	
Ik	wilde	deze	veronderstelling	in	mijn	proefschrift	onderzoeken,	maar	ik	stuitte	op	een	
gebrek	 aan	 vergelijkende	opiniedata.	We	weten	hierdoor	 simpelweg	niet	 of	 en	welk	
deel	 van	 de	 kiezers	 referenda	 steunen,	 waarom	 ze	 dat	 doen,	 hoe	 sterk	 deze	 steun	
is	 en	 of	 zulke	 steun	 toe-	 of	 afneemt.	We	weten	 ook	 niet	 hoe	 burgers	 verschillende	
soorten	referenda	ervaren,	noch	wat	zij	vinden	van	de	wijze	waarop	referenda	in	hun	
land	worden	gehouden.	Referenda	worden	over	het	algemeen	uitgeschreven,	dan	wel	
gestuurd,	 door	 de	 actoren	 (de	 regering	 of	 politieke	 partijen	 in	 het	 algemeen)	 tegen	
wie	de	politieke	ontevredenheid	 is	gericht.	Daarom	kunnen	 referenda	misschien	wel	
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After the French and Dutch public rejected the European Constitution in 
2005, enthusiasm for referendums declined markedly among political 
leaders in Europe. Today, however, they are back on the agenda, with 
EU-related referendums being held in Greece in July 2015 on the country’s 
bailout deal, in Denmark in December 2015 on its opt-out from the EU area 
of freedom, security and justice, in the Netherlands in April 2016 on the EU’s 
Association Agreement with Ukraine, and in the UK in June 2016 on Brexit.
 
In this book, Saskia Hollander demonstrates that the generally assumed 
dichotomy between referendums and representative democracy does not 
do justice to the diversity of types of referendum and how they are used in 
EU countries. Although in all referendums citizens vote directly on issues 
rather than letting their political representatives do this for them, some 
referendums are more direct than others. Rather than reflecting the direct 
power of the People, most referendums in EU countries are held by, and 
serve the interest of, the political elites, most notably the executive – i.e. the 
Machiavellian Prince.
This book places political agency as central to referendum research. It 
argues that referendums are called because political actors have an interest 
in doing so, and that their interests rarely match the justifications given in 
the public debate. Instead of being driven by the need to compensate for 
the deficiency of political parties, political actors use referendums primarily 
to protect the position of their party. In unravelling the strategic role played 
by national referendums in decision-making, this book makes an 
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